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Abstract 
This thesis investigates three aspects of Lebanese banking: Bank Perfonnance, Bank 
Capital and Bank Mergers. The first chapter tackles the issue of bank perfonnance, with focus 
on the differences between domestic and foreign banks. We study panel data of almost the 
entire population of Lebanese banks between 1993 and 2003 to analyse the (different) 
detenninants of domestic and foreign banks' profitability. Using the Fixed Effects Regression 
Model, we find that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic ones and factors that 
shape a domestic bank's profitability are different from those of a foreign bank, mainly the 
macroeconomic variables. Moreover, we find that subsidiaries of foreign banks perfonn better 
than domestic banks acquired by foreign banks. The second chapter tests the applicability of 
some bank capital theories. Specifically, the Too-Big-To-Fail, the signalling, and the 
cyclicality of bank capital theories. Besides, we test the importance of market capital 
requirements vs. regulatory capital requirements. We use a panel of data from almost all the 
population of commercial Lebanese banks between 1993 and 2003. We split the panel data 
"horizontally" (according to bank ownership) and "vertically" (by time), and fmd that the 
above mentioned theories are applicable in certain conditions and circumstance. The Too-Big-
To-Fail hypothesis emerges with tighter capital requirements, foreign banks do not "signal" 
using their capital level and foreign bank capital is not cyclical, etc ... The third chapter deals 
with bank mergers in emerging markets. We are interested in: (1) finding the motives behind 
bank mergers, and (2) detecting the outcome of bank mergers. We study the merger 
experience in the Lebanese banking sector, which has witnessed a large number of bank 
mergers. We find that mergers in emerging markets are driven by the will of large healthy 
banks to acquire small underperfonning banks. Additionally, we find that the regulatory 
authorities play an important role in this process. Bank mergers do have a constructive effect 
on consolidated entities as there is an improvement in profitability and efficiency, but the 
credit risk deteriorates. 
v 
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1 Chapter One: An Overview of the Lebanese 
Banking System 
9 
1.1 Introduction 
The Lebanese economy is a typical model of an open and service-oriented economy I 
with extensive links abroad, an unrestricted exchange and trade system, free access to foreign 
investment and perfect capital and labour mobility. The banking sector is the centrepiece of 
the Lebanese economy, and banks represent a very active segment because of the limited role 
of other financial intermediaries. Prior to the civil war (1975-1990), the Lebanese banking 
sector was the most advanced banking sector in the Middle East, but it has been seriously 
affected by the war, as were all other sectors. By the end of 1990, banks were lagging behind 
in terms of infrastructures and services (as a result of 15 years of war and partial isolation 
from international financial markets), their capitalisation levels dropped dramatically and their 
assets and liabilities became highly dollarised after the severe depreciation of the Lebanese 
currency in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since early 1990s, the banking sector has been 
implementing restructuring and modernisation programmes and procedures, along with 
increasing capital, service diversification, debt issuing, and mergers and acquisitions. As a 
result, the sector has overcome most of its problems, grown at fast rates and become capable 
of regaining its leading position in the region. Moreover, the sector has witnessed the return of 
foreign banks, and the establishment of investment banks to pursue development of the 
domestic emerging capital market. 
At the end of 2004, there were 54 commercial banks and 10 investment banks 
operating in the Lebanese market. These banks can be classified into three categories: (1) 
domestic banks with majority domestic control, (2) domestic banks with majority foreign 
control and (3) subsidiaries of foreign banks. 2 Also, there were representative offices of 16 
foreign banks, and there were 33 other fmancial institutions, 9 brokerage institutions, and 3 
leasing institutions operating in the Lebanese market. The banking sector employs about 1.2% 
1 The Lebanese economy is based mainly on the service sector, which accounts for about 60% ofGDP. The main 
components of the service sector are the commerce, the tourism and the financial services. Source: the Lebanese 
Ministry of Finance. 
2 The classification of these banks according to their ownership will be illustrated in detail in the following 
chapter. 
10 
of the total domestic workforce and contributes about 5% of GD P. More than 80% of the total 
assets of the banking sector are invested domestically. 34 
The Lebanese banking system has several features that represent advantages among the 
other banking systems in the Middle East. These features are: 
a- Free exchange system and free movement of capital and earnings. 
b- The banking secrecy law, which was implemented in 1956, affected all banks established 
in Lebanon, as well as foreign banks' branches. According to this law, all bank managers 
and employees who are exposed to the banks' activities, cannot reveal what they know 
concerning their clients' names, assets or holdings to any party whatsoever, whether 
individuals or public authorities. 
c- Money laundering law: because the banking secrecy law could be used as a mean for 
illegal operations (money laundering particularly), the Association of Banks in Lebanon 
(ABL) has set up a Due Diligence Convention. With respect to the law of banking secrecy, 
this law aims at preventing money-laundering operations. 
d- The free banking zone, which was established in 1975, grants the government the right to 
exempt non residents' deposits and liabilities in foreign currency from: 
• The income tax on interest earned, 
• The required reserves imposed by the central bank, and 
• The deposit guarantee premium imposed on bank deposits by the National Deposits 
Guarantee system. 
e- The openness to foreign banking: the Lebanese market is very open to foreign banks and 
has a long history of foreign banking. Foreign banks can receive deposits from the public 
and perform credit operations, fiduciary operations and portfolio management on the 
behalf of other parties. Besides foreign banks can carry out brokerage activities, without 
intermediation, on the floor of the Beirut Stock Exchange. 5 
3 Source: the Association of Banks in Lebanon, the Annual Report. 
4 The main sectors of the economy and their participation in the GDP are approximately as follow: Agriculture 
(6.3%), Manufacturing (13.5%), Construction (9.4%), Market services (22.6%), Trade (21.3%), Non-market 
services (11.6%). Source: the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. 
S On the other hand, foreign banks are prohibited from: (1) carrying out industrial or commercial activities or any 
activity other than banking, (2) participating, in any form, in industrial, commercial or agricultural institutions or 
any other institutions except within the limits of the private funds, (3) carrying out, on its behalf, any operation on 
11 
The banking sector is controlled and regulated by the central bank (Banque du Liban) 
which imposes the necessary prudential rules related to capital adequacy, asset quality, 
liquidity, profitability, management efficiency and effectiveness. The central bank coordinates 
its activities with the Banking Control Commission (BCC) to implement banking regulations 
and supervision. The central bank imposes the rules and regulations, and the BCC supervises 
the business, ensures the banks comply with the appropriate rules and regulations, and reports 
to the Central Council of the central bank about the status of operating banks especially the 
one(s) that are not in accordance with applied regulations. The Central Council has the 
authority to withdraw a license and remove a bank from the central bank's official list and its 
decisions are unchangeable and definitive. 
The above cited features make the Lebanese banking system somewhat different from 
the other banking systems in the region and the other emerging markets generally. Thus, it is 
interesting studying such a market in order to extract some conclusions that may help in 
setting investment and regulatory decisions, related mainly to foreign banking and bank 
mergers and acquisitions. 
1.2 The Evolution of the Lebanese Banking Sector After 1990 
It is important firstly to have a clear image of the market under study and understand 
its features and characteristics. In order to do that, we will look at the evolution of the whole 
banking sector during the period that will be studied later. As mentioned before, the civil war 
that occurred in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 had destructive effects on the domestic 
economy. The sectors of the Lebanese economy started to recover gradually after the war 
ended and the fastest one among them was the banking sector. However, from around 1993, 
banks started to overcome their problems. Some changed their structures and all worked on 
complying with the international standards of efficiency and capital adequacy. Thus, the 
period before 1993 could be considered as a transitionary period where most banks were still 
inefficient and undercapitalised. Therefore, in order to be able to extract useful lessons from 
derivatives, and (4) reducing the capital assigned for its investment, or buying back any part of it. Source: the 
Central bank of Lebanon. 
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the available data, the scope of our empirical analysis will cover the period from 1993 
onwards. However, we will use some data before 1993 for the third empirical chapters, which 
will help clarifying the situation of most small banks 6 at that period. In the following section, 
we will focus on the evolution of three main variables: total assets, capitalisation and fixed 
assets. In addition, the evolution of the sector's total assets will be compared to the evolution 
of the entire economy, proxied by GDP. 
1.2.1 The Evolution of Assets and Capitalisation 
The Lebanese banking sector has been growing at high rates by all tenns since the 
early 1990s. The evolution of the size of the sector represented by the consolidated balance 
sheet is shown in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1: 
Table 1.1: The Evolution of the Entire Sector Assets and Caoital ($ billion) 
Year Assets Growth rate Capital Growth rate Capital-to-asset (%) (%) ratio (%) 
1991 7.73 0.17 2.18 
1992 7.96 2.95 0.14 -14.77 1.80 
1993 10.99 38.07 0.26 80.99 2.36 
1994 14.75 34.13 0.41 58.11 2.78 
1995 18.21 23.46 0.72 74.97 3.94 
1996 23.96 31.60 l.25 74.41 5.23 
1997 29.88 24.73 l.96 56.37 6.55 
1998 36.49 22.11 2.40 22.59 6.58 
1999 40.45 10.83 2.67 11.07 6.59 
2000 45.03 1l.35 2.90 8.88 6.45 
2001 47.78 6.09 2.96 1.98 6.20 
2002 52.56 10.02 3.33 12.55 6.34 
2003 60.12 14.37 3.65 9.46 6.07 
2004 65.92 9.65 3.85 5.64 5.85 
Total growth 7.5X Total growth 22X (1991-2004) (1991-2004) 
Source: Banque du Liban. 
6 Banks operating in Lebanon are classified into four groups according to the amount of deposits they hold, and 
the threshold varies according to the growth of the total sector deposits. These groups are Alpha, Beta, Gamma 
and Delta. In 1992, the classification was as follows: Alpha group contained banks with deposits over $200 
million, Beta group contained banks with deposits between $50 and $200 million, Gamma group contained banks 
with deposits between $20 and $50 million and Delta group contained banks with deposits under $20 million. 
13 
We observe from Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 the "jumps" in the size of the Lebanese 
banking sector, where its total assets have increased more than 7 times during the last fourteen 
years. The considerable growth of assets was provoked mainly by the growth of deposits due 
to the increasing domestic and external confidence in the Lebanese banking system. The 
increase of deposits has allowed banks to augment their lending capacity, and expand their 
loans to the private and the public sector. Additionally, the capitalisation of the sector has 
increased about 22 times during this period. Note that the capitalisation growth rate was very 
high between 1993 and 1998, when the central bank required banks to boost their capital in 
order to enhance their solvency and meet the Basle Accord requirements. Another important 
remark is that capital accounts represented only 2.18% relative to total assets in 1992, and 
became more than 6% in 2003. This increase in capitalisation was mainly due to: 
1. The re-valuation of fixed assets. 
11. The admission of new shareholders to most of the banks and the changes of their 
ownership. 
111. The various credit instruments on the international financial markets. 
Figure 1.1: The Evolution of the Banking Sector Assets and Capitalisation 
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1.2.2 The Evolution of Fixed Assets 
Over the last 14 years, Lebanese banks have been heavily investing in developing and 
modernising their infrastructures, to regain their position in the region and face the 
increasingly competitive environment. They have invested heavily in IT and information 
systems, technology of exchange and data treatment, telecommunication systems, E-banking, 
and ATMs. Additionally, they have expanded their presence domestically and abroad by 
spreading their network of branches in the Lebanese market and the international markets. The 
following figure exhibits the evolution of fixed assets: 
Figure 1.2: The Evolution of the Banking Sector Fixed Assets 
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1.2.3 The Evolution of the Banking Sector Compared to the Entire Economy 
During the last decade, the Lebanese economy has witnessed significant changes, and 
moved from a "war economy" to one of reconstruction and development. The sectors of the 
economy that have been affected by the war, started, in early 1990s, to recover and overcome 
the structural problems caused by the war. The biggest and most active sector has been the 
15 
banking sector, which has grown at high rates, more than the economy as a whole and more 
than any other sector. Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of the sector compared to GDP. 
Additionally, relative to the size of the economy, the Lebanese banking sector is one of 
the largest in the world and is about 3.5 times the GDP. To get a better idea about this fact, 
note that this ratio was in some emerging markets, at the end of 2003 as follow: 0.44X in 
Greece, 0.68X in Turkey, 1.69X in Israel, 1.21X in Thailand, 0.66X in Indonesia, and 2.33X 
in Singapore. 7 
This "large" size of the Lebanese banking sector allows it to play a dominant role 
among the other sectors of the economy. This "excess capacity" of the banking sector has 
forced Lebanese banks to expand their activities internationally where 18 banks have 
considerable presence in 14 foreign countries, with very ambitious plans for large and medium 
sized banks to expand their activities internationally in the future. 
Figure 1.3: The Evolution of the Banking Sector Compared to GDP 
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7 Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, 2004 and the central banks of the cited countries. 
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1.3 The Characteristics of the Lebanese Banking Sector 
In the following sections, we will analyse the characteristics of the Lebanese banking 
sector, focusing on three issues: the overbanking, the concentration and the dollarisation of the 
sector. 
1.3.1 Overbanking 
The Lebanese banking system is potentially overbanked due to the existence of large 
number of banks (either Lebanese or foreign banks). 8 Many of these banks are small (in terms 
of total assets). Compared to other emerging markets, Lebanon seems heavily banked. For 
instance, the number of banks in some emerging markets is as follow: Republic of Korea (53), 
Thailand (30), Argentina (91), Brazil (165), Poland (81), Cyprus (14), Indonesia (133) and 
Singapore (110). 9 Besides, we have to take into consideration the wide differences in 
population and geographical surface between these countries and Lebanon. The existence of 
large number of banks competing in a narrow market restricts the opportunities of expanding 
their in-market operations. 
In order to solve this "problem" IO and reduce the number of banks operating in the 
Lebanese market and creating larger banking entities, the central bank has been encouraging 
bank mergers and acquisitions since early 1990s. A law was passed in 1992 aiming at 
8 It is not simple to detennine what the "appropriate" number of banks for a certain market is. However, by 
comparing the number of banks in different markets, we can "assume" that a country is "crowded" or not in tenns 
of banks operating in that country. 
9 End of year 2004 figures. Source: the central banks' websites of cited countries. 
10 Several papers have addressed this issue and the potential problems that emerge in an overpopulated banking 
system. For instance, Pyle (2002) claims that the increased number of banks may damage the efficiency of loan 
markets, where the existence of many alternative sources for external financing for borrowers (i.e. banks), 
reduces their concern for building a reputation for creditworthiness with a single lender, and diminishes the 
potential self-enforcing agreements to sustain lending arrangement. The larger is the number of (competing) 
banks, the more likely is that they do not engage in costly screening and, as a consequence make more bad loans. 
Kuo and Lee (2003) illustrated the problems that emerged in Taiwan post-deregulation. In 1991, the Taiwan 
Ministry of Finance deregulated the establishment of new commercial banks in order to increase the competition 
between banks and to increase financial efficiency. Then, the number of financial institutions in Taiwan increased 
rapidly to overbanking. After the Asian crisis in 1997, the effects of overbanking emerged and affected the 
market structure: the quality of banks' assets worsened, interest spread and the profitability of banks decreased. 
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encouraging and facilitating bank consolidations and offering many incentives to merging 
banks. This issue will be subject to empirical analysis in the third chapter of this thesis, where 
we will assess the bank mergers experience in Lebanon as a model for bank mergers in 
emerging markets. 
1.3.2 Concentration 
Even though it is not expected that banks would be of similar sizes, there is a wide 
range among them in Lebanon. In fact, it could be claimed that few banks dominate the 
Lebanese banking sector, where the others have a very small market share and playa very 
moderate role in the national economy. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 clarify this situation: 
Figure 1.4: Asset Concentration 
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As a result, the Taiwanese government drafted the "Merger Law for Financial Institutions" in October 1999 in 
order to avoid financial crisi . 
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Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show that the five biggest banks dominate almost half of the 
Lebanese market in terms of assets and deposits, and the largest 10 banks represent about 70% 
of the market. Note that the concentration has increased due to the mergers that occurred 
during the last decade. 11 
1.3.3 Highly Dollarised 12 
Prior to the civil war, the Lebanese currency (the Lira) had been very stable, and this 
was the case until mid 1980s. But later, due to the severe economic problems that occurred, 
confidence in the Lebanese Lira as a mean for settlements and to be an effective medium for 
financial contracts was lost. Three related factors contributed to this: 
11 The concentration in the Lebanese banking system appears to be less than many other emerging market. A 
study by the IMF showed that in 2000 the concentration in some emerging markets (in tenns of largest ten banks 
deposit share) was as follow: Republic of Korea (77.7%), Malaysia (82.2%), Philippines (73 .3%), Thailand 
(79.4%), Argentina (80.7%), Brazil (85.6%), Chile (82%), Mexico (94.5%), Venezuela (75 .7%), Czech Republic 
(90.3%), Hungary (80.7%), Poland (77.7%) and Turkey (72%). Source: International Capital Market, IMF, 
2001. 
12 Although thi issue is not related directly to our study and it will not be a part of our empirical inve tigation , 
we ha e mentioned it here a one of the characteristic of the Lebanese banking sector only. 
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1. The value depreciation: in December 1984, the exchange rate was 8.9 LBPIUSD, when 
its value started to depreciate continuously to 530 LBPIUSD in December 1988 and to 
2,420 LBPIUSD in September 1992. 13 
11. The high rate of inflation, especially in the early 1990s. In 1992 the inflation rate was 
33% and jumped to 131% in 1993. 14 
111. The increased public debt (mainly in local currency) and the high budget deficit have 
weakened the confidence in the government monetary credibility and raised fears that 
the heavily indebted government may fmd it effective to reduce the debt's real value 
by depreciating the currency. These expectations have been a reason, always, for 
avoiding savings and lending in the Lebanese Pound. 
As a consequence, the U.S. dollar has become the currency of savings, and widely 
utilised in commercial settlements. As a part of the economy, the banking sector became 
highly dollarised as well. Below, we will look at deposits and loans dollarisation. 
1.3.3.1 Dollarisation of Deposits 
Although the exchange risk is controlled since 1993 and almost fixed since 1998, the 
level of dollarisation of deposits is still very high, because individuals and enterprises tend to 
deposit their savings in USD in order to secure them. Among the emerging markets, Lebanon 
seems to have one of the highest dollarised banking sectors as shown by the study of Honohan 
and Shi (2002). They ranked 25 emerging markets according to the level of their deposits 
dollarisation between 1990 and 2000 Lebanon was ranked the sixth among them. 15 The 
following figure shows the level of dollarisation of deposits: 
13 The government and the central bank could overcome this risk since 1993, and were able to prevent exchange 
rate fluctuations. Moreover, since 1998 the exchange rate was always around 1,500 LBPIUSD. 
14 Starting 1994 the inflation rate started to decline. It became (12.1%) in 1994, (9.9%) in 1995, (5.2%) in 1996, 
(3.5%) in 1997, (1.6%) in 1998, (1.4%) in 1999, (-0.9%) in 2000, (2.9%) in 2001, (4.2%) in 2002, (2.3%) in 2003 
and (2.5%) in 2004. Source: the Lebanese Ministry of Finance. 
15 The five countries that preceded Lebanon were Cambodia, Bolivia, Angola, Zaire and Georgia. 
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Figure 1.6: Dollarisation of Private Sector Deposits 
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1.3.3.2 Dollarisation of Loans 
-
-
o Total deposits 
• LBP deposits 
o Foreign currency deposits 
The high dollarisation of deposits is accompanied by high loan dollarisation. Lebanese 
banks tend to practice a very conservative policy to avoid foreign exchange risk although this 
risk is under the control of the central bank. This policy aims at decreasing the FOREX risk by 
decreasing the share of LBP loans to the private sector as shown in Figure 1.7. The 
dollarisation of loans is even higher than deposits rate, and it has not fallen below 80% during 
the period of study. Lebanese banks implement this policy although it reduces the interest 
income from the private sector lending, since LBP interest rates are higher than USD. 
Lebanese banks tend to use their deposits in LBP to invest in Lebanese T -bills, and the 
deposits in foreign currencies to make USD loans. 
A final remark is that the dollarisation of domestic and foreign banks funds is similar 
and the proportion of foreign currency deposits and loans are almost the same for the two 
categories. For instance, at the end 2003 the percentage of interest-earning assets in for ign 
currencies was 62.81 % for domestic banks and 64.59% for foreign banks. On the other hand 
the percentage of interest-bearing liabilities in foreign currencies was 64.97% for dome tic 
banks and 64.99% for foreign bank. 
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1.4 Motivations, the Importance of the Study and the Potential 
Extracted Lessons 
The above general outlook and analysis of the Lebanese banking system allows us to 
understand the type of market under study. It is an emerging market with an advanced banking 
system, which is in fact more advanced than all the other sectors of the economy. This banking 
system is subject to the international standards of banking practices, from regulation to capital 
solvency standards, to accounting and disclosures etc. It is open to foreign banking and the 
investment in domestic banks is allowed. A considerable number of Lebanese banks have 
presence abroad under the form of subsidiaries, branches or representative offices. Besides, 
the consolidation of banks is "welcome" by the regulatory authorities and incentives are 
offered to banks that wish to merger. 
What is important about such a case study? And what are the lessons that we can 
conclude from studying a banking sector like the Lebanese banking sector? Primarily we were 
interested in analysing three different topics in banking: (1) Bank Performance, (2) Bank 
Capital, and (3) Bank Mergers. In order to extract useful lessons from our research, we have to 
implement an appropriate case study with specific characteristics that help doing so. We 
believe that the characteristics of the Lebanese banking sector allow the extraction of many 
conclusions regarding the three topics that will be subject to empirical analysis. Firstly, the 
existence of considerable number and market share of foreign banks in Lebanon permits the 
comparison between the profitability of foreign banks operating in a market and the domestic 
banks of that "host" market. Secondly, again this existence of foreign banks in Lebanon allows 
analysing the capitalisation differences between them and the domestic banks. Moreover, the 
change in capital requirements that occurred in 1999 adds another motive for implementing 
this case study because we are interested in knowing the reaction of banks to new capital 
regulation, taking into consideration the ownership factor (i.e. domestic vs. foreign). Finally, 
regarding the bank mergers topic, Lebanon has witnessed the largest number of bank 
consolidations among the emerging markets. Therefore, it could provide a sufficient sample 
that when analysed, gives a picture of the motives and the consequences of bank 
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consolidations in emerging markets. Now, considering the research questionslhypotheses, the 
motives behind them are the following. 
In the first chapter (Bank Performance) we look at the performance differences 
between the domestic banks of an emerging market and the foreign banks operating in it. It is 
known - according to the literature - that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic 
banks due to several factors, such as their corporate governance amongst others. Most of the 
literature stops at this point: the efficiency differences (and their determinants) between 
domestic and foreign banks. Therefore, there are many other issues that do not have an 
empirical support. Among these things could be the following: could this efficiency 
superiority be translated in better profitability? 16 Besides, there are many other issues that 
could represent an interesting subj ect to investigate, and do not have any empirical evidence 
so far. These issues could be, for instance, (1) the effect of foreign ownership on domestic 
banks profitability, (2) the profitability differences between the subsidiaries of foreign banks 
and the domestic banks with foreign control, and (3) how the profitability of domestic banks 
and foreign banks is determined (similarly or differently?). In the first chapter of this thesis we 
will analyse these points empirically and try to find an answer for each of them. Lebanon is a 
good case study to investigate these issues since it has a significant presence (as mentioned 
before) of foreign banks, where almost half of the banking sector is dominated by foreign 
banks. 
In the second chapter (Bank Capital) we firstly follow the literature in analysing the 
determinants of bank capital. The literature has suggested several theories regarding bank 
capital and its determinants. We pool a group of domestic banks and foreign banks operating 
in the Lebanese banking sector for a period of 11 years and we find that these theories do hold. 
But what if we take into consideration some factors that could have an effect on the decision 
of banks to set their capital? We assume that these theories are applicable in certain conditions 
only, where some factors like the ownership of banks may prove the inapplicability of these 
theories or even lead to different ones. Thus, it is interesting to investigate if a domestic bank 
16 The first impression could be that better efficiency SHOULD be translated into better ｰｲｯｦｩｴ｡｢ｩｬｩｾＮ＠ ｈｯｷ･ｶ･ｾＬ＠
there are other factors that could offset it, e.g. the better knowledge of the market, the concentratIOn etc. ThiS 
issue will be explained in detail later. 
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sets its capital differently from a foreign bank and thus, whether the same theories on banking 
could be applicable for the two groups of banks indifferently. The main question regarding 
this issue is: what the determinants of a bank capital are, taking into consideration the 
differences between a domestic bank and a foreign bank. 
Another important issue regarding bank capital that the second chapter of this thesis 
will tackle: how banks react to newer - tighter - capital requirements. Again we do not have in 
the literature an empirical study that shows how banks react to new regulation, taking into 
consideration the ownership factor. We will try to fill this gap and find empirical evidence on 
how banks change their policy and "reshuffle their balance sheet items" to adopt the new 
capital requirement. We will try to find answers for these questions by analysing data on banks 
in Lebanon for the same reasons mentioned above. 
In the third chapter (Bank Mergers) we will analyse the bank mergers experience in 
Lebanon. A considerable body of literature has analysed bank mergers in different developed 
markets, but this will be the first study on bank mergers in an emerging market. Lebanon has 
witnessed the most number of bank mergers among all the emerging markets and thus, it could 
represent a good case study for such a subject. The literature on developed markets has shown 
the motives behind bank mergers and their outcomes. We will try to find out if the factors that 
motivate banks to consolidate in a developed market are the same in an emerging market. 
Moreover, we will try to detect the outcome of bank mergers in emerging markets. Thus, this 
study will fill a gap on bank consolidations in emerging markets since. One last remark 
regarding our case study is that the data set that will be analysed contains a group of assisted 
mergers whereas all the other studies have tackled different sets of unassisted mergers. 
This main body of the thesis is structured as follow: 
l. An introductory chapter, which includes the overview of the Lebanese banking system. 
2. Three empirical chapters, where each chapter tackles a different topic in banking. These 
three chapters are structured as follow: (1) each chapter will start by an introduction, (2) 
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followed by a review of the literature related to its topic, (3) from the literature we will extract 
the hypotheses that will be subject to empirical investigation, (4) an explanation of the 
methodology used and all the issues related to the specification of the models exploited, (4) an 
illustration of the data used and some analyses where this may help understanding better the 
empirical findings, (5) the empirical results and the interpretation of these results, (6) the 
conclusion of the chapter, (7) a summary of the empirical studies cited in the review of the 
literature, and (8) the appendices of the chapter. 
3. The conclusions of the thesis and the value added of this study. 
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2 Chapter Two: The Determinants of Domestic and 
Foreign Bank Profitability 
27 
Abstract 
We analyse and compare the profitability of almost the entire population of domestic 
and foreign banks operating in the Lebanese market between 1993 and 2003. Almost half of 
the banks are "foreign", i.e. they are either subsidiaries of foreign banks, or domestic banks 
with foreign control. To control for the effect of bank ownership on performance, we split the 
sample into three categories: (l) domestic banks with domestic control, (2) domestic banks 
with foreign control, and (3) foreign banks. We find that foreign banks were more profitable 
than all domestic banks regardless of their ownership control, i.e. whether domestic or foreign. 
This may suggest that it is better for a multinational bank to establish a subsidiarylbranch 
rather than acquiring an "existing player" in the host country. We also find that although they 
operate in the same market, domestic banks' and foreign banks' profitability determinants are 
different, i.e. factors that are important in shaping domestic banks' profitability are not 
necessary important for foreign banks and vice versa. Finally, we found that foreign banks are 
less affected by the macroeconomic factors of the host country than domestic banks. 
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2.1 Introduction: the Expansion of Foreign Banks 
Banks expand their operations internationally by establishing subsidiaries and branches 
or by taking over established foreign banks. This internationalisation of banking systems has 
been encouraged by the liberalisation of international financial markets. The increased 
presence of foreign banks in host markets raises two issues: (l) the effect of this presence on 
domestic banking systems and (2) the competition inequalities and differences in performance 
between foreign and domestic banks. The entrance of foreign banks may improve the quality 
and availability of financial services in the host market by increasing competition, enable 
better application of modem banking skills and technologies, encourage the development of 
the bank supervision and legal framework, and enhance a country's access to international 
capital markets. Claessens et al. (2001) argue that while foreign banks have lower overhead 
expenses, profitability and interest margins than domestic banks in developed countries, the 
opposite is true in developing ones. Besides, they found that the increased presence of foreign 
banks is associated with reductions of profitability, non-interest income and overall expenses 
of domestic banks and the competitive pressure from foreign banks leads to positive efficiency 
effects at domestic banks. Lensink and Hermes (2004) also claim that the entrance of foreign 
banks motivates domestic banks to enhance their efficiency and increase the diversity and 
quality of financial services in order to retain their market share. Additionally, foreign bank 
entry is associated with falling costs, profits and interest margins of domestic banks especially 
at higher economic development. Foreign bank entry also raises worries of destabilising 
effects especially in emerging markets, where a fast external financial liberalisation can be 
seen as a potential trigger for financial instabilities, and where relatively inefficient domestic 
banks may not be able to withstand competitive pressure, resulting in bankruptcies (Buch and 
Golder, 2001). This instability, according to Song (2004), could occur if foreign banks shift 
funds suddenly from one market to another for risk management purposes. 
It is interesting to analyse foreign bank performance, what determines it and how it 
differs from domestic bank performance. The different structure and characteristics of foreign 
and domestic banks on one hand, and the different influence of external factors on these banks 
on the other, could lead to performance differences between the two categories. Empirical 
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analysis of foreign and domestic bank performance will illustrate if the two groups of banks 
perform differently and the reasons behind the difference (i.e. the factors causing it). This may 
help clarify the necessary conditions for successful entry of multinational banks into foreign 
markets, and on the other hand, could assist in developing a regulatory framework for foreign 
bank entry and expansion. The Lebanese banking market has a substantial foreign bank 
presence. Foreign banks are almost half of the number of banks operating in the Lebanese 
market, and thus provide a good test case for understanding how and why bank performance 
varies according to ownership. 
The Lebanese banking sector has a long history of foreign participation. After the First 
World War and until the independence in 1946, the banking system in Lebanon was 
dominated by the presence of foreign banks, and a great proportion of funds was deposited 
with foreign banks abroad. These foreign banks focused on the financing of the foreign trade, 
leaving domestic financing to domestic banks. Starting with independence and continuing with 
the establishment of the central bank (Banque du Liban) in 1964, the banking system in 
Lebanon has witnessed continuous progress and rising prosperity. This development has 
promoted the establishment of more domestic banks, which has lead to a reduction of 
differences between foreign and domestic banks. The former lost their overwhelming 
monopoly power and the domestic banks became important players in the market. The 
Lebanese banking system remains very open to the entry of foreign banks and the acquisition 
of domestic banks by foreign banks/investors is permitted. At the end of 2003, 63 banks were 
operating in Lebanon. Among them, 21 were foreign banks (33% of banks) and 8 banks (13% 
of banks) were domestic banks with foreign control (i.e. majority foreign ownership), which 
leaves only 54% of banks with domestic control (total or majority control). Moreover, foreign 
banks control a considerable stake in the banking sector. For instance, among the top 10 banks 
(in terms of assets), the 5th and the 8th were foreign banks, the 6th and the 9th were domestic 
banks with foreign control. In terms of deposits, the 5th and the 9th were foreign, the 6th and the 
8th were domestic with foreign control. All these four banks controled about 30% of the assets 
and of the deposits among the top 10 banks. 
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2.2 Foreign Bank Entry and Expansion: Determinants 
A wide number of empirical studies have analysed the motives behind foreign bank 
entry and expansion. The aim was to understand why multinational banks "target" a certain 
market to establish subsidiaries, branches or representative offices, and the characteristics of 
bank "exporter" country and those of an "importer". On the other hand, the literature has tried 
to detect the differences between domestic and foreign banks in terms of structures and 
organisation and thus, if they should be subject to different regulation. 
On the determinants of foreign bank entry in the United States, Goldberg and Saunders 
(1981) and Hultman and McGee (1989) found that interest differential between the U.S. and 
foreign deposits and loans is the most important factor determining foreign bank presence and 
growth in the U.S. Grosse and Goldberg (1991) claim that foreign investment in the United 
States, foreign trade with the United States, and the size of the banking sector in the foreign 
country are positively correlated with the country's bank presence in the United States. They 
also found that, the greater the country risk of the source country, the more foreign banking 
appears to be allocated to the (relatively low-risk) U.S. market. Fisher and Molyneux (1996) 
replicated Grosse and Goldberg (1991) on the determinants of foreign bank entry and activity 
in London. They find firstly that banks' market size is one of the most significant factors of 
the origin country, suggesting that countries with large banking markets have the largest 
banking presence in London. They found additionally that a more stable country environment 
appears to attract foreign banks, implying that banks whose home countries are more risky 
than the UK will have more tendency to conduct business through London. Finally, they found 
that there is a strong relationship between the level of trade and foreign bank presence in 
London. Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) found a positive correlation between the size of a 
foreign bank and the GOP of its home country. Moreover, the GOP of the parent country is 
more important than the GOP of the host country in determining the size of the foreign bank. 
They argue that large economies are large exporters of banks. Williams (1998) studied the 
factors that distinguish between domestic and multinational banks operating in Australia, and 
the effect of these factors in determining the profits and size of foreign banks in Australia. He 
found that the size of the parent bank in the home country has a positive and significant effect 
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on the size of the foreign banle Also, Wright (2002) has the same finding: the size of the 
parent bank has a positive and significant effect on the subsidiary's size and the larger parents 
have larger subsidiaries in Australia. Clarke et al. (2001) say that banks that expand abroad are 
characterised by large size with large home-market share and superior efficiency. Minh and 
Tripe (2002) analysed the factors affecting the size of foreign bank subsidiaries in New 
Zealand. They found that the parent bank's size and its profitability have a positive impact on 
the foreign bank size: larger and more profitable multinational banks have the larger foreign 
subsidiaries in New Zealand. They also tested the effect of long-term presence of a foreign 
bank in a local market on its size and found that it has indeed a positive and significant effect 
on the size of its subsidiary, indicating that the specific experience of operating in a local 
market is an important factor in determining foreign bank's size (and profitability). On the 
decision of establishing a branch or a subsidiary in the host country, Ball and Tscheoegl 
(1982) analysed the effect of the parent bank's experience at operating internationally, its 
knowledge of the host country, the home country specific advantages and the distance between 
the host country and the parent's bank headquarters. They found that if the parent has already 
a presence in the host country, the other three factors were not important. Finally, Magri et al. 
(2004) studied the determinants of foreign bank entry and activity in Italy. Their results show 
that: (1) trade has a positive effect on foreign bank entry and it influences both the entry 
decision and the activity level of foreign banks, (2) banks come mainly from larger countries 
with more developed financial systems, and (3) the difference of interest spreads (defined as 
loan rate minus interest rate on short term Government bonds) between Italy and the country 
of origin has a strong positive effect on the entry decision into Italy. They argue that foreign 
bank entry seems to be strongly influenced by the possibility of arbitrage between interest 
rates. From the above-cited studies, it seems that foreign banks are affected by their home 
macroeconomic factors more than those of the market where they operate. Hence, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
HI: foreign banks are affected by their parent bank's market macroeconomic factors (e.g. 
GDP and inflation) more than those of the host market. 
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The level of openness of the host country affects the presence of foreign banks. Parkhe 
and Miller (1998) examine how banking regulations and the banking system development of a 
host country influence U.S. banks' preferences for organisational form in that country. They 
found that a bank's size, globalisation, product diversity and charter value influence 
organisational form preferences. They found a positive relationship between banking system 
development and the percentage of subsidiaries for larger banks and more internationalised 
banks, and that more global banks establish a higher percentage of subsidiaries in host 
countries with high banking system development than in countries with low banking system 
development. Additionally, they argue that there is a negative effect of banking system 
development and regulation for low size banks and low global banks. Dopico and Wilcox 
(2001) claim that countries that were more economically liberal as measured by (1) their 
openness to foreign banking in the past, (2) by their currently permitting banks to undertake 
more activities, and (3) by their involvement in international trade, tend to have more foreign 
banks. Moreover, they found that countries that had smaller domestic banking sectors (relative 
to their own GDP) tended to have more foreign banks. 
2.3 Foreign Bank Efficiency and Profitability 
The structural and organisational differences between foreign and domestic banks may 
have implications for differences in cost structures and scale and scope economies. These 
differences result from different management strategies, differences of the markets they serve 
(i.e. retail, corporate, etc), knowledge of the local market, international synergies, and 
regulation. A parent company of a foreign bank can provide its subsidiary with access to 
international markets, international diversification, and access to low-cost funds. These factors 
represent benefits for the foreign subsidiaries with cost advantages. However, a lack of 
familiarity of the foreign bank's parent company with the nature and features of the local 
markets, and difficulties with adaptation of home country strategy into the local markets may 
obstruct its development. A final remark is that foreign banks operating in a host market are 
subject to two processes: the first is due to their ownership by a foreign multinational bank and 
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the second is due to their participation in the host banking system. 17 In this study, we will put 
these processes into a single model to explain foreign bank profitability in Lebanon. In the 
following section, we will examine the literature and extract several hypotheses that will be 
subject to empirical investigation. 
There are two types of evidence on foreign bank efficiency in companson with 
domestic banks, according to the market studied. Studies that had focused on developed 
markets found that foreign banks do not have efficiency superiority: they have less or the same 
efficiency as domestic banks. For instance, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) argue that foreign 
banks operating in the U.S. were significantly less efficient than domestic banks. Although 
there was little difference between the two sets of banks in terms of output efficiency, foreign 
banks had a distinct disadvantage in terms of input efficiency, primarily driven by excess 
expenditures on purchased funds. Elyasiani and Mehdian (1997) studied the production 
efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in the U.S. They used linear programming 
techniques and found that foreign and domestic banks were operating under different 
technologies, however, foreign banks were as efficient as the domestic banks relative to their 
respective group-specific frontier. Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002) investigate the efficiency 
difference between the cost structures and the cost economy characteristics of foreign banks 
and domestic banks in the U.S. Their results indicate that although the cost structure of the two 
categories of banks are different, scale and scope economy measures derived for the two 
groups, relative to own-group cost structure, are not significant. Regarding the less developed 
countries, the results were different. Sturm and Williams (2004) compared the efficiency of 
foreign owned-banks operating in Australia with Australian domestic banks. They found that 
foreign banks were more input efficient than domestic banks, mainly due to superior scale 
efficiency, however, this did not result in superior profitability. Bongini et al. (2001, 2002) 
used foreign ownership data to predict financial distress and closure of financial institutions in 
the East Asian financial crisis. They found that foreign-owned institutions tend to be more 
efficient and less risky than domestic institutions due to their corporate governance and 
operational structures, or sometimes because they were more diversified. Unite and Sullivan 
17 For more details regarding foreign bank supervision, see Song (2004) who presents an important study about 
the division of responsibilities between the home and the host countries and the co-operation between banking 
supervisors. 
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(2003) studied the effect of foreign ownership on Philippines banks and found that the entry of 
foreign banks leads to a decline in operating expenses and an increase in domestic banks' risk. 
They claim that due to the foreign bank entry, domestic banks are forced to take on less 
creditworthy customers due to the increased competition. Finally, Detragiache and Gupta 
(2004) examined the experience of Malaysia during the crisis of 1997 and provided evidence 
on the performance of foreign banks during extreme financial fragility. They found that 
foreign banks (particularly those with operations not concentrated in Asia) had relatively low 
non-performing loans, and their profitability and capitalisation even improved during the 
crisis. Additionally, foreign bank lending and deposits contracted less than for domestic banks. 
From the above-cited studies it is clear that foreign banks are (on average) more 
efficient than domestic banks, however, there is no clear evidence about the difference in 
profitability of the two groups of banks. We will try to find out if (and why) there is a 
difference in profitability between the two categories. We presume that better efficiency could 
be translated into higher profitability and hence we propose the following hypothesis, and we 
will test it empirically later: 
H2: in an emerging country, foreign-owned banks have higher profitability (ROE and/or 
ROA) than domestic banks. 
Peek et al. (1999) compared the performance of acquired banks in the U.S. post-
acquisition. They divided acquired banks (the targets) into four categories: the first and second 
categories contain domestic banks acquired by foreign banks and domestic banks, 
respectively. The third and fourth categories contain foreign banks acquired by foreign banks 
and domestic banks, respectively. They found that domestic banks acquired by foreign banks 
have the lowest performance among all groups. They argue that the reason could be that 
foreign banks acquire domestic banks that already perform poorly (as shown by their low 
ROA), that have low capital ratios and poor loan quality. The motivation for such a strategy is 
that poor performers provide a relatively low-cost entry vehicle, and the new management 
would then attempt to improve the long-run performance of the target. After the acquisition, 
targets' capital ratios improve, but their non-performing loans and past-due loans rise sharply 
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and their ROA deteriorates compared to other targets. Nine quarters post-acquisitions, these 
banks have significantly fewer non-performing loans and much higher capital, although they 
remain less profitable than domestically owned targets. We base on these findings and 
hypothesis H2 to assume that domestic banks acquired by foreign banks/investors have lower 
profitability than the subsidiaries of foreign banks, and we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: subsidiaries offoreign banks have higher profitability than domestic banks acquired by 
foreign banks/investors, even in the long run. 18 
Williams (1998) studied the determinants of profitability of foreign banks operating in 
Australia, and focused on factors related to their home countries. He found a negative effect of 
the size of the parent bank on foreign banks' profitability, whereas home net interest margin 
and home GDP show some positive effect on foreign banks' profitability. Williams (1996, 
1998) found that foreign bank profitability in Australia is a positive function of the Australian 
net interest margin and fees. Molyneux and Seth (1998) modelled the determinants of foreign 
bank profitability in the U.S. They found that capital strength, assets composition, commercial 
and industrial loan growth, and U.S. GDP growth were important factors in determining 
foreign banks' ROA. They found that profitability appears to be inversely related to banks' 
loans-to-assets ratios, which implies that foreign banks that dedicate a larger proportion of 
their business to securities have relatively higher returns. For ROE, they found that capital 
strength was the most important factor. Minh and Tripe (2002) investigated the determinants 
of foreign bank profitability in New Zealand and focused on the effect of their home factors. 
They found that: firstly, the size and the profitability of the parent bank have a positive effect 
on the profitability of its subsidiary operating in New Zealand, indicating that larger and more 
profitable multinational banks earn higher profits in New Zealand. Second, the specific 
experience of operating in New Zealand is the most important factor determining a foreign 
bank's size and profitability in New Zealand. Third, the relative capital scarcity in New 
18 The motive behind testing this hypothesis is to find out if it is better for a foreign bank to establish a subsidiary 
or to acquire a bank in the host country. It could be faster for a multinational bank to enter a foreign market by 
acquiring an "existing player", but it could be better to establish a subsidiary or a branch. 
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Zealand compared to the home countries (as reflected in interest rate differentials) affects 
negatively bank's ROA. 19 
Domestic banks are mainly affected by domestic variables and their profitability is 
influenced by factors related to their market (among these factors are - of course - the 
characteristics of these banks). The last cited four studies and the studies cited to develop the 
first hypothesis (H 1), suggest that foreign banks and domestic banks are affected by the 
internal factors at varying degrees. We build on this to argue that foreign banks' and domestic 
banks' profitability are determined "differently" and hence they should implement different 
strategies in order to maximise it. We propose the following hypothesis: 
H4: the profitability determinants of foreign banks are different from those of domestic 
banks and hence, the strategy adopted by foreign banks to maximise their ROE and/or ROA 
should be different from those implemented by domestic banks. 
2.4 Measuring Bank Perfonnance: the Return on Equity Model 
The most popular model for evaluating firm performance is the "return on equity 
model". Return on equity (ROE) is a measure of the rate or return flowing to the bank's 
shareholders. It represents the net benefit the shareholders receive from investing their capital 
in the bank, i.e. placing their funds at risk in the hope of earning an appropriate profit. So ROE 
measures the profitability from the shareholders perspective, and it measures bank accounting 
profits per dollar of book equity capital. ROE is defined here as net income divided by average 
book value of equity. Return on assets (ROA) is an indicator of managerial efficiency and it 
shows how the bank's management converted the institution's assets under their control into 
earnings. ROA is defined here as net income divided by average book value of assets. 20 ROE 
is linked to ROA by the equity multiplier (EM), which is equal to total assets divided by total 
19 They argue that as the interest rate differential widened, the relative cost of New Zealand liabilities increased, 
with negative impacts on the growth of foreign banking in New Zealand and therefore on foreign banks' 
ｾｲｯｦｩｴ｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹＮ＠
o In some other cases, ROA is calculated by adding the after-tax interest to the numerator. We did not use this 
methodology due to the lake of some needed information for some banks. However, the comparison of the results 
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equity (the inverse of the equity-to-asset ratio), or average assets divided by average equity. A 
bank's equity multiplier compares assets with equity, where high EM ratio indicates a large 
amount of debt relative to equity. Thus, EM measures the bank's financial leverage and 
represents both a profit and a risk measure: profits measure because it has a multiplier impact 
on ROA to determine a bank's ROE, and a risk measure because it reflects how many assets 
can go into default before a bank becomes insolvent (Sinkey 2002, p 131). ROE and ROA are 
linked by the following equation: 
ROE = ROAx EM (2.1) 
2.5 Profitability Determinants: Control Variables 
What are the factors that maximise a firm's value? In other words, what are the factors 
that influence its profitability? Several factors affect the revenues that banks earn from assets 
and pay on liabilities and therefore, their net income flows. The profitability and changes in 
profitability of a bank (regardless of its ownership) are determined by two sets of variables: 
Internal variables and External variables. The internal variables are related to the bank itself 
and they are planned according to the management decisions. The external variables are an 
outcome of the environment where the bank is operating. Our purpose is to separate these two 
effects and determine their degree of importance on foreign and domestic banks. We assume 
that the relationship between ROE and ROA and the variables that determine them can be 
described by the following equation: 
Y = aX+bZ+ E (2.2) 
where Y is the bank's ROE/ROA, X is a vector of internal variables and Z is a vector of 
external variables and E is an error term. 
Among the internal variables, we cite the size of the bank, its investments, its off-
balance sheet activities, efficiency, ownership structure, etc. On the other hand, the main 
external variables that affect the bank's profitability are: macroeconomic conditions, market 
demand and supply conditions, cost of inputs, concentration and competition, regulation (or 
for some banks using the two methods does not show significant differences. Therefore, we will use the ROA as 
explained above. 
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deregulation) concerning capital and liquidity requirements, etc. In the following, we will shed 
light on the findings of the literature regarding the determinants of bank profitability. 
2.5.1 Size Effects 
Many studies have argued that a large size allows banks to enjoy scale and scope 
economies. Scale economies can be achieved by maximising bank's outputs and reducing the 
"per unit cost" and scope economies can be achieved by joint production and marketing. Large 
banks are less affected by changes in business environment and can react more effectively to 
protect themselves from shocks that would affect the profitability. Humphrey and Pulley 
(1997) found that in response to interest rate deregulation on U.S. banks in the early 1980s, 
which sharply raised banks costs and lowered their profits, large banks reacted more 
effectively by changing their output prices and input use. On the other hand, smaller banks 
responded with few major adjustments and instead relied on the improved business 
environment to stabilise their profitability. DeYoung and Hasan (1998) investigated the 
determinants of profit efficiency of banks by testing a set of economic, regulatory, structural 
and financial variables on new and established U.S. banks. They found that size had a positive 
impact on banks' profitability. Unite and Sullivan (2003) found that size has a positive impact 
on profits and non-interest income, and a negative impact on operating expenses. Rime and 
Stiroh (2003) analysed scale and scope economies for Swiss banks between 1996 and 1999. 
They found that the size of banks has a positive impact on ROE (but a negative insignificant 
effect on ROA). 
2.5.2 Off-Balance Sheet Activities 
Off-balance sheet activities represent another source of income for banks and, 
therefore, they should be considered as a determinant of bank profitability. Clark and Siems 
(2002) investigated the statistical and economic importance of including off-balance sheet 
activities when estimating U.S. bank cost and profit X-efficiency measures. Their tests 
provided strong support for including off-balance sheet activities in X-efficiency studies, 
where the results demonstrate that such activities increase the cost-efficiency estimates. 
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Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) tested the effects of on- and off-balance sheet items on banks' 
ROE. They found that interest rate derivatives contracts (as a proxy for bank management of 
market risk) has a positive effect on ROE (but a negative effect on ROA). Additionally, they 
found it to have a positive influence on the volatility of ROE and ROA. 
2.5.3 Deposit Growth Effects 
Deposits from the public represent the main source of funding for banks. A bank with 
more deposits is able to allocate more funds for loans and investments and, hence, increase its 
revenues. Empirical studies have found a positive influence of deposits and deposit growth on 
banks' earnings. For instance, Swindle (1995) tested the correlation between a set of balance 
sheet items of a sample of U.S. bank holding companies. He found that the largest correlation 
was between deposit growth and ROE, which means that banks that had higher deposit growth 
enjoyed higher profitability. Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) studied the effect of deposits on 
bank failures in the U.S. and two emerging markets: Mexico and Colombia. His findings 
show that larger deposits from the public lower the probability of failure and increase bank's 
survival time. 
2.5.4 Loans Effects 
Kwast and Rose (1982) examme the relationship between bank profitability and 
operating performance. They tested the influence of real estate loans, commercial and 
industrial loans, consumer loans and "other loans" on bank's total income and net income and 
found that all the types of loans have a positive and significant effect on profitability. 
2.5.5 Capital Requirement Effects 
Capital requirements generally oblige banks to hold more equity than they would hold 
voluntarily. Therefore, these requirements represent an external constraint on banks' 
operations, which may affect their profitability negatively (at least in the short run) and/or 
growth. On the other hand, banks with high level of capital adequacy may compensate their 
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allocation of high (costly) capital by lowering their funding costs. Therefore, capital 
requirements and higher capital levels may imply two scenarios: 
Scenario I: capital requirements => lower ROE 
Scenario 2: capital requirements => higher ROE 
Regarding the first scenario, Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995) found that Basle capital 
requirements had forced banks with low capital-to-asset ratios to cut back lending (and lose 
the opportunity of more revenue). Besides, due to these capital requirements, banks with low 
ratios increased their total assets faster than loans, whereas banks with higher ratios had loans 
grow at a faster rate than assets. Peek and Rosengren (1995) show that regulatory restrictions 
seriously limit the credit available from local lenders, and lead to shrinkage of both bank loan 
portfolios and bank lending. Chiuri et al. (2002) tested the effects of the introduction of capital 
adequacy rules on bank lending policies in emerging markets and provided some evidence of a 
negative impact of minimum capital requirements on banks lending. The enforcement of 
capital adequacy requirements has had a negative effect on the supply of bank loans, and the 
effect tends to be stronger for less well-capitalised banks. 
For the second scenario, Berger (1995) claims that higher capital adequacy is followed 
by higher earnings due to the following reasons: (1) Higher capital-to-asset ratio (CAR) may 
cause higher ROE if it reduces risk-related barriers to entry or expansion into more profitable 
activities (e.g. OBS activities). (2) Safer banks are able to borrow uninsured funds more easily 
to take up on-balance-sheet investment opportunities with high revenue. (3) An increase in 
CAR raises the expected ROE by lowering interest expenses on uninsured debt. (4) Capital 
may affect earnings through operating costs. For instance, when a bank is not fully cost 
efficient, a change in CAR increases the pressure on management to reduce operating costs to 
offset the higher financing costs. Empirically, Berger (1995) found that for u.S. banks there 
was a positive relationship between capital and earnings and that each variable positively 
Granger-caused the other: an unexpected increase in capital tended to be followed by an 
increase in earnings and vice versa. In addition, Bourke (1989) tested the profitability 
determinants of a sample of banks from North America, Europe and Australia and found that 
capital ratios affected their profitability positively. They claim that well-capitalised banks 
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enjoy access to cheaper sources of funds or that the prudence implied by high capital ratios is 
maintained in the loan portfolio with consequent improvement in profit rates. Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) replicated Bourke's methodology using European banks and found that 
capital ratios were positively correlated to profitability. Rime and Stiroh (2003) found that for 
Swiss banks, excess capital 21 had a positive and significant correlation with ROA, ROE, and 
the standard deviation of ROE. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) found that the capital-to-risky 
asset ratio has a positive and significant impact on ROA, but a negative (insignificant) impact 
on ROE. In addition, they found that this ratio had a negative and significant effect on the 
volatility of ROA and ROE. 
2.5.6 Liquidity and Reserve Requirement Effects 
This variable is another proxy for regulation and its effect on banks' profitability and 
its impact is not clear. Studies that had tested the impact of liquidity requirements found 
different results. For instance, Kwast and Rose (1982) detected the influence of reserves on 
banks' profitability and found that liquidity has a positive effect on total income, operating 
income, and net income. Bourke (1989) also found liquidity ratios to be positively related to 
profitability. He claims that these results were not expected, as liquidity holdings (particularly 
if imposed by authorities) represent an expense to banks. Conversely, Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992) found that liquidity ratios had a negative effect on profitability and liquidity holdings 
represent a cost to the bank. 
2.5.7 Credit Risk Effects 
According to Spahr (1989), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), and Kolari et al. (2002), 
credit risk and assets quality is an important predictor for insolvent institutions that usually 
have large proportions of non-performing loans (NPLs) prior to failure. Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) found that NPLs have a negative and significant effect on short-term efficiency. They 
argue that, when loans become past due or non-accruing, operating costs rise because of the 
difficulty in dealing with these loans. In addition, high levels of problem loans cause banks to 
21 Defined as available capital less required capital divided by required capital. 
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increase spending on monitoring, working out and/or selling-off these loans. Also DeYoung 
and Hasan (1998) found that the relative NPL ratio had a negative impact on banks 
profitability . 
2.5.8 Treasury Bills Investments 
Capital requirements and the implementation of the risk-based capital have a direct 
effect on banks' investment decisions, since they have to allocate private funds for each type 
of assets. Capital adequacy rules require much higher capital levels for loans to the private 
sector than for those to the public sector. So the enforcement of these rules may cause a shift 
in banks' assets from investments that require high capital (e.g. commercial loans) to those 
that require less capital (e.g. treasury bills). This reallocation of assets allows banks to hold 
less (costly) capital. 
2.5.9 Interest Rate Spread 
The interest margm 22 is an important determinant of banks' profitability, and its 
increase leads to higher profits for banks. More generally, large interest margins may enhance 
the degree of stability of the banking system as banks can increase their profitability and raise 
their capital. 23 The status of competition and concentration in a market has a direct effect on 
banks' interest rate spreads. When banks have a degree of market power, they tend to lower 
rates paid on deposits and raise rates charged on loans (i.e. higher IRS). Hannan (1991) shows 
that the loan rate decreases in absolute value of the elasticity of loan demand and increases 
with concentration. Conversely, the rate offered for each type of deposit decreases with 
concentration of the relevant deposit market. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) assess the 
effect of changing market structure (mainly due to bank consolidations) on NIM in the U.S. 
n Interest Rate Spread and Net Interest Margin will be used here interchangeably. 
23 Interest rate spread may reflect the riskiness banks. First, banks that have a high spread may be more risky. For 
instance, Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) claims that high yields paid on loans and thus high interest rate spread may 
mean that the bank is originating high-risk loans. Second, according to Soledad et al. (200 1), a low interest spread 
may be a sign of riskiness. Their findings on Argentina, Chile and Mexico show that the interest rates respond to 
bank risk taking, and banks with a larger share of NPLs pay higher interest rates on deposits (i.e. low NIM). On 
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and Europe. Their results showed that due to restrictions on interstate banking and universal 
banking, the spread for the U.S. banks was by far the largest among all markets, suggesting 
that the competitive structure in the U.S. allows banks to have higher spreads than in all other 
European markets. 
On the determinants of NIM, Zarruk and Madura (1992) claim that changes in capital 
regulation or deposit insurance premiums have direct effects on the bank's interest margin. 
They find that an increase in bank capital requirement or in deposit insurance premiums 
results in a reduced interest margin under non-increasing risk aversion. So, an increase in the 
capital-to-deposits ratio and an increase in the cost of deposit insurance reduce the optimal 
margin. Wong (1997) shows that the optimal bank interest margin is larger when the bank is 
risk averse than when the bank is risk neutral. Besides, the optimal bank interest margin is 
positively related to the bank's market power, its operating expenses, an increase in credit risk, 
and an increase in interest rate risk. Furthermore, an increase in the bank's equity capital has a 
negative effect on the spread when interest rate risk is small. Finally, Unite and Sullivan 
(2003) find that the interest rate spread is affected positively by the bank's capital level, and 
negatively by the size of the bank, GDP, inflation, and the reserve requirement. 
2.5. 1 o Efficiency Effects 
As a proxy for bank efficiency we will employ two variables: cost-to-income ratio and 
cost-to-average asset ratio. A bank that is not able to operate efficiently and control its costs 
will suffer from high expenses, high risk, low growth etc, and the consequence will be lower 
profitability. 
2.5.11 Listing 
Listing of bank shares on a stock exchange represents another motive for banks to 
improve their performance and increase their profits. Any announcement of profits (losses) 
the other hand a rise in ROA, liquidity and capital adequacy reduces the interest rates charged by banks (i.e. high 
NIM). This ｭｾ｡ｮｳ＠ that risky banks pay higher interest rate for deposits and their interest spread (NIM) narrows. 
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will reflect positively (negatively) on bank's share (Docking et al.,1997). Hence, listed banks 
have a motive to enhance their profitability to avoid any capitalisation of negative 
announcements in their share price. 
2.5. 12 Ownership Structure Effects 
In emerging markets, a large number of businesses (including banks) are characterised 
by a narrow family-ownership, and they mainly finance themselves by issuing stock to family 
members to avoid the dilution of their control. These banks could perform worse than those 
with institutional ownership because of the limited financial capability of their owners to 
afford costly technologies and even to boost the bank capital if needed. We claim that the 
ownership structure of a bank plays a crucial role in determining its performance. Testing the 
effect of institutional ownership on bank performance will be an original contribution since 
(according to our best knowledge) no empirical studies have provided evidence on this issue. 
2.5.13 Concentration Effects 
Concentration affects the degree of competition of a certain market. In more 
concentrated markets, banks may be able to increase the interest charged on loans and lower 
the interest paid on deposits. The literature is highly suggestive. For example, Kwast and Rose 
(1982) found that concentration affects positively and significantly U.S. banks' profits. Bourke 
(1989) also found a positive and significant effect of concentration on ROE (however, a 
moderate effect on ROA). Hannan (1991) showed that bank profits are a positive function of 
the level of concentration of each market in which the bank operates. Besides, an increase in 
concentration has a larger impact on the profits of a bank with more loans and deposits than a 
bank with smaller loans and deposits. He adds that changes in deposit market concentration 
have a bigger effect on ROA than do changes in loan market concentration. Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992) analyse the impact of market concentration on the adjustment of prices for 
consumer bank deposits. They find that banks in concentrated markets tend to be slower to 
increase interest rates on deposits (the six-month certificate of deposits and the money market 
deposit account) in response to rising open market rates. Conversely, these banks are faster to 
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lower interest rates on deposits in response to falling market interest rates. They state that 
when market interest rates fluctuate in either direction, the adjustment behaviour of banks in 
concentrated markets allows them to extract more surplus from depositors than banks in less 
concentrated markets. 
2.5. 14Economic Growth 
The national economic environment has a direct influence on banks' growth and 
profitability. In recessionary conditions, borrowers face difficulties and might find it hard to 
repay their debts to banks, which increases banks' credit risk and harms their profitability. 
Several empirical studies have found a direct effect of GDP growth on banks' profitability and 
bank failures. For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) analysed a sample of 36 
markets (emerging and mature) and show that low GDP growth is associated with a high 
probability of a banking crisis. Berger et al. (2000) found that regional/macroeconomic shocks 
are strong determinants of banks stability and that banks are vulnerable to these shocks, 
whereas favourable economic conditions boost their profitability. Bongini et al. (2002) 
analysed the relation between micro- and macroeconomic variables and bank fragility in the 
East Asian countries and found a negative relation between GDP per capita and the failure of 
banks. Unite and Sullivan (2003) found that GDP growth had a positive impact on profits and 
non-interest income, and a negative impact on operating costs and credit risk (LLP-to-asset 
ratio). Salas and Saurina (2003) argued that better economic conditions lower loan loss. They 
found that GDP growth has a negative influence on Spanish banks' loan loss ratios. 
The relationship between economic growth and financial sector development is in fact 
bi-directional. The literature has provided evidence about how economic growth and financial 
development affect each other. For instance, Calderon and Liu (2003) analysed the effect of 
economic growth on financial development and the effect of financial development on 
economic growth on a sample of developing and industrial countries. They found that: (i) 
financial development leads to economic growth in both groups, (ii) a bi-directional causality 
exists between economic growth and financial development, (iii) financial deepening 
contributes more to the causal relationships in developing countries than in industrial 
46 
countries, which implies that financial intermediaries have larger relative effects in less-
developed economies, (iv) financial development enhances growth through more rapid capital 
accumulation and technological change. Smith (1998) examined the effect of concentration on 
the economy and claimed that an imperfectly competitive banking system can result in a bad 
macroeconomic outcome. Increased banking competition improves the efficiency of the 
financial system, which, in tum, improves the level of macroeconomic activity and reduces the 
severity of business cycles. But when banks have market power, even highly creditworthy 
firms may face a higher cost of financing. 
2.6 Methodology 
2.6.1 Model Specification 
The variables affecting bank profitability and the equation relating ROE and ROA and 
their determinants as tested in equation (2.2) are as following: 24 
ｒｏｾｴＨｒＰＴＩ＠ = /30 + ＯＳＱｓｉｚｾｴ＠ + /320Bqt + /33 DEF!t + /34LOANu + /3sCAF!t + /36L1Qt 
+ /37 RISKit + ＯＳＸｔｂｉｌｌｾ＠ + ＯＳＹｉｒｾｴ＠ + /3lOClu + /311 CAjt + /312LISTEIJ + /3130 WJ\t (2.3) 
+ A4FOREIG"l + AsCONG + /316GD17+ A7INF4 +C( 
The data set under study is a cross-section and time-series (panel data). The first 
applicable estimation in such cases is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The banks included in 
our sample are widely dispersed in terms of efficiency and this factor has to be considered in 
our regression. The OLS method is not suitable in this case since it does not consider the finn-
specific effect. The Fixed Effects method (or the Least Squares Dummy Variable, LSDV) 
24 Note that not all these variables will be included in one single model. We will test for the multicollinearity 
among the regressors and then, we will run regression models that do not include variables that together could 
cause any misspecification problem. 
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solves this problem and allows us to take into consideration the firm-specific effects on 
regression estimates. 25 
2.6.2 The Implication of Control Variables 
Regarding the explanatory variables, we have employed the following. 26 Firstly, for 
foreign ownership, we define a bank as "foreign bank" if it has more than 50% of its equity 
under foreign control. Consequently, this will include domestic banks under foreign control 
and the subsidiaries of foreign banks. We proxy for this factor by a dummy variable 
(FOREIGN) that takes the value of 1 if the bank is "foreign", zero otherwise. The size (SIZE) 
of a bank will be utilised to control for scale and scope economies. Off-balance sheet activities 
(OBS), private sector loans as proportion of total assets (LOAN) and treasury bills as 
proportion of total assets (T-BILLS) are proxy for banks' investment opportunities/decisions. 
Costumer deposit growth (DEP) represents the growth opportunities/strategies. Capitalisation 
level (CAP) is employed to detect the effect of capital requirements on banks' profitability. 
Also the liquidity (LIQ) controls for the effect of reserve requirements on banks' profitability. 
RISK will control for the effect of credit risk on banks' profitability. The net interest margin 
(IRS) will control for the market power of banks. Cost-to-income ratio (CI) and cost-to-asset 
ratio (CA) control for the efficiency of bank management. For listed banks, we employ a 
dummy variable (LISTED) that takes the value of 1 if the bank is listed, zero otherwise. We 
test for the effect of institutional ownership on banks by employing a dummy variable (OWN) 
that takes the value of 1 in the presence of an institutional ownership in the bank, zero 
otherwise. To proxy for the effect the monopolistic behaviour of banks, we utilise the 
proportion of the top 5 banks' assets of the entire banking sector's assets (CONC). Finally, to 
control for the effect of the economic environment on banks' profitability, we exploit two 
variables: the GDP growth (GDP) and the inflation level (INFL). 
25 Another applicable method is the Random Effects Model (The Generalised Least Squares) which besides 
incorporating the firm-specific effects, it takes into consideration the time effects. We will test for the appropriate 
model by performing the Hausman test later. 
26 For the calculation of the variables, see Appendix 2.B. 
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The expectations reported in Table 2.1 are based on the findings of previous empirical 
studies. The two variables reported with "?" have no a priori expectations, due to different 
results reported by different studies (CAP and LIQ). On the other hand, the expectation of the 
effect of the institutional ownership (OWN) is based on the rationale mentioned previously, 
again due to the lack of relevant empirical studies. 
a e e T hI 21Th E xpecte d S' 19TI 0 oe lClen so n enen en ana fC ffi' t fI d d tV' hI es 
" .... -:able Y Ma a, Expected sign 
SIZE + 
OBS + 
DEP + 
LOAN + 
CAP ? 
LIQ ? 
RISK -
TBILLS + 
IRS + 
CI -
CA -
LISTED + 
OWN + 
FOREIGN + 
CONC + 
GDP + 
INFL -
2.7 Data 
To estimate Equation 2.3, we use a panel data set for the Lebanese banks between 
1993 and 2003, i.e. 11 years. Annual data (balance sheets and P&L accounts) are used for 
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almost all of the population of Lebanese banks. Few banks were dropped from the study 
because of lack of data. Data for some banks for some years were not available therefore we 
are analysing an unbalanced data set. The source of bank data is BilanBanques, and regarding 
the macroeconomic variables, we will use end of year figures (reported by the central bank of 
Lebanon) to be consistent with the year end banks' data. 
Since our study focuses on the differences in profitability between domestic and 
foreign banks, we split the sample into three sub-samples according to their ownership: the 
first sub-sample contains domestic banks with domestic control, the second contains domestic 
banks with foreign control, and the third contains foreign banks. 27 The banks in the second 
and third sub-samples are clarified as Foreign Banks and this division allows us to compare 
two strategies for a multinational bank entering a foreign market: establishing a subsidiary 
from scratch or acquiring a bank in the host market. The following two figures show the 
evolution of ROE and ROA for the three sub-samples: 
Figure 2.1: The Evolution of Banks' ROE (According to Ownership) 
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Figure 2.2: The Evolution of Banks' ROA (According to Ownership) 
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The ownership of a substantial number of Lebanese banks has changed since 1992, 
which has changed the structure of the banking sector and the market share of domestic and 
foreign banks (Table 2.2). Before 1992, domestic banks with domestic control and foreign 
banks dominated the market, whereas domestic banks with foreign control had a moderate 
share. Regarding the number of banks, the total number of banks has decreased from 72 in 
1992 to 63 at the end of 2003. The major decrease was for domestic banks with domestic 
control due to 17 merger operations. On the other hand, 2 domestic banks with foreign control 
and 6 foreign banks were taken over. 28 Therefore, the percentage of domestic banks has 
decreased from 65% to less than 54%. At the same time, the foreign investment in the 
Lebanese banks has almost tripled during the same period, where several domestic banks 
where subject to foreign acquisitions. 
Regarding the equity, we notice that domestic banks have raised their capitalisation 
and foreign acquirers have boosted significantly the equity of acquired banks. Conversely, 
27 None on the banks operating in the Lebanese market is publicly owned, i.e. owned directly by the government. 
Only one bank is owned by the central bank since the year 2000, when it took it over after it was insolvent. 
Therefore, our case study does not have public banks. 
28 Several other domestic and foreign banks have entered and exited the Lebanese market during that period. 
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foreign banks tended to lower their equity. Regarding the market share, domestic banks have 
grown faster than the other two groups and despite the decrease in their number, their assets 
and deposits have witnessed a growth. Foreign banks have lost an important share of deposits 
and loans. This decrease in foreign banks' market share during the period under study was 
mainly due to the acquisition of some foreign banks by other domestic banks, which has 
shifted the control of their assets to domestic banks. Therefore, this issue has decreased the 
market share of foreign banks and increased the market share of domestic banks. 
Finally, in order to understand the data subject to analysis, we present some descriptive 
statistics for the period 1993-2003 in the following two tables. Table 2.3 contains the 
descriptive statistics for domestic banks, and Table 2.4 contains the descriptive statistics for 
foreign banks. 
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Table 2.2: Market Sh 
--
fBankin2: G R 
# Percentage of banks EquliY Assets 
of Dom. Dom.! For Dom. Dom.! For Dom. Dom.! 
banks Fe Fe Fe 
1992 72 65.28 5.56 29.17 64.50 1.32 34.18 60.03 2.07 
1993 72 63.89 6.94 29.17 68.98 1.44 29.58 61.87 2.13 
1994 72 61.64 6.85 31.51 74.25 1.97 23.78 65.19 2.29 
1995 71 59.15 8.45 32.39 75.55 2.56 21.89 67.24 3.13 
1996 76 55.84 11.69 32.47 67.13 9.29 23.57 66.13 7.08 
1997 81 56.41 10.26 33.33 72.71 8.07 19.21 69.07 5.49 
1998 79 56.00 9.33 34.67 73.02 8.45 18.52 68.07 6.02 
1999 73 53.42 9.59 36.99 72.19 9.11 18.69 68.10 7.54 
2000 68 49.28 13.04 37.68 66.32 14.77 18.91 61.13 13.24 
2001 69 47.69 13.85 38.46 67.64 14.80 17.56 62.93 15.74 
2002 65 53.45 13.79 32.76 68.92 14.68 16.40 64.74 15.56 
2003 63 53.97 12.70 33.33 71.43 13.38 15.20 68.39 13.68 
Notes: 
Dom. = banks with domestic control. Dom.lFC = banks with foreign control. For. = foreign banks. 
Source: The central bank of Lebanon, Association of Banks in Lebanon and BilanBanques. 
For 
37.91 
36.00 
32.52 
29.63 
26.79 
25.45 
25.28 
24.36 
25.63 
21.33 
19.69 
17.93 
T 
Deposits Loans 
Dom. Dom.! For Dom. Dom.! For 
Fe Fe 
59.28 2.20 38.52 69.48 1.88 28.64 
60.77 2.25 36.98 68.11 1.91 29.98 
63.66 2.39 33.95 69.65 2.60 27.75 
65.05 3.32 31.63 68.94 2.72 28.34 
67.27 3.88 28.85 62.45 10.47 27.08 
70.38 2.28 27.34 65.91 9.56 24.53 
70.06 2.66 27.27 65.10 10.44 24.46 
69.91 3.77 26.32 63.13 12.15 24.72 
63.23 9.77 27.01 57.79 16.96 25.26 
64.90 12.54 22.56 57.79 20.31 21.90 
66.70 12.37 20.94 57.94 20.65 21.41 
70.87 10.21 18.92 57.70 20.98 21.32 
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Domestic Banks 
ROE I ROA I DEP I LOAN I CAP LI Q I RISK I TBILLS I IRS CI CA 
1993 Mean 13.63 0.34 27.28 29.82 4.46 65.80 2.79 25.46 4.19 88.08 4.59 
Median 4.71 0.17 27.47 29.25 3.58 66.25 1.72 20.08 3.54 93.27 3.44 
SO 18.21 0.49 27.99 12.86 4.26 13.39 3.17 14.69 2.17 15.50 3.66 , 
Maximum 78.07 1.70 135.80 73.36 19.33 98.05 14.11 91.43 10.92 104.13 21.85 
Minimum -6.22 -0.87 -15.43 1.78 0.02 23.03 0.00 2.18 0.04 40.35 0.64 
1994 Mean 29.14 1.21 46.70 29.34 7.84 65.02 1.22 30.99 3.77 77.50 3.98 
Median 28.71 0.99 33.43 31.57 4.84 62.84 0.46 27.82 3.75 72.67 3.44 
SO 32.40 1.59 81.00 12.43 13.28 13.13 2.21 16.94 1.88 30.09 2.10 
Maximum 112.65 7.12 547.37 58.52 90.61 98.46 12.50 95.51 10.45 209.01 12.61 
Minimum -51.11 -2.80 -32.34 0.21 0.06 36.13 -0.64 0.00 -1.15 33.01 0.56 
1995 Mean 24.04 1.43 25.14 31.58 11.50 61.07 1.56 32.04 4.48 73.92 4.04 
Median 18.14 1.03 17.50 33.83 6.87 58.22 0.76 29.12 3.80 75.71 3.52 
SO 32.07 2.37 30.65 14.26 16.56 15.11 2.44 18.35 2.74 27.15 2.97 
Maximum 170.48 10.59 160.55 59.60 98.09 99.18 13.18 96.47 14.62 140.25 19.88 
Minimum -34.87 -5.30 -47.55 0.00 0.75 32.72 -0.47 0.00 1.35 7.13 0.41 
1996 Mean 20.16 1.70 31.64 30.46 10.10 63.06 1.56 34.62 4.51 67.58 3.44 
Median 16.09 1.27 31.11 30.71 7.58 63.35 0.99 34.28 4.15 65.89 3.07 
SO 17.53 2.14 21.76 10.88 7.84 12.86 2.17 13.82 2.28 26.07 1.77 
Maximum 85.64 11.66 87.60 54.03 50.04 97.78 10.82 70.11 13.81 148.57 9.50 
Minimum -7.21 -2.38 -10.99 0.21 3.38 25.17 0.00 0.00 2.12 9.76 0.32 
1997 Mean 16.19 1.61 30.46 31.30 14.05 62.01 0.97 28.71 3.65 66.03 2.89 
Median 18.30 1.37 24.84 32.21 9.03 61.57 0.65 27.81 3.25 64.09 2.61 
SO 14.32 1.79 25.80 10.11 14.95 11.84 1.66 12.37 1.74 28.83 1.42 
Maximum 52.74 8.37 98.54 54.49 89.26 97.87 4.49 56.72 11.89 125.38 5.98 
Minimum -10.26 -0.69 -25.88 0.04 3.61 35.69 -4.46 1.43 1.21 2.72 0.07 
1998 Mean 14.01 1.50 33.04 31.97 13.06 61.13 0.92 32.92 3.46 64.07 2.60 
Median 13.58 1.17 20.74 29.47 9.21 63.29 0.43 32.44 2.99 64.64 2.29 
SO 11.43 1.63 64.29 9.75 10.80 11.05 2.81 11.38 1.97 26.70 1.63 
Maximum 41.63 7.07 363.41 55.92 49.87 78.32 9.26 61.61 11.40 103.36 9.57 
Minimum -1.28 -0.08 -69.00 16.41 3.28 35.73 -9.41 5.57 1.09 0.84 0.02 
ｾＭ ｾＭＭＭ
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-1999 Mean 10.33 1.02 27.04 33.45 11.34 59.55 0.46 35.06 2.99 71.36 2.51 
Median 10.30 0.83 16.35 30.50 8.77 61.41 0.32 35.40 2.59 70.77 2.19 
SO 9.97 1.34 51.67 10.61 8.27 11.95 1.06 11.31 1.54 31.76 1.58 
Maximum 29.14 5.58 295.54 64.25 41.72 76.09 3.02 65.12 7.66 136.61 8.48 
Minimum -8.99 -1.23 -66.67 19.92 3.07 22.06 -3.69 8.85 0.95 0.95 0.04 
2000 Mean 8.91 0.89 15.91 32.43 11.43 61.42 0.99 32.97 2.79 75.96 2.26 
Median 9.16 0.66 11.34 30.09 8.22 64.87 0.83 32.46 2.55 67.06 1.95 
SO 9.22 1.35 26.08 11.56 7.92 12.00 1.28 12.61 1.32 49.18 1.47 
Maximum 25.83 4.61 111.35 65.72 39.01 77.69 5.99 64.02 6.62 273.38 7.42 
Minimum -17.41 -2.57 -21.04 15.25 3.99 30.02 -0.51 4.43 0.53 3.24 0.14 
2001 Mean 8.04 1.02 19.46 29.09 13.47 64.85 0.86 32.64 2.78 71.20 2.06 
Median 8.39 0.72 9.77 25.64 8.53 68.67 0.66 33.01 2.38 63.69 1.74 
SO 8.27 1.57 55.89 12.31 14.84 12.55 1.07 14.92 1.85 41.33 1.19 
Maximum 22.78 6.47 327.14 65.52 85.92 86.73 3.23 86.59 10.74 249.83 4.91 
Minimum -18.43 -2.21 -45.38 0.00 3.51 39.73 -1.31 5.02 0.10 2.82 0.13 
2002 Mean 9.50 1.17 15.55 27.28 12.24 66.85 1.18 33.32 3.05 63.54 1.94 
Median 10.10 0.82 8.36 25.99 8.47 67.35 0.89 35.54 2.64 67.39 1.66 
SO 6.52 1.37 36.08 11.41 10.21 11.82 1.38 12.32 1.99 26.29 1.06 
Maximum 27.65 6.36 184.94 64.37 39.86 95.67 7.01 58.77 11.92 102.10 5.02 
Minimum -0.65 -0.07 -49.04 0.51 3.69 41.80 -0.60 2.75 1.36 3.75 0.15 
2003 Mean 10.15 1.13 28.37 22.38 11.53 71.39 1.50 24.76 2.70 63.98 1.75 
Median 10.44 0.86 19.82 19.98 7.22 73.47 0.79 25.67 2.45 63.60 1.56 
SO 8.81 1.22 35.51 9.69 12.69 11.16 1.66 8.93 1.46 33.47 0.83 
Maximum 31.88 4.92 173.86 48.54 66.47 92.82 5.45 45.08 7.36 196.67 3.98 
Minimum -20.22 -1.41 -15.14 0.21 2.29 45.35 -1.44 1.96 0.73 3.35 0.20 
Notes: 
ROE is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; ROA, which is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; DEP is the deposit (percentage) 
growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful 
loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; IRS is the net interest 
margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for Foreign Banks 
ROE I ROA I DEP I LOAN I CAP I LIQ I RISK I TBILLS I IRS CI CA 
i 1993 Mean 82.65 2.35 17.25 25.37 4.72 70.63 5.49 16.86 5.65 69.96 4.81 
Median 24.35 0.75 16.93 23.95 2.68 72.77 3.01 14.54 4.37 72.97 3.20 
SO 164.21 5.78 19.16 16.14 6.91 15.37 7.48 9.72 3.93 23.10 4.35 
Maximum 764.19 27.05 45.81 55.51 31.77 97.07 32.40 35.21 18.63 100.00 20.54 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 -13.55 0.00 0.47 39.03 0.00 0.72 2.04 28.26 1.29 
1994 Mean 50.99 1.63 25.82 25.81 7.83 69.06 3.40 20.04 4.06 74.11 4.08 
Median 54.94 1.55 27.00 23.35 4.81 70.10 1.27 20.53 3.62 66.37 3.46 
SO 57.94 2.25 33.87 14.44 11.50 14.10 7.08 11.24 1.53 36.99 2.34 
Maximum 226.58 7.12 129.08 55.62 56.88 95.24 32.45 41.62 8.53 196.49 9.88 
Minimum -43.51 -3.72 -43.05 2.51 0.69 40.90 0.00 1.64 2.22 27.43 1.50 
1995 Mean 43.36 1.90 15.54 30.39 9.44 62.90 1.66 20.34 4.71 67.27 3.68 
Median 22.88 1.56 9.91 28.19 6.91 63.39 1.13 18.99 4.16 64.65 3.35 
SO 55.86 1.79 26.59 17.41 9.49 16.82 2.07 10.55 1.90 23.24 1.74 
Maximum 255.90 6.86 93.44 71.93 44.54 95.31 8.67 38.03 9.02 120.50 8.82 
Minimum -12.63 -0.69 -22.59 2.64 0.75 25.64 0.00 1.18 2.24 26.05 1.82 
1996 Mean 30.55 1.76 22.82 29.81 10.11 63.73 2.03 24.79 4.64 70.57 3.61 
Median 19.79 1.22 23.98 30.24 7.48 62.76 1.32 24.34 4.00 71.21 3.15 
SO 38.97 2.52 22.02 15.95 8.88 16.02 2.48 13.62 2.53 25.60 1.77 
Maximum 157.59 11.66 87.60 66.97 40.32 95.98 10.68 50.56 13.81 127.59 10.06 
Minimum -13.28 -1.27 -8.63 2.31 0.96 26.27 0.00 0.19 1.38 17.67 1.86 
1997 Mean 18.27 1.41 39.28 28.89 11.62 65.15 1.06 22.53 3.71 69.20 3.11 
Median 16.16 1.50 20.79 28.56 7.64 66.51 0.41 21.68 3.71 66.26 2.93 
SO 18.49 1.17 103.36 15.31 10.38 16.61 1.98 12.31 1.47 24.01 1.32 
Maximum 73.67 4.25 481.43 57.12 44.77 96.38 7.45 49.16 6.68 112.64 7.03 
Minimum -6.49 -0.31 -33.74 2.02 1.50 30.84 -2.51 0.00 -0.06 28.78 1.58 
1998 Mean 16.11 1.17 15.59 31.20 10.33 63.30 2.89 22.38 3.35 74.35 2.75 
Median 12.30 0.96 18.21 32.22 7.27 64.18 0.60 19.92 3.03 66.65 2.50 
SO 17.57 1.11 19.11 15.63 8.22 17.26 10.13 13.41 1.64 35.40 1.05 
Maximum 60.39 3.16 60.07 63.87 37.16 96.56 47.76 51.08 7.65 206.35 5.33 
Minimum -16.25 -l.16 -40.40 1.92 2.46 27.40 -3.66 0.00 -0.02 33.73 1.51 
-
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1999 Mean 7.05 0.56 13.90 29.44 13.87 63.86 0.73 28.04 3.31 85.88 3.13 
Median 9.56 0.78 6.29 34.99 7.75 61.50 0.18 23.68 3.13 69.25 2.33 
SD 17.89 1.73 22.63 17.11 17.43 17.53 1.91 16.66 1.83 52.15 2.58 
Maximum 41.91 3.45 101.48 65.77 84.79 96.63 6.45 59.97 8.84 262.93 13.85 
Minimum -38.02 -4.79 -2.98 1.17 1.58 26.69 -3.86 0.00 0.09 22.92 0.99 
2000 Mean 1.79 0.81 31.60 28.08 12.14 65.42 1.10 23.93 3.10 119.64 2.54 
Median 11.70 0.73 9.98 25.00 8.71 67.12 0.26 24.40 2.71 68.82 2.04 
SD 41.23 1.46 79.83 16.30 12.36 16.47 2.36 15.31 1.29 201.40 1.24 
Maximum 44.71 3.23 380.15 66.62 57.15 97.50 9.76 51.58 6.06 987.48 6.61 
Minimum -155.43 -3.08 -5.68 1.18 0.72 25.38 -1.18 0.00 0.28 15.22 0.53 
2001 Mean 9.15 0.78 18.58 27.58 9.87 66.98 0.76 20.52 2.75 79.11 2.28 
Median 9.24 0.48 1.31 25.78 7.32 63.12 0.42 19.58 2.33 78.58 1.96 
SD 14.08 1.56 54.02 14.83 7.54 16.47 1.68 13.93 1.35 53.41 1.15 
Maximum 35.49 3.82 203.00 66.30 25.79 97.80 5.51 51.72 5.18 267.01 5.79 
Minimum -32.75 -3.62 -16.55 1.21 2.91 28.26 -3.14 0.00 0.61 15.37 0.47 
2002 Mean 13.24 0.98 27.43 24.44 9.05 69.88 1.18 20.90 2.69 70.41 2.27 
Median 12.24 0.78 2.26 24.78 6.59 66.13 0.32 19.60 2.67 66.91 2.11 
SD 15.19 1.11 82.31 13.45 6.53 14.85 3.60 13.91 0.97 34.11 0.91 
Maximum 36.50 3.26 346.36 45.75 27.11 98.03 12.75 53.05 4.72 165.65 3.73 
Minimum -22.75 -1.34 -20.50 1.22 2.97 46.18 -4.61 0.00 l.17 12.77 0.34 
2003 Mean 8.05 0.63 -1.06 24.41 8.64 69.78 2.51 17.41 2.59 82.79 2.28 
Median 7.94 0.55 -3.10 21.11 6.53 73.82 1.01 14.73 2.59 75.42 2.24 
SD 16.91 1.03 13.05 15.18 5.40 16.67 3.68 12.75 0.83 53.78 1.02 
Maximum 39.13 2.46 18.27 47.16 23.83 98.65 11.53 41.11 4.21 269.66 4.19 
Minimum -34.37 -1.85 -37.28 0.71 3.03 43.37 -1.90 0.00 1.25 17.26 0.39 
Notes: 
ROE is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; ROA, which is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; DEP is the deposit (percentage) 
growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful 
loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; IRS is the net interest 
margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio. 
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2.8 Empirical Results 
2.8.1 Fixed Effects (LSDV) vs. Random Effects (GLS): the Hausman Test 
Regarding the model specification, we will perform the Hausman test (Hausman, 
1978). The Fixed Effects estimates P FE' are calculated from the following equation: 
(2.4) 
These estimates include an individual constant for each firm and are consistent under 
both the null hypothesis of no misspecification and the alternative hypothesis. The Random 
ｾ＠
Effects estimates [JGLS , are calculated from the following equation: 
(2.5) 
where f.1 i is the individual effect. 
The Random Effects model allows for two types of unobserved effects affecting Yil : an 
idiosyncratic (firm-specific) time-constant effect f.1i' which is random, and an idiosyncratic 
time-varying random error Bit' Under the null hypothesis both estimates are consistent, but 
PGLS is more efficient, whereas under the alternative hypothesis only PFE is consistent. The 
specification test consists of seeing how large the difference in estimates is, q = P FE - P GLS III 
relation to its variance, M(q) = M{jJFE)- M{jJGLs)' Hausman's m-statistic is given as: 
(2.6) 
Hausman has shown that m is distributed asymptotically as X 2 with k degrees of 
freedom, where k is the number of estimated parameters. To test the Random Effects model, 
we calculated the m-statistic for each of the individual coefficients one at a time, by using the 
following equation: 
(2.7) 
where, SE 2 are the estimated vanances of the coefficients. The results are reported in 
Appendix 2.C. The critical %12 value is 3.84 at the 5% level and as we see from column four, 
the null hypothesis that the two coefficient estimates are equal is accepted in 11 out of the 15 
cases. 
Next, we undertake a joint %2 test of all the coefficients. This results in an m-statistic 
of: m = c/M(q tl q = 460.68. Since m is distributed asymptotically as %125 which has a critical 
value of 24.99 at the 5% level, this gives evidence of the presence of misspecification in the 
Random Effects model and therefore, the Fixed Effects is the appropriate model. 
2.8.2 Determinants of Banks' ROE 
In this section we analyse the determinants of banks' ROE and we focus on the effect 
of foreign control on banks. We then compare the performance differences between domestic 
banks with foreign control and foreign banks. 
2.8.2.1 The Entire Sample 
Before analysing the results for the dependent variables individually, we will look at 
the overall models. 29 These models seem to be satisfactory for estimating the determinants of 
banks' profitability. From Table 2.5, we see that these models generate an adjusted R-squared 
of around 68%. Additionally, the F-test shows the significance of the models. Now, looking at 
each variable separately, we obtain the following overall conclusions. 
29 We present different regression models in each section, where each one does not include all the control 
variables. We do this to avoid any multicolinearity among the regressors. The tests show that LIQ and T-bills 
should not be included together in one single model, as well as OWN and FOREIGN, since they are perfectly 
correlated. 
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Firstly, the lag dependent variable shows a positive and significant effect on the current 
one. This proves that current profitability has a strong effect on the future profitability of 
banks (i.e. profitability is persistent). The size variable has no effect on banks' ROE, which 
means that shareholders of all banks earn similar returns on their invested funds. Off-balance 
sheet activities are associated with lower ROE, which may show that the income resulting 
from OBS is offset by the extra capital needed when engaging in such activities (according to 
risk-based capital rules that banks operating in Lebanon are subject to). Deposit growth shows 
a positive correlation with profitability. Thus the deposits (local and foreign) received by 
banks could be a source of increasing profits. The capitalisation level has a negative 
association with profitability. T -bills investments enhance banks' ROE. Credit risk as 
expected has a negative and significant effect. IRS shows the expected sign, a positive and 
significant effect on ROE, so if banks have certain monopoly power, they will realise higher 
profits. CI and CA have a negative and significant impact on ROE and banks that are not able 
to control their expenses realise lower profits. The variable distinguishing listed and unlisted 
banks shows a positive effect and thus, listing represents another motive for banks to boost 
their profitability. The ownership structure shows some positive impact on ROE and this 
variable does have an ability to distinguish between banks according to their ownership 
structure (institutional or individual). Foreign ownership does not show a significant effect on 
banks' ROE. Foreign banks or banks with foreign control do not seem to have better ROE 
than domestic banks. This result does not support H2, since foreign banks do not show 
superiority over domestic banks in terms of ROE. Surprisingly, concentration has a significant 
negative effect on ROE. This contradicts the fmdings of the literature that argues that higher 
concentration is usually accompanied by higher profitability, where banks are able to extract 
higher rates from customers. This was not the case of the market under study, where the 
concentration does not have a positive correlation with banks' profitability. Thus, the 
Lebanese banking sector has moved towards higher concentration - from 37% to 44% during 
the period of study 30 - but with more intense competition and hence, it did not have a positive 
effect on banks' profitability. The two macroeconomic variables show the expected effect 
(GDP positive effect and inflation negative effect). 
30 Besides, the top 10 banks concentration has increased from 61 % to 67% during this period. 
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- - ｾ＠ - - - -- - - - - - - -----------
- --- -
---ir------- ------ --- --- ---- ----- ---Ii - ,- - - - - -- , 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 25.46 (0.74) 157.78*** (3.91) 13.06 (0.36) 172.06*** (4.49) 23.77 (0.70) 155.37*** (4.02) 11.71 (0.33) 169.88*** (4.63 
LAG ROE 0.20*** (5.98) 0.20*** (5.79) 0.19*** (6.25) 0.20*** (5.83) 0.20*** (6.01) 0.20***(5.81 ) 0.19*** (6.27) 0.20*** (5.85 
SIZE 3.87 (1.06) -2.61 (-1.02) 4.77 (1.33) -2.57 (-0.87) 4.08(1.11) -2.40 (-0.91) 5.00 (1.38) -2.34 (-0.78 I 
OBS -0.89***(-3.01) -0.78*** (-2.62) -0.83*** (-2.99) -0.77** (-2.51) -0.88*** (-3.04) -0.78*** (-2.66) -0.82*** (-3.04) -0.76** (-2.56 ' 
DEP 0.04 (1.49) 0.04 * (1.66) 0.04* (1.72) 0.04* (1.74) 0.04 (1.48) 0.04* (1.67) 0.04*-<1.71) 0.04* J1.75 
LOAN 0.12 (0.59) -0.05 (-0.19) 0.06 (0.43) -0.20 (-1.32) 0.12 (0.53) -0.05 (-0.19) 0.04 (0.32) -0.21 (-1.35) 
CAP -0.15 (-0.93) -0.40*** (-3.75) -0.17 (-0.97) -0.45*** (-4.17) -0.14 (-0.83) -0.39*** (-3.56) -0.16 (-0.89) -0.44*** (-4.01) 
LIQ 0.21 (1.09) 0.19 (1.04) 0.21 (1.09) 0.20 (1.05) 
TBILLS 0.27*** (3.08) 0.07 (0.57) 0.27*** (3.11) 0.07 (0.571 
RISK -1.59*** (-2.70) -1.48*** (-2.82) -1.55*** (-2.73) -1.47*** (-2.82) -1.59*** (-2.65) -1.48*** (-2.77) -1.54*** (-2.68) -1.48*** (-2.76) 
IRS 5.59*** (8.92) 5.65*** (7.04) 5.25*** (8.39) 5.62*** (6.49) 5.55*** (8.88) 5.62*** (6.99) 5.21 *** (8.34) 5.59*** (6.46) 
CI -0.13*** (-3.36) -0.14***(-3.83) -0.13*** (-3.47) -0.14*** (-3.85) -0.13*** (-3.36) -0.14*** (-3.81) -0.13*** (-3.46) -0.14*** (-3.831 
CA -4.84*** (-4.99) -5.41 *** (-5.33) -4.79*** (-4.92) -5.46*** (-5.29) -4.80*** (-5.16) -5.37*** (-5.53) -4.74*** (-5.07) -5.42*** (-5.45) 
LISTED 1.90 (0.85) 3.82* (1.67) 1.75 (0.85) 3.70 (1.59) 1.38 (0.690 3.42* (1.74) 1.15 (0.62) 3.26 (1.59) 
OWN 2.91 (1.31) 2.18(1.04) 3.40* (1.64) 2.37 (1.15) 
FOREIGN 3.01 (1.22) 1.68 (0.77) 3.32 (l.48) 1.94 (0.94) 
CONe -1.70** (-2.13) -2.45*** (-2.78) -1.55** (-2.04) -2.44*** (-2.67) -1. 71 ** (-2.15) -2.45*** (-2.81) -1.56** (-2.07) -2.44*** (-2.71) 
GOP 1.96*** (2.93) 2.47*** (3.77) 1.95*** (2.99) 2.45*** (3.86) 
INFL -0.07*** (-4.42) -0.06*** (-3.32) -0.07*** (-4.48) -0.06*** (-3.35) 
Adjusted 0.6751 0.6714 0.6812 0.6713 0.6749 0.6712 0.6809 0.6712 
R-squared 
TxN 655 655 655 655 655 655 655 655 
F -statistic 15.7721 15.5250 16.1918 15.5231 15.7624 15.5148 16.1750 15.5120 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(F -statistic) 
Noles: 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of78 banks (domestic and foreign) and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of bank 
ROE. 
The dependent variable is ROE, which is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; LAG_ROE is the year I-I ROE; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LlQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset 
ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtfulloans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-
income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to I if the bank share is listed, 0 otherwise; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the bank has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 otherwise; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of 
the total banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. !NFL is the inflation level. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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After this preliminary analysis of the entire sample, we will deepen our investigation of 
the detenninants of bank ROE according to ownership and we will try to see whether different 
categories of banks have different profitability detenninants. 
2.8.2.2 The Detenninants of Domestic Banks' ROE and the Effects of Foreign Ownership 
It is obvious from Figure 2.1 that the profitability (ROE) of banks differs according to 
their ownership. Hence, we split the sample into three groups in order to understand how each 
group perfonns. In the first regression we include domestic banks only regardless of their 
ownership (i.e. majority or minority domestic control). The reason for this is to find out if 
foreign ownership of domestic banks has any effect on profitability and if this profitability 
changes as a result of the acquisition of a domestic bank by a foreign bank. The results of the 
regressions are reported in Table 2.6. The regression results for the first sub-sample show 
different results from those of the entire sample. The SIZE variable has now captured a 
negative effect. This shows that larger domestic banks' shareholders earn less than those of 
smaller banks and thus, it seems that domestic banks do not benefit from economies of scale. 
This may be due to the limited domestic investment opportunities because of the small size of 
the Lebanese market, and because it is "crowded" by the existence of large number of banks 
relative to the size of the market. The large size of Lebanese banks represents an excess 
capacity, which could be utilised in other markets abroad, and that is why many Lebanese 
banks are increasing their operations abroad and expanding internationally. OBS activities do 
not seem to represent a source of income for domestic banks, where it is associated with lower 
ROE. The effect of deposit growth is significantly positive for this sub-group and domestic 
banks benefit from issuing more deposits. The effect of capitalisation on banks' ROE remains 
the same showing that domestic banks' ROE is affected negatively by any increase in equity. 
LIQ does improve domestic bank's profitability. Additionally, T -bills capture a significant 
effect, which suggests that investing in government securities is profitable for domestic banks. 
In this regression, the LISTED variable is unable to distinguish between domestic banks. The 
institutional ownership is not associated with higher ROE and banks with institutional 
ownership do not have better returns to shareholders than those with family/individual 
ownership. Regarding the foreign ownership, we see that this variable does not have a 
significant effect and is unable to classify domestic banks, which have similar ROE regardless 
of their ownership control (domestic vs. foreign control). Thus, foreign investment in domestic 
banks does not improve their ROE. Finally, we see that domestic banks are strongly affected 
by the macroeconomic variables. Higher GDP growth improves domestic bank's profitability 
and higher inflation level deteriorates it. 
We notice that the adjusted R-squared has increased from 68% up to more than 73%, 
indicating less variability when only domestic banks are included. 
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I I ｰｾ＠ i ｾＲｾ＠ I ｰｾ＠ I ｾＴｾ＠ ｾ＠ (5) i (6) II ｆｾ＠ I ｾＸｾ＠
C 63.63* (1.94) 147.68*** (4.23) 33.81 (1.16) 158.26*** (5.51) 62.78* (1.94) 147.45*** (4.20l 33.31(1.16) 157.97*** (5.52 
LAG ROE 0.11 ** (2.37) 0.12*** (3.27) 0.08* (1.79) 0.11 *** (2.73) 0.11 ** (2.40) 0.12*** (3.30) 0.08* (1.82) 0.11 *** (2.76 
SIZE 0.34 (0.13) -4.26** (-1.97) 1.87 (0.66) -3.76 (-1.29) 0.37 (0.14) -4.30** (-2.2) 1.97 (0.70) -3.76 (-1.28 
OBS -0.65*** (-3.81) -0.59*** (-3.30) -0.51 *** (-3.27) -0.47** (-2.38) -0.65*** (-3.85) -0.59*** (-3.32) -0.51 *** (-3.35) -0.48** (-2.42 
DEP 0.05* (1.67) 0.06* (1.73) 0.05** (2.11) 0.05** (2.03) 0.06* (1.67) 0.06* (1.74) 0.05** (2.090 0.05** (2.04 
LOAN 0.20(0.85) 0.09 (0.37) 0.13 (1.15) -0.11 (-0.95) 0.20 (0.85) 0.10 (0.39) 0.12 (1.13) -0.11 (-0.95 
CAP -0.20 (-1.151 -0.39*** (-2.87) -0.23 (-1.28) -0.44*** (-3.54) -0.20 (-1.18) -0.39*** (-2.96) -0.23 (-1.31) -0.45*** (-3.71 
LIQ 0.32 (1.44) 0.34* (1.67) 0.32{1.41) 0.34 (1.60) 
TBILLS 0.41 *** (4.27) 0.24** (2.29) 0.41 *** (4.29) 0.24** (2.28) 
RISK -1.73***{-6.91) -1.47*** (-5.12) -1.69*** (-6.41) -1.43*** (-4.98) -1.75*** (-6.46) -1.48*** (-4.81) -1. 71 *** (-6.07) -1.44*** (-4.72) 
IRS 4.43*** (4.28) 4.40*** (4.22) 4.15*** (4.14) 4.25*** (4.10) 4.45*** (4.33) 4.43*** (4.27) 4.15*** (4.17) 4.26*** (4.14) 
CI -0.27** (-2.35) -0.26*** (-2.62) -0.24** (-2.41) -0.25*** (-2.72) -0.27** (-2.35) -0.26*** (-2.62) -0.24** (-2.41) -0.25*** (-2.71) 
CA -3.80*** (-4.24) -4.17*** (-5.10) -3.69*** (-3.76) -4.15*** (-4.69) -3.79*** (-4.36) -4.18*** (-5.19) -3.66*** (-3.82) -4.15*** (-4.74) 
LISTED 0.41 (0.24) 1.74(1.12) 0.05 (0.03) 1.15 (0.69) 0.41 (0.27) 1.88 (1.37) -0.15 (-0.09) 1.20 (0.77) 
OWN 0.10 (0.07) -0.52 (-0.38) 1.06 (0.71) -0.15 (-0.10) 
FOREIGN -1.06 (-0.52) -1.41 (-0.70) -0.59 (-0.34) -1.05 (-0.58) 
CONC -1.42 * * *{ -2.281 -1.82*** {-3.42) -1.10*** (-1.98) -1.77*** (-2.90) -1.42*** (-2.31) -1.82*** (-3.490 -1.10*** (-2.01) -1.76*** (-2.96) 
GOP 1.02*** (2.20) 1.88*** (3.52) 1.01 *** {2.28) 1.85*** (3.62) 
INFL -0.09*** (-14.68) -0.06*** (-4.71) -0.09*** (-14.71) -0.06*** (-4.71) 
Adjusted 0.7073 0.7223 0.7368 0.7306 0.7074 0.7224 0.7367 0.7307 
R-squared 
TxN 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 
F-statlstic 16.9770 18.1906 19.5065 18.9278 16.9840 18.2014 19.4943 18.9358 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(F-statistic) 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSD V). For a sample of 55 domestic banks and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of domestic bank 
ROE. 
The dependent variable is ROE, which is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; LAG_ROE is the year I-I ROE; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities on the assets side; OEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset 
ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtfulloans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-
income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the bank share is listed, 0 otherwise; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the bank has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 otherwise; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of 
the total banking sector assets; GOP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. INFL is the inflation level. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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By runmng the regressions containing domestic banks (with domestic or foreign 
control), we do not see a significant difference between the two categories in terms of ROE 
(Table 2.6), which suggests that the two categories foreign banks and domestic banks with 
foreign control do not have advantage over domestic banks with domestic control. 
Table 2.7: The Determinants of Bank ROE - Regression Estimates for Domestic Banks 
. hD . C I WIt omestlc ontro and Foreign Banks 0993-2003) 
I ｰｾ＠ I ｾＲｾ＠ I ｰｾ＠ I ｾＴｾ＠
C 29.03 (0.70) 144.49*** (45.41) 25.73 (0.77) 163.40*** (4.09) 
LAG ROE 0.20*** (5.71) 0.20***(5.56) 0.20*** (5.91) 0.20*** (5.58) 
SIZE 4.76 (1.31) -1.02 (-0.40) 5.42 (1.52) -0.95 (-0.33) 
OBS -0.93*** (-2.90) -0.83** (-2.55) -0.88*** (-2.92) -0.81 ** (-2.4i) 
DEP 0.04 (1.450 0.04* (1.68) 0.04* 0.74) 0.05* (1.80) 
LOAN 0.10(0.350 0.02 (0.07) -0.005 (-0.03) -0.20(-1.12) 
CAP -0.04 (-0.27) -0.18 (-1.64) -0.05 (-0.30) -0.22* (-1.90) 
LIQ 0.23 (1.06) 0.25 (1.280 
TBILLS 0.25***(2.79) 0.09(0.72) 
RISK -1.48** (-2.38) -1.38** (-2.45) -1.42** (-2.41) -1.35** (-2.44) 
IRS 5.77*** (7.11) 5.61 *** (6.53) 5.43*** (6.64) 5.55*** (6.18) 
CI -0.13*** (-3.50) -0.13*** (-3.97) -0.13 *** (-3.60) -0.14*** (-4.00) 
CA -4.89*** (-4.69) -5.30*** (-4.89) -4.84*** (-4.80) -5.35*** (-5.00) 
LISTED 1.97 (1.00) 4.02**(2.05) 1.83-(1.02) 3.88* (1.91) 
FOREIGN 2.23 (0.18) -0.96 (-0.08) 2.48 (0.20) -0.55 (-0.04) 
CONC -2.06** (-2.31) -2.77*** (-3.03) -1.95** (-2.22) -2.76*** <-2.89) 
GDP 1.69** (2.45) 2.07*** (3.03) 
INFL -0.07*** (-3.36) -0.06*** (-2.72) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6650 0.6620 0.6699 0.6619 
TxN 567 567 567 567 
F -statistic 14.8748 14.6904 15.1851 14.6803 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
I 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 67 banks (domestic with 
domestic control and foreign) and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of domestic and foreign 
bank ROE. 
The dependent variable is ROE, which is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; LAG_ROE is the year I-I 
ROE; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP 
is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the 
liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the 
treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; 
CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the bank share is listed, 0 
otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 otherwise; CONC is the top 5 
banks assets as a percentage of the total banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. INFL is 
the inflation level. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
However, we run regression models containing domestic banks with domestic control 
and foreign banks to see whether there is a difference between the two categories. The results 
are reported in Table 2.7. The impact of FOREIGN in the four presented models does not have 
a significant influence. It is obvious that foreign banks do not have better ROE than domestic 
ones. Since foreign banks report similar ROE to domestic banks with majority or minority 
domestic ownership, hypotheses H2 and H3 do not reveal support here. 
2.8.2.3 The Determinants of Foreign Banks' ROE 
The differences between the results reported in Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 show that 
foreign banks operating in the Lebanese markets perform differently from domestic banks and 
the factors that affect their ROE could be different. To fmd out if there are some specific 
factors that influence foreign banks more (or less) than domestic ones, we run regressions 
including only foreign banks. The results are reported in Table 2.8. 31 
A general comparison between the results reported in Table 2.8 and those reported in 
Table 2.6 shows that - indeed - what is important in determining domestic banks' ROE is not 
the same for foreign banks. Firstly, we notice that the size variable that had negative effect on 
domestic banks loses its effect here, which means that large and small foreign banks generate 
similar ROE. Deposit growth has completely lost its effect. Therefore, this factor has a 
positive effect only for domestic banks and it does not show that receiving more deposits 
improves foreign banks' ROE. Capitalisation level has a (weak) positive effect on foreign 
bank's ROE, whereas it had a negative effect for domestic banks. This could be interpreted in 
many ways. Firstly, it could be because bank capital is more costly for domestic banks than 
foreign banks. Secondly, it may suggest that foreign banks have better capability in increasing 
their earnings when increasing their equity. Thirdly, it could be due to the fact that foreign 
banks have lower capitalisation than domestic banks. T -bills investments do not improve 
foreign bank's ROE like domestic banks. Credit risk seems to have lower impact on foreign 
banks because the negative effect is less significant than in Table 2.6. 
31 Note that the outcome of the regressions should be interpreted carefully, because the subsidiaries of foreign 
banks may have a nominal number of issued shares, and the funds necessary for their activities may come mainly 
from their parent company. 
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Table 2.8: The Determinants of Bank ROE - Regression Estimates for Foreign Banks 
(1993-2003) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 47.60 (0.62) 179.76*** (2.66) 24.81 (0.34) 149.17***(3.70) 
LAG ROE 0.20*** (3.85) 0.21 *** (3.74) 0.20*** (3.86) 0.21 *** (3.76) 
SIZE 9.240.12) 4.32 (0.65) 9.320.19) 3.99 (0.66) 
OBS -1.43*** (-2.77) -l.22** (-2.24) -1.40*** (-2.82) -l.21 ** (-2.36) 
OEP 0.02 (0.53) 0.02(0.57) 0.01 (0.34) 0.01 (0.38) 
LOAN -0.43 (-l.07) -0.63 (-l.59) -0.19 (-0.74) -0.33 (-l.39) 
CAP 0.17 (0.92) 0.08 (0.52) 0.190.17) 0.10(0.76) 
LIQ -0.34 (-0.87) -0.46 (-1.29) 
TBILLS -0.31 (-l.15) -0.47 (-1.55) 
RISK -l.30* (-l. 73) -l.31* (-l.74) -l.32* (-l.75) -l.32* (-1.76) 
IRS 7.75*** (3.06) 7.48*** (3.51) 8.19*** (3.10) 8.02*** (3.26) 
CI -0.11 *** (-4.35) -0.12*** (-4.89) -0.11 *** (-4.46) -0.12*** (-5.07) 
CA -5.56*** (-3.88) -5.63*** (-3.60) -5.43 *** (-3.37) -5.54*** (-3.06) 
CONe -2.68* (-l.85) -3.77* (-2.07) -2.72* (-l.92) -3.66* (-2.22) 
GOP 2.62* (1.94) 2.30* (1.82) 
!NFL 0.02(0.60) -0.005 (-0.13) 
Adiusted R-squared 0.6651 0.6509 0.6675 0.6570 
TxN 203 203 203 203 
F -statistic 12.1477 11.4627 12.2677 1l.7519 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSOV). For a sample of 24 foreign banks and for a 
period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of foreign bank ROE. 
The dependent variable is ROE, which is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; LAG_ROE is the year (-1 
ROE; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; OEP 
is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the 
liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the 
treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; 
CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total banking sector 
assets; GOP is the real GOP (percentage) growth. INFL is the inflation level. 
(-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the I % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
Regarding the effect of macroeconomic factors, the figures show clearly that foreign 
banks are less affected by these factors than domestic banks. Obviously, CONC and GDP 
show a less significant effect on foreign banks than on domestic banks (significance at 10% 
vs. 1 % for domestic banks). Besides, the inflation does not show any impact on foreign banks' 
ROE. This may be evidence that although these banks operate in the Lebanese market, they 
are less influenced by its macroeconomic conditions and this gives a support for the 
hypothesis H 1. The result could be due to the fact that there are constraints on domestic banks' 
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investments abroad, whereas foreign banks may have the opportunity of investing abroad, 
which lowers the effect of domestic factors on their profitability. 
Finally, we observe that the adjusted R-squared of the models are around 66% 
compared to 73% for domestic banks and the same models are able to explain the profitability 
of domestic banks more successfully than that of foreign banks. Hence, we may conclude that 
foreign banks operating in a host market are not only affected by their own characteristics and 
by the host market macroeconomic variables, but they are also influenced by some other 
factors that are not included in our regressions. These factors could be their home 
micro economic factors (e.g. the size of their parent company) and/or their home 
macroeconomic factors (e.g. concentration, GDP, inflation). These findings give support for 
hypothesis H 4. When studying the determinants of profitability of foreign banks, we may have 
to include more variables that are related to their home market (but this is beyond the scope of 
our study). 
2.8.3 Determinants of Banks' ROA 
In the following section, we extend our analysis to detect the determinant of banks' 
ROA. We use the same methodology used in the previous section. Our aim is to identify the 
different determinants of domestic and foreign banks' ROA and if the control variables affect 
differently the two categories of banks. 
2.8.3.1 The Entire Sample 
The estimated models in Table 2.9 show well determinant estimates of influences on 
ROA for the entire sample. The F-test indicates the fit of the overall models, which also 
generates a high adjusted R-squared (up to 82%). The same models with the same variables do 
better at explaining the relationship between these explanatory variables and ROA than ROE. 
The main conclusions are: as for ROE, the lag of ROA has a strong influence on current ROA, 
which means that there is persistence in profitability. The size of a bank has a negative impact 
on its ROA. T -bills and IRS show a positive effect on ROA and they have a strong influence 
70 
in enhancing banks' ROA. The institutional ownership boosts bank's ROA and listed banks do 
have higher ROA than other banks. In contrast to ROE, foreign ownership does have a 
positive influence on ROA. OBS activities, DEP, LOAN, and CAP do not have a significant 
impact. Credit risk and the efficiency indicators eCI and CA) show a significant influence on 
ROA. Finally, ROA is similarly affected by GDP, concentration and the inflation level to 
ROE. 
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I I ｰｾ＠ I ｾＲｾ＠ I ｰｾ＠ I ｾＴｾ＠ II ｾＵｾ＠ ! ｾＶｾ＠ I ｆｾ＠ I ｾＸｾ＠
C -l.12 (-0.57) 4.29*** (3A2) -1.71 (-0.68) 5.21 *** (5.12) -1.24{-0.64). 4.04*** (3.36) -1.81 (-0.74) 4.96*** (5.16) 
LAG ROA 0.11 ** (2.56) 0.10** (2.39) 0.11 ** (2.50) 0.10** (2AO) 0.11 *** (2.67) 0.10** (2A8) 0.11 *** (2.61) 0.10** (2A9) 
SIZE 0.12{0.76) -0.21 *** (-2.65) 0.15 (0.90) -0.22*** (-2.62) 0.13 (0.89) -0.18** (-2.52) 0.17 (l.03) -0.19** (-2A7 
OBS 0.0004 (0.03) -0.001 (-0.08) 0.002 (0.19) -0.001 (-0.17) 0.001 (0.15) 0.0002 (0.02) 0.003 (0.32) -0.001 (-0.07 
DEP 0.001 (0.97) 0.001 (1.13) 0.001 (1.06) 0.00 I{ 1.141 0.001 {0.92) 0.001 (l.06) 0.001 (0.99) 0.001 (1.07 
LOAN 0.01 (0.75) 0.001 (0.10) 0.005 (1.05) -0.01 (-1.55) 0.004 (0.68) 0.0001 (0.02) 0.004 (0.83) -0.01 * (-1.79 
CAP 0.01 (0.72) -0.01 (-1.25) 0.01 (0.59) -0.01 (-1.53) 0.01 (0.84) -0.005 (-0.96) 0.01 (0.70) -0.01 (-1.27 
LIQ 0.005 (0.56) 0.01 (0.84) 0.005. (0.601 0.01 (0.91) 
TBILLS 0.01 * (1.83) -0.001 (-0.21) 0.01 * (1.83) -0.001 (-0.20) 
RISK -0.08*** (-4.20) -0.07*** (-4.05) -0.08*** (-4.30) -0.07*** (-4.03) -0.08*** (-4.09) -0.07*** (-3.99) -0.08*** (-4.18) -0.07***. (-3.96) 
IRS 0.65*** {9.19) 0.65*** {9.87) 0.64*** 18.72) 0.65*** (9.64) 0.65*** (9.30) 0.64*** (9.95) 0.64*** (8.83) 0.65*** (9.72) 
CI -0.005** (-2.02) -0.005** (-2.23) -0.005** (-2.03) -0.01 ** (-2.22) -0.005** (-2.03) -0.005** (-2.23) -0.005** (-2.03) -0.01 ** (-2.22) 
CA -OAO*** (-10.09) -OA3*** (-12.15) -OAO*** (-9.08) -0.43*** (-11.74) -OAO*** (-10.37) -OA3*** (-12.621 -0.39***(-9.23) -OA3*** (-12.09) 
LISTED 0.07 (0.46) 0.23** JI.97) 0.07 (0.44) 0.24* (1.95) 0.03 (0.18) 0.18* (1.87) 0.02 (0.13) 0.18* (1.84) 
OWN 0.27*** (2.72) 0.27** (2.34) 0.28*** (2.89) 0.28** (2A5) 
FOREIGN 0.36** (1.99) 0.30 (l.63) 0.37** (1.99) 0.31 (1.62) 
CONC -0.02 (-0.64) -0.04** (-2.18) -0.01 (OA9) -0.04** (-2.15) -0.02 (-0.67) -0.04** (-2.21) -0.02 (-0.52) -0.04** (-2.18) 
GOP 0.04* (1.65) 0.05*** (2.63) 0.03 (1.65) 0.05*** (2.65) 
INFL -0.01 *** (-14.48) -0.01 *** (-13.92) -0.01 *** (-15.89) -0.01*** (-15.17) 
Adjusted 0.8037 0.8220 0.8060 0.8218 0.8039 0.8216 0.8061 0.8214 
R-squared 
TxN 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 656 
F -statistic 30.1623 33.8828 30.5916 33.8341 30.1930 33.8095 30.6105 33.7572 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
( I-,Llti<;tic) 
Soles: 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of78 banks (domestic and foreign) and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of bank 
ROA. 
The dependent variable is ROA, which is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; LAG_ROA is the year t-1 ROA; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total 
asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the 
cost-to-income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the bank share is listed, 0 otherwise; OWN is a dummy variable which 
equals I if the bank has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 otherwise; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a 
percentage of the total banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. INFL is the inflation level. 
t-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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After this overview of the results of the regressions, it seems that some different results 
will emerge if we split the sample into sub-samples as in the previous section. Consequently, 
we will analyse the effect of foreign ownership on banks, and try to fmd out if ROA 
determinants differ according to banks' ownership. 
2.8.3.2 The Determinants of Domestic Banks' ROA and the Effects of Foreign Ownership 
The results reported in Table 2.10 are for the domestic banks with domestic and 
foreign control. This division allows us to detect the effect of foreign investment on domestic 
banks' ROA. It is obvious from these figures that the two categories have similar ROA and 
again foreign investment in domestic banks does not enhance their profitability. Looking at the 
variables individually, we conclude that, first of all, the lag dependent variable loses its 
significant effect and domestic banks' ROA is not persistent. Therefore, the other group (the 
foreign banks) may have driven the effect shown in Table 2.9. Bank size shows a negative 
influence in two out the eight models, which may support again the theory of excess capacity 
for domestic banks, or it may suggest that asset augmentation was not accompanied by the 
same growth in earnings. Listed banks have higher ROA, whereas they show to have similar 
ROE. LOAN shows to have a positive effect in two models, which suggests that private sector 
lending have some effect in improving ROA. T -bills influence hold and they add to domestic 
banks profitability. The institutional ownership in domestic banks does boost their profitability 
in terms of ROA and proves that it has a constructive impact on domestic banks. Finally, the 
other variables (OBS, DEP, CAP, and LIQ) do not have a significant influence on domestic 
bank ROA. 
Finally, we perceive that the adjusted R-squared of the models increased by 6-7%, 
indicating that these models have better capability in explaining the variability of ROA when 
including domestic banks only. 
------- ----- ---- - ---------------
- --i:- ------- .... _-_-.- --- .... _- ----- --- - --- 11 - - - - - -- , 
(1) (2) (3) (4) II (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 0.06 (0.03) 4.02*** (3.17) -0.26 (-0.14) 5.07*** (5.50) -0.10 (-0.05) 3.71 *** (3.0U -0.301-0.17) 4.83*** (5.25 
LAG ROA -0.02 (-0.54) -0.01 (-0.37) -0.02 (-0.54) -0.01 (-0.36) -0.02 (-0.48) -0.01 (-0.31) -0.02 (-0.47) -0.01 (-0.31 
SIZE 0.08 (0.61) -0.15* (-1.66) 0.10 (0.75) -0.16* (-1.65) 0.10 (0.83) -0.12 (-1.42) 0.12 (0.94) -0.14 (-1.43 
OBS 0.004(0.58) 0.01 (0.98) 0.01 (0.87) 0.004 (0.65) 0.005 (0.62) 0.01 (0.98) 0.01 (0.87) 0.004 (0.67 
DEP 0.001 (0.93) 0.001 (1.09) 0.000511.00) 0.001 (1.12) 0.000510.80) 0.0005 (0.92) 0.0004 (0.83) 0.0005 (0.95) 
LOAN 0.02(1.15) 0.01 (0.89) 0.01 ** (2.10) 0.002 (0.43) 0.02 (1.14) 0.01 (0.90) 0.01 * (1.84) 0.001 (0.21) 
CAP 0.01 (0.60) -0.003 (-0.37) 0.005 (0.48) -0.01 (-0.70) 0.01 (0.67) -0.002 (-0.26) 0.01 (0.53) -0.005 J-0.62) 
LIQ 0.01 (0.57) 0.01 (0.80) 0.01 (0.65) 0.01 (0.88) 
TBILLS 0.01 ** (1.59) -0.0003 (-0.09) 0.01 ** (1.53) -0.0004 (-0.09) 
RISK -0.13*** (-6.86) -0.12*** (-6.07) -0.13*** (-6.46) -0.12*** (-5.81) -0.13*** (-6.69) -0.12*** (-6. t:ll -0.13*** (-6.31) -0.12*** (-5.80) 
IRS 0.62*** (9.56) 0.62*** (10.45) 0.62*** (9.40) 0.62*** (10.11) 0.62*** (9.58) 0.62*** (10.41) 0.61 *** (9.44) 0.62*** (10.07) 
CI -0.02*** (-3.71) -0.02*** (-4.07) -0.02*** (-3.72) -0.02*** (-3.97) -0.02*** (-3.69) -0.02*** (-4.01) -0.02*** (-3.69) -0.02*** (-3.92) 
CA -0.35*** (-6.96) -0.38*** (-8.03) -0.35*** (-6.57) -0.38*** (-7.85) -0.35*** (-6.95) -0.37*** (-7.90) -0.35*** (-6.56) -0.37*** (-7.72) 
LISTED 0.13 (1.17) 0.21 *** (2.63) 0.13 (1.14) 0.21 *** (2.63) 0.07 (0.72) 0.16** (2.43) 0.07 (0.64) 0.16** (2.36) 
OWN 0.27*** (5.07) 0.24*** (3.66) 0.28*** (5.26) 0.25*** (3.74) 
FOREIGN 0.15 (1.22) 0.14 (1.19) 0.17 (1.24) 0.16 (1.22) 
CONC -0.02 (-0.75) -0.04* (-1.87) -0.01 (-0.57) -0.04* (-1.90) -0.02 (-0.74) -0.04* (-1.82) -0.01 (-0.57) -0.03* (-1.86) 
GDP 0.04 (1.62) 0.05*** 12.59) 0.03 (1.53) 0.05** (2.47) 
(NFL -0.004*** (-7.43) -0.004*** (-8.32) -0.004*** (-7.292 -0.004*** (-8.06) 
Adjusted 0.8748 0.8834 0.8761 0.8831 0.8736 0.8824 0.8748 0.8820 
R-squared 
TxN 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 
lo'-statistic 47.1915 51.1027 47.7474 50.9275 46.7075 50.6312 47.1894 50.4306 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(F -statistic) 
-
Noles: 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 55 domestic banks and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of domestic bank 
ROE. 
The dependent variable is ROA, which is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; LAG _ ROA is the year t-1 ROA; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total 
asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the 
cost-to-income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the bank share is listed, 0 otherwise; OWN is a dummy variable which 
equals I if the bank has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 otherwise; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a 
percentage of the total banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. INFL is the inflation level. 
t-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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Since the foreign control of domestic banks has not improved their ROA, we will try to 
detect the differences (if any) between domestic banks with domestic control and foreign 
banks' ROA. The results are shown in Table 2.l1. 
Table 2.11: The Determinants of Bank ROA Regression Estimates for Domestic 
B nk ·th D . C 1 a s WI omestic ontro and Foreign Banks (1993-2003) 
! !! ｰｾ＠ i ｾＲｾ＠ I ｾＳｾ＠ I (4) 
C -0.85 (-0.36) 3.99** (2.35) 
-0.98 (-0.45) 5.26*** (4.69) 
LAG ROA 0.11 ** (2.41) 0.11 ** (2.31) 0.11 ** (2.39) 0.11 ** (2.34) 
SIZE 0.08 (0.67) 
-0.21 *** (-4.09) 0.11(0.81) -0.22*** (-4.03) 
OBS 0.01 (0.52) 0.005 (0.62) 0.01 (0.67) 0.004 (0.51) 
DEP 0.001 (0.65) 0.001 (0.84) 0.0005 (0.74) 0.001 (0.93) 
LOAN 0.005 (0.59) 0.004 (0.53) 0.001 (0.42) -0.01 (-1.40) 
CAP 0.02*** (2.83) 0.01 (1.37) 0.02** (2.21) 0.01 (0.99) 
LIQ 0.01 (0.77) 0.01 (l.30) 
TBILLS 0.01 ** (2.00) 0.0001 (0.05) 
RISK -0.07*** (-3.67) -0.06*** (-3.34) -0.07*** (-3.80) -0.06*** (-3.33) 
IRS 0.60*** (11.11) 0.58*** (10.19) 0.59*** (10.38) 0.58*** (10.16) 
CI -0.005** (-2.13)- -0.005** (-2.35) -0.005** (-2.16) -0.005** (-2.36) 
CA -0.39*** (-10.00) -0.41 *** (-1l.99) -0.39*** (-9.17) -0.42*** (-1l.88) 
LISTED 0.06 (0.49) 0.21 *** (2.78) 0.06 (0.47) 0.22*** (2.83) 
FOREIGN 0.37** (1.20) 0.12 (0.42) 0.37** (l.21) 0.13 (0.44) 
CONC -0.02 (-0.62) -0.04** (-2.49) -0.02(-0.49) -0.04** (-2.33) 
GDP 0.03 (1.49) 0.05** (2.42) 
INFL -0.01*** (-Il.II) -0.01 * * * (-10 .18) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7958 0.8127 0.7980 0.8120 
TxN 568 568 568 568 
F -statistic 28.2926 3l.3798 28.6614 31.2399 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
I 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 67 banks (domestic with 
domestic control and foreign) and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of domestic and foreign 
bank ROA. 
The dependent variable is ROA, which is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; LAG_ROA is the year 1-1 
ROA; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; 
DEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is 
the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the 
treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income 
ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the bank share is 
listed, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 otherwise; CONC is 
the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. 
INFL is the inflation level. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the I % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
By looking at the foreign ownership variable, we notice that it has captured a 
significant effect here and therefore, foreign banks have better ROA than domestic banks 
regardless of their ownership (domestic vs. foreign). Although this factor was not able to 
distinguish banks according to their ROE, it is now able to separate them according to their 
ROA. Therefore, hypotheses H2 and H3 do find support when considering ROA. 
2.8.3.3 The Determinants of Foreign Banks' ROA 
We have seen that foreign and domestic banks operating in the Lebanese markets have 
different factors that affect their ROE. Now we will see if it is the same for the estimation of 
ROA, and how the determinants of ROA differ between the two groups. The empirical 
findings are reported in Table 2.12. 
Table 2.12 shows clearly that different factors influence domestic banks and foreign 
banks' ROA, which gives again support for hypothesis H4. Some factors that were important 
for domestic banks became unimportant and vice versa. For instance, in contrast to domestic 
banks, foreign banks' ROA is in fact persistent. Differently from domestic banks that have a 
negative correlation between size and ROA, foreign banks generate similar ROA regardless of 
their size. Foreign bank CAP shows to have a positive influence on ROA and foreign banks 
benefit more than domestic banks from boosting capital. On the other hand, investing in liquid 
assets deteriorates foreign banks' ROA. DEP, T-bills do not improve foreign bank ROA. 
Finally, foreign banks seem again to be less affected by domestic macroeconomic factors. The 
concentration does not have any effect on ROA and GDP affect less significantly foreign 
banks (10% vs. 1 % for domestic banks). 
The adjusted R-squared generated by foreign banks models dropped below those of 
domestic banks by 7-8%, indicating again that foreign banks could be affected by some 
"external factors" that do not have impact of domestic banks (i.e. foreign banks home market 
GDP, inflation, etc ... ). This gives support for hypothesis HI. 
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Table 2.12: The Detenninants of Bank ROA - Regression Estimates for Foreign Bank 
(1993-2003) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 3.24 (1.42) 7.43*** (2.80) -0.97 (-0.59) 4.39*** (2.62} 
LAG ROA 0.22*** (7.09) 0.21 *** (7.10) 0.22*** (6.52) 0.21 *** (6.33) 
SIZE 0.09 (0.60) -0.16 (0.96) 0.12 (0.89) -0.16 (-1.12) 
OBS -0.03(-1.43) -0.03 (-1.37) -0.03 (-1.49) -0.03 (-1.42) 
DEP 0.0001 (0.06) 0.0005 (0.36) -6.51E-05 (-0.04) 0.0003 (0.24) 
LOAN -0.05*** (-3.06) -0.05** (-2.50) -0.01 (-1.43) -0.02** (-2.24) 
CAP 0.03*** (4.91) 0.02*** (2.77) 0.03*** (7.78) 0.02*** (3.33) 
LiQ -0.04** (-2.54) -0.03* (-1.90) 
TBILLS -0.0003(-0.07) -0.007 (-1.43) 
RISK -0.07*** (-4.96) -0.06*** (-5.46) -0.07*** (-4.84) -0.06*** (-5.46) 
IRS 0.64*** (7.34) 0.61 *** (6.51) 0.63*** (7.66) 0.61 *** (6.81) 
CI -0.003** (-2.46) -0.003** (-2.58) -0.003 ** (-2.41) -0.003** (-2.561 
CA -0.33*** (-5.25) -0.35*** (-5.51) -0.33*** (-4.51) -0.34*** (-4.74) 
CONC -0.01 (-0.41) -0.04 (-1.48) -0.01 (-0.34) -0.04 (-1.59) 
GDP 0.05* 0.96) 0.05* (2.16) 
!NFL -0.002*** (-2.70) -0.003*** (-4.46) 
Adiusted R-squared 0.8139 0.8138 0.8095 0.8117 
TxN 204 204 204 204 
F -statistic 25.6704 25.6552 24.9730 25.3115 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with the Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 24 foreign banks and for a 
period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of foreign bank ROA. 
The dependent variable is ROA, which is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; LAG_ROA is the year 1-1 
ROA; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP 
is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the 
liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the 
treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; 
CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total banking sector 
assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. INFL is the inflation level. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
2.9 Conclusion 
We have analysed the profitability differences between foreign and domestic banks 
operating in Lebanon between 1993 and 2003. We have chosen several internal variables that 
represent a bank's characteristics and 3 external variables (concentration, GDP and inflation), 
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and detected their different effects on foreign and domestic banks. The sample of banks was 
divided into three sub-samples according to their ownership (domestic or foreign). 
Regarding ROE, we found that: (i) all banks have similar ROE regardless of their 
ownership, (ii) the determinants of foreign banks' ROE are different from those of domestic 
banks, (iii) institutional ownership does not improve domestic banks' ROE, and (iv) 
macroeconomIC factors of the host market affect foreign banks' ROE less than domestic 
banks. 
On the other hand, we found that for ROA: (i) subsidiaries of foreign banks have 
higher ROA than all domestic banks, (ii) the determinants of bank ROA differ according to 
bank ownership, (iii) institutional ownership in domestic banks improve their ROA, and (iv) 
macroeconomIC factors of the host market affect foreign banks' ROA less than domestic 
banks. 
For both ROE and ROA, we found the estimated models show better capability in 
explaining the variability of domestic banks' profitability more than foreign ones, which may 
lead to a conclusion that foreign banks operating in a market are not only affected by the 
conditions in that market, but also by other factors that could be related to their home markets. 
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Appendix 2.A: Summary of Cited Empirical Studies 
Study Market Period Sample Findings 
Berger (1995) US 1983-1989 14,862 banks - capital has a positive impact on bank's earnings 
Berger and US 1985-1994 All banks - NPLs have a negative effect on cost-efficiency and a positive effect on 
DeYoung capital of small banks 
(1997) 
- Cost efficiency has a negative effect on NPLs and a positive effect on 
capital 
- Staff expenses have a negative effect on profitabili!Y 
Berger et al. US 1969-1997 All domestically - Macroeconomic shocks are strong determinants of banks persistence 
(2000) chartered US - In boom periods, of-balance sheet activities increase substantially 
commercial banks 
Bongini et al. Indonesian, 1996-1998 283 financial - Foreign ownership decreases the probability of distress 
(2001) Malaysia, South institutions - Foreign-owned banks were more efficient and less risky than domestic 
Korea and Thailand banks 
Bongini et al. Indonesian, End-1996 data 246 financial - A negative relation between foreign ownership and bank failure 
(2002) Malaysia, institutions - A negative and significant relation between GDP per capita and bank 
Philippines, South failures 
Korea and Thailand 
Bourke (1989) Europe, North 1972-1981 12 markets, 90 - Concentration has a positive effect on return profitability 
America and banks - Capital level has a positive effect on ROA 
Australia - Liquidity has a positive effect on ROA I 
- Staff expenses has a positive effect on ROA 
Brealey and Developed and 2000 overseas - Host countries are large economies with large overseas trade 
Kaplanis (1996) developing markets offices (37 parent 
and 82 host 
countries) 
Brinkmann and US 1987-1991 10,445 banks - Loans-to-asset ratio increased for banks with larger capital surplus, and 
Horvitz (1995) decreased for other banks 
Calderon and Developing and 1960-1994 87 developing and - Financial development leads to economic growth 
Liu (2003) industrial countries 22 industrial - Bi-directional causality between economIC growth and financial 
development 
- Financial intermediaries have larger effect in less developed economies 
- The longer the period, the larger the effect of financial development on 
economic growth 
- Financial development enhances growth through rapid capital 
accumulation and technology changes. 
Ccbcnoyan and US 1988-1993 Entire bank - A positive and significant relation between size and banks' profitability 
Strahan (2004) ｬｾｯｒｵｬ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ - A negative and significant relation between the size and volatili!Y of 
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banks'ROA 
- Derivatives have a negative correlation with ROA but positive 
correlation with ROE 
- A positive and significant relation between CAR and ROA but negative 
relation with ROE 
- A negative and significant relation between CAR and volatility of ROA 
and ROE 
Chiuri et al. Developing 1992-1997 10 crisis countries - Capital requirements have a negative effect on loans supply for less 
(2002) countries and 5 non-cnSlS capitalised banks 
countries 
Claessens et al. 80 developed and 1988-1995 7,900 banks - In developed countries, foreign banks have lower overhead costs and 
(2001) developing lower profits than domestic banks 
countries - In developed countries, foreign banks have higher profits, higher interest 
margin, and higher tax payments than domestic banks 
Clark and US 1992-1997 Entire bank - Off-balance sheet activities increase cost-efficiency estimates 
Siems (2002) population 
Demirguc-Kunt Developed and 1980-1995 36 systemic - Low GDP growth is associated with high probability of bank failures 
and Detragiache developing banking crises in 65 
( 1999) countries countries 
Detragiache and Malaysia 1997 (the Asian 46 banks (foreign - Non-Asia-oriented foreign banks performed better 10 terms of 
Gypta (2004) crisis) and domestic) profitability and loan quality, but worse in terms of cost efficiency 
- Foreign bank operating mainly in Asia did not differ from domestic 
banks I 
DeYoung and US Years 1988- 16,282 banks - Size has a positive effect on profitability 
Hasan (1998) 1990-1992 and - NPLs have a negative effect on profit efficiency 
1994 - Concentration has a positive effect on profitability 
DeYoung and US 1985-1990 240 domestic banks - Foreign banks are less profit-efficient than US-owned banks 
Nolle (1996) and 62 foreign - Foreign banks had disadvantages in input efficiency due to excess 
banks expenditures on purchased funds 
- Foreign banks sacrificed profitability in exchange for increased market 
Dopico and Developing and 1999 133 countries - Foreign banks have significantly larger presence in countries that were 
Wilcox (2001) developed countries open to foreign ownership of banks, more international trade, and more 
interaction with the rest of the world 
- Countries that had smaller or more profitable domestically-owned 
banking sectors tended to have more foreign bankinR 
Elyasiani and US 1992-1994 2054 observations - Foreign banks do not possess advantage in product-specific scale 
Rezvanian (foreign banks and econorrues 
(2002) domestic banks) - Domestic banks and foreign banks are not widely different in terms of 
scale and scope economies 
Fisher and UK 1980-1989 Foreign banks from - Bilateral trade, market size, country risk and distance are correlated with 
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Molyneux 
(1996) 
Gonzalez-
Hermosillo 
( 1999) 
Humphrey and 
pulley (1997) 
Kwast and Rose 
(1982) 
Lensink and 
Hermes (2004) 
Magri et al. 
(2005) 
Minh and Tripe 
(2002) 
u.s. Southwest, 
Northwest and 
California, Mexico 
and Colombia 
US 
US 
Developed 
developing 
economIes 
Italy 
New Zealand 
and 
Molyneux and I US 
Seth (19981 
( 1986-1992), 
(1991-1992), 
(1992-1993), 
(1994-1995) and 
( 1982-1987) 
successivelY 
1977-1988 
1970-1977 
1990-1996 
1983-1998 
1991-2000 
1987-1991 
66 countries 
(2,946), (261), 
(562), (31) and (18) 
banks successively 
683 bank 
41 high-profit and 
39 low profit banks 
48 markets 
203 foreign banks 
8 foreign banks 
Average of 125 
foreign subsidiaries 
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the number of firms and employees. 
- The size of the banking sector of the foreign country is positively 
correlated with that country's bank presence in London 
- The smaller the cultural distance and the less stable the home country, the 
more likely foreign banks are to enter London. 
- Large deposits from the public are associated with lower probability of 
failure and higher deposits increase bank's survival time 
- High interest spreads reflect banks riskiness 
- Low GDP growth is associated with banking crises 
- Large banks react more efficiently to deregulation shocks than smaller 
banks 
- Liquidity has a positive effect on net income 
- Loans have a positive effect on net income 
- Concentration has a positive effect on profitability 
- Demand deposits have a positive effect on profitability, and time deposits 
have a negative effect 
- The presence of foreign banks forces domestic banks to reduce costs and 
increase efficiency. 
- Foreign banks entry is associated with falling costs, profits and margins 
of domestic banks at higher level of economic development 
- Foreign banks entry is associated with increasing costs and margins of 
domestic banks at lower level of economic development 
- The size and the development of the financial sector are positively related 
to foreign bank entry decision 
- The profit opportunities of the local market has a positive effect on the 
entry decision 
- The trade has a ｾｯｳｩｴｩｶ･＠ effect on entry decision 
- Foreign bank parent profitability has a positive effect on the subsidiary's 
SIze 
- The profitability of the parent bank has a positive effect on the 
profitability of the subsidiary 
- The relative capital scarcity has a negative effect on the subsidiary's 
ROA 
- The specific experience of operating in the host market is an important 
factor determining the profitability of the subsidi<llY 
- Foreign bank profitability in the US is related to growth in bank's 
commercial and industrial loans, capital level and the hos!country GOP 
- Foreign bank profitability is inversely related to bank's loan-to-asset ratio 
Molyneux and 18 European 1986-1989 Average of 1053 - A positive effect of concentration on return on capital and return on 
Thornton markets banks per year assets 
(1992) 
- A negative effect of liquidity on ROA 
- Apositive effect of staff expenses on ROA 
Neumark and US Oct. 1983-Nov. 255 banks - In concentrated markets, banks tend to be slower in respond to increase 
Sharpe (1992) 1987 deposit rate as a respond to increase in market interest rate. But they 
respond faster to falling market interest rate 
Parkhe and US 1984-1995 - A bank's tendency to use a more subsidiary-oriented strategy is 
Miller (1998) negatively related to the levels of banking system development and 
banking regulation in the host country 
- More global banks establish a higher percentage of subsidiaries in host 
countries with high banking system development than in countries with 
low banking system development 
Peek and New England, U.S. 1989Ql- 150 banks - Capital requirements caused a drop in bank's lending 
Rosengren 1 992Q2 
(1995) 
Peek et al. US 1984Ql- 2565 banks - Foreign banks that are acquired by domestic banks are more troubled 
( 1999) 1 997Q2 than most banks prior to the acquisiton 
Rime and Switzerland 1996-1999 289 - The asset size has a positive effect on ROE, but negative effect on ROA 
Stiroh (2003) - Excess capital has a positive effect on ROA, ROE, and SD of ROE 
Salas and Spain 1968-1998 21 banks - Better economic conditions imply lower loan loss ratios 
Saurina (2003) - Large banks have higher loan loss ratios than small banks 
Saunders and Germany, Italy, 1988-1995 736 banks - NIM is an increase function of: implicit interest rate, required reserve by 
Schumacher Switzerland, UK, the central bank, capital requirements, and concentration 
(2000) Spain, France, U.S. 
Soledad et al. Argentina, Chile 1981-1997 (155), (37), and - More profitable banks attract more deposits 
(2001 ) and Mexico (34) banks - Risky banks pay higher interest rates on deposits 
successively - Higher CAR reduce the interest rates on deposits 
Spahr (19R9) US 1985 117 failed banks - 4 and 5 years prior to failure, the size of the commercial and industrial 
and 117 non-failed loan portfolio predict the failure. Operating efficiency is also important 
banks factor 
- 2 and 3 years prior to failure, loan revenue is higher for failed banks 
- 1 year prior to failure, the profitability is lower for failed banks 
Sturm and Australia 1988-2001 19 foreign banks - Large Australian banks used their size as a barrier to entry of foreign 
Williams and 16 domestic banks 
(2004) banks - Foreign banks display superior technical efficiency due to superior scale 
efficiency 
Swindle (1995 ) US 1984Ql- 51 BHCs - A positive and significant correlation between deposit growth and 
1986Q4 profitability 
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--
- A positive and significant relation between capital and ROE 
Unite and Philippines 1990-1998 39 banks (yearly - Larger banks are more able to control their expenses 
Sullivan (2003) average) - A positive relation between foreign ownership and profits 
- A negative relation between foreign ownership and risk 
- A positive and significant relation between GDP and banks profitability 
- A ｾ･｣ｬｩｮ･＠ ｩｾ＠ interest rate spreads was followed by increase in profits and I 
non-mterest mcome 
Williams Australia 1987-1993 Average of 55 - Foreign bank size is a positive function of the parent size 
( 19981 foreign banks - Foreign bank profitability is a positive function of the Australian NIMs 
Wright (2002) Australia 1988-1992 45 foreign banks - The larger the parent bank has larger subsidiary. 
- Foreign bank "follow" their customers 
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Appendix 2.B: Calculation of Control Variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables 
ROE After tax net income divided by average equity 
ROA After tax net income divided by average assets 
Independent variables 
SIZE Natural log of assets 
OBS Log off-balance sheet (assets side) 
DEP Customer Deposit growth (percentage) 
LOAN Loan-to-asset ratio 
CAP Equity-to-asset ratio 
LIQ Cash and central bank + T-bills + marketable securities + 
deposits with head office and branches and with the other banks 
divided by total assets 
RISK Provisions for doubtfulloans-to-gross loan ratio 
TBILLS T -bills-to-asset ratio 
IRS Net interest margin divided by average assets 
CI Cost-to-income ratio 
CA Cost-to-asset ratio 
LISTED Dummy variable (1 for listed, zero otherwise) 
OWN Dummy variable (1 for institutional ownership, zero otherwise) 
FOREIGN Dummy variable (1 for foreign ownership, zero otherwise) 
CONC Assets of top 5 banks divided by sector total assets 
GDP Real GDP growth (percentage) 
INFL Inflation level 
86 
Appendix 2.C: the Hausman Test 
Fixed Effects Random Effects A q m 
LAG ROE 0.196049 0.228910 
-0.032861 21l.309768 (0.032797) (0.032719) (0.00005) 
SIZE 3.874979 l.724862 2.150117 0.359850 (3.651073) (0.695198) 02.847034) 
OBS 
-0.885218 
-0.443392 
-0.441826 4.369804 (0.294418) (0.204962) (0.044673) 
OEP 0.042391 0.035986 0.006405 0.165478 
(0.028466) (0.023715) (0.000248) 
LOAN 0.124176 0.017687 0.106489 0.293549 
(0.209491 ) (0.072499) (0.038630) 
CAP 0.151010 
-0.474367 0.323357 8.869265 
(0.161888) (0.120078) (0.011789) 
LIQ 0.206388 0.115589 0.090799 0.287905 
(0.189628) (0.085573) (0.028636) 
RISK 
-l.593381 
-1.732554 0.l39173 
-0.300151 
(0.591190) (0.643457) (-0.064531 ) 
IRS 5.591543 4.715091 0.876452 
-3.455365 
(0.626872) (0.784398) (-0.222312) 
CI 
-0.l33261 
-0.121508 
-0.011753 0.403074 
(0.039626) (0.035036) (0.000343) 
CA -4.836574 
-3.978637 -0.857937 
-3.716249 
(0.968834) (l.066163) ( -0.198064) 
LISTED 1.895926 -1.740373 3.636299 4.969886 
(2.235896) 0.529272) (2.660558) 
OWN 2.906673 -0.695822 3.602495 3.375833 
(2.226173) 0.054263) (3.844376) 
CONC -l.704801 -1.450455 -0.254346 0.234561 
(0.800263) (0.603839) (0.275799) 
GOP 1.962953 0.795511 l.167442 3.370682 
(0.670412) (0.212383) (0.404346) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6751 0.6025 
d[ 645 645 
F -statistic 15.772 67.088 
Critical %12 value 3.84 
Notes: 
The first regression is estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSOV) and the second regression with the Random 
Effect model (GLS); the dependent variable is ROE, which is the after tax net profit-to-average equity ratio; 
LAG_ROE is the year I-J ROE; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet 
activities on the assets side; OEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; LOAN is the loan-to-asset ratio; CAP is the 
equity-to-asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; RISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-
gross loan ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; CA is the 
cost-to-average asset ratio; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals to I if the bank share is listed, 0 
otherwise; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; CONC 
is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total banking sector; GOP is the real GOP (percentage) growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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3 Chapter Three: The Applicability of Bank Capital 
Theories 
88 
Abstract 
The literature on bank capital shows the importance of market capital requirements vs. 
regulatory capital requirements. Theoretical and empirical studies show that larger banks hold 
less capital, that banks use their solvency to signal confidence, that bank capital (especially 
according to the risk-based capital rules) follows the economic cycle. Finally, many studies 
show how banks react to new (tighter) capital requirements. However the literature does not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign banks in all these issues. In this chapter we test the 
applicability of these findings taking into consideration the ownership of banks. We study the 
Lebanese banking sector and analyse the factors that influence the capital of almost the entire 
population of commercial domestic and foreign banks operating in the Lebanese market 
between 1993 and 2003. Firstly, we analyse the determinants of bank capital for the entire 
sample (all domestic and foreign commercial banks), the findings consist with those of the 
literature. Next, we divide the panel data according to the bank ownership and by time. 
Different results emerge and most of these theories do not hold in all the cases. We find that 
(1) the reaction of domestic banks to new capital requirements differs from that of foreign 
banks, (2) foreign banks do not use their capital level as a signal for confidence, and domestic 
banks adopt this policy only when few other banks are able to do so, (3) foreign bank capital 
does not vary according to the economic cycle, and even domestic bank capital loses this 
feature when capital requirements become tighter, and (4) the Too-Big-To-Fail doctrine does 
not hold in all cases even for the same category of banks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Banking is one of the most regulated industries in the world, and the bank capital 
standards are one of the most prominent aspects of such regulation. 32 This prominence results 
from the central role that banks play in financial intermediation, the importance of bank 
capital for bank soundness and the efforts to adopt international common capital standards. 
Banks are the most important financial intermediaries, which is a result of their role as 
providers of payments, loans and deposits, and monitoring services and as producers of 
information. The importance of regulation of bank capital is derived, among other things, from 
the role it plays in banks' soundness and risk-taking incentives and from its role in the 
corporate governance of banks, in addition to the influence of capital level on the 
competitiveness of banks. This important influence was one of the motives behind the 
international efforts to harmonise capital standards in the 1980s, when the international 
meeting of bank capital regulation started with the 1988 Basle Accord on capital standards. 
Since its introduction, the capital accord has been acknowledged for its contribution to the 
widespread use of risk-based capital ratios both as measurement of the soundness of banks and 
as trigger devices for regulators' intervention. The accord has generated a debate on how best 
to design the regulation of bank capital due to the differences in opinion and the objectives of 
that regulation and the different results that studies have found regarding the optimal design of 
capital standards. 
In order to suggest an optimal regulatory framework, a large body of literature has 
analysed the factors affecting and determining a bank capital and the reaction of bank capital 
to the change of these factors. Some of these studies have developed a number of 
principles/theories about the factors influencing bank financial structure and some others 
analysed the response of banks to capital requirements. However, there are still gaps in the 
literature regarding the differences between a domestic bank's and a foreign bank's capital, for 
example: what are the differences between domestic banks and foreign banks in terms of 
32 The role of banks as deposit collectors is the main reason behind this issue. When a firm goes bankrupt, the 
effects of bankruptcy are limited to the shareholders, and to some extent to the creditors and ｾｨ･＠ debtholders .. ｏｾ＠
the other hand, a bank failure has additional effect of the depositors and maybe on the national economy If It 
triggers the failure of other banks. 
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capital structure? How is a foreign bank capital determined? When capital requirements 
become tighter, what is the reaction of banks when we take into consideration the ownership 
of banks? And finally, do all the findings of the literature apply on banks regardless of their 
ownership (i.e. domestic vs. foreign)? 
In the host market, domestic banks and foreign banks operate (and compete) together. 
However, they may not be subject to the same influence of different micro- and 
macroeconomIC factors. Among those different factors is the regulatory effect. Evidence 
shows that although banks are subject to the same capital requirements, neither their 
capitalisation level nor their reaction to any new regulation are the same. The different 
capitalisation level is due to the fact that foreign banks tend to hold the minimum (costly) 
capital required by regulators and invest as much as possible funds, mainly abroad. On the 
other hand, domestic banks tend usually to keep more than the required capital and keep high 
"buffer" to be able to absorb any shocks and to keep reserves to exploit any investment 
opportunities in their market. Foreign banks do not implement the same policy, since their 
position as a subsidiary of a larger multinational bank, allows them to "import" funds when 
needed. Multinational banks keep the minimum capital in their subsidiaries abroad and create 
an internal capital market and channel capital among subsidiaries or from the main branch in 
the home market to the subsidiary that needs these funds. Thus, it is useful when studying 
bank capital, to distinguish between domestic and foreign banks. In another word, we could 
assume that by considering the ownership of banks (domestic or foreign) the findings and the 
theories built on these findings do not hold in all cases because empirical studies about bank 
capital consider all banks operating in one market (or more) without considering the effect of 
ownership. 
3.2 Foreign Banking and Regulatory Concerns 
During the 1980s, banks III some countries claimed they were at competitive 
disadvantages relative to banks III other countries and "levelling the playing field" 
internationally was one objective behind the Basle Accord (BIS 1999). These competitiveness 
differences are due to accounting treatment across countries and to differences in the cost of 
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capital. Differences in the protection provided by the safety net in each country could affect a 
bank's cost of equity. The introduction of minimum capital requirements aimed at narrowing 
the international differences and competitiveness among banks. Imposing comparable capital 
standards on banks across countries diminishes the value of having a strong safety net. Thus, 
internationally agreed minimum capital standards narrow international cost-of-equity 
differentials for banks. 
Studies showing the advantages of foreign bank participation tend to ignore the 
question of the regulation and how foreign banks react to capital requirements, and if foreign 
banks react in the way regulator wants or they behave in a way to escape regulation. Makler 
and Ness (2002) raise this issue by arguing that although foreign banks aid in the development 
of financial systems, they increasingly place financial institutions beyond the reach of 
effective national regulation. They add that emerging market regulators become dependent on 
monitoring by regulators from a bank's parent country, which diminishes their effective 
sovereignty in this area. Chiuri et al. (2002) argue that foreign banks are less sensitive to 
"shocks" caused by higher capital requirements, and that the impact of more stringent 
minimum capital regulations on banks' deposit taking in some emerging markets, has been 
smaller for foreign owned banks. Song (2004) illustrates a problem facing regulators, which is 
particularly acute in very small countries. In some circumstances, such countries may have a 
few large companies, and the local banks cannot compete because the large exposure rules 
keep them from offering large lines, whereas a small branch of a major international bank can 
offer these lines using the parent bank's world-wide capital. He adds that many countries have 
tried to level the playing field by requiring such banks to have some form of quasi-capital and 
sometimes limit lending to a multiple of that local quasi-capital in order to tie foreign bank 
down and restricts its ability to compete. However, that is often ineffective because quasi-
capital requirements can meet simply by a "piece of bookkeeping" where foreign bank 
branches can avoid the requirements by booking some of the transactions at the offshore 
branches. Another issue confronting supervisors is that foreign banks entering local markets 
tend to offer a variety of new financial products, including derivatives, in order to expand their 
market share in the local market. These new derivative products can allow market participants 
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far better hedging opportunities and, thereby, can be a source of considerable benefit, but they 
may also be used as a way of avoiding prudential regulations. 
3.3 The Optimal Capital Structure and the Value of the Banking Firm 
In the absence of bankruptcy costs and corporate income taxation, and with perfect 
capital markets, the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure and the way it is 
financed (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). But in reality, the violation of one or more of the 
simplifying assumptions (i.e. the existence of bankruptcy costs, taxation and market 
imperfections) leads to an optimal financial structure of a firm and its value. Consider first the 
situation where interest on debt is tax deductible but no bankruptcy costs exit. In this case, 
there is an incentive to substitute debt for equity. In the absence of bankruptcy costs and the 
positive incentive for debt (as tax savings), this may lead to a situation with all debt and no 
equity. Conversely, in the case of no taxes but positive bankruptcy costs, the value of the firm 
is maximised when it is unlevered (i.e. when it is a pure equity firm without any debt). 
Therefore, the tax system creates an incentive for firms to increase their leverage and 
encourages them to use subordinate debt over equity (since debt payments are tax-deductible 
expense). A firm with risk-free debt could borrow at an interest rate below the required return 
on equity, reducing its weighted-average cost of financing and increasing its value by 
substituting debt for equity. However, when leverage is higher, the cost of bankruptcy and 
financial distress becomes high and so are the risks to shareholders, increasing the costs of 
equity. Combining costly bankruptcy with the tax deductibility of interest produces a situation 
in which bankruptcy costs provide a disincentive that offsets the tax-shield incentive to expand 
debt. Under these dual conditions, an optimal capital structure exists in which the value of the 
firm is maximised. 
Do M&M propositions apply to banks? Miller (1995) argues that M&M propositions 
do and do not apply to banks. Firstly, he argues that it is hard to see anything about demand 
securities (bank deposits) being so special to rule out the applications of M&M propositions to 
banks. But on the other hand, what make banks special is the government guarantees that 
protect these securities (i.e. the deposit insurance). Besides, differently from other firms, bank 
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capital comes from a number of sources, either on or off balance sheet. The gm'ernment 
guarantee, for instance, is an off-balance sheet source of capital, which affects the bank cost of 
capital from these sources. Moreover, the bank capital is not left to its own devices and the 
amount of debt a bank may use as a capital is limited by regulators. This makes banks 
different from other firms and makes M&M propositions do not apply for banks. 
3.4 Bank Capital and its Role 
Matten (2000, pp 15-17) claims that in classical corporate financial theory, capital has 
two particular roles: (l) funding the business, and (2) transfer of ownership through selling its 
shares to third parties. For banks, there is another reason why they hold large amount of 
capital: 
The role of capital in a bank is a buffer against future, unidentified, even relative(v 
improbable losses, whilst still leaving the bank room to recover or organise on orderly 
winding down. 
Matten adds later that a bank's capital is: 
The amount held or required to be held by a financial institution to underpin the risk of 
loss in value of exposures, business, etc., such as to protect the depositors and general 
creditors against loss. 
In other words, when the value of bank's assets drops, the capital provides a cushion 
that protects the bank from insolvency. A bank can meet its obligations to depositors as long 
as losses on its asset portfolio do not exceed its capital, and banks with higher capitals are less 
vulnerable to financial shocks and have more ability to absorb losses. 
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3.5 The Capital Requirements 
Berger et al. (1995) claim that regulatory capital requirements are motivated by two 
main concerns. First, "the safety net", 33 particularly the deposit insurance component, makes 
the government (the deposit insurance agency) the largest uninsured creditor of banks, and 
capital requirements are a means to limit the risk exposure of the government and the 
taxpayers that stand behind it. Regulators as representatives of the Deposit Insurance, central 
bank, and the taxpayers, are vulnerable to the same costs of financial and expropriations of 
value as other creditors. Therefore, regulators require capital for almost all the same reasons 
that other uninsured creditors of banks: to protect themselves against the costs of financial 
distress, agency problems, and the reduction in market discipline caused by the safety net. 
Second, regulatory capital requirements protect the economy from negative externalities 
caused by bank failures, especially systemic risk. So, the regulatory capital requirements help 
protect the financial system and the economy from the destructive effects of contagious bank 
runs. The failure of a large number of banks or the failure of a small number of large banks 
could set off a chain reaction that may undermine the stability of the financial system. 
3.5.1 The Flat-Rate Standard (the Equity-to-Asset Ratio) 
Until early 1980s there were no minimum capital requirements in most countries. But 
after several banking and financial crises, the regulatory concerns about the safety of banking 
sectors, as well as the emphasis on capital adequacy, have pushed a wide range of countries to 
introduce formalised capital requirements. This development was spearheaded by the adoption 
of minimum capital requirements in particular countries (for example, the UK and the USA in 
early 1980s). Capital requirements were introduced in order to reduce the risk of banks by 
implementing a uniform standard (the flat-rate standard) that aims at increasing the capital-to-
asset ratio. However, that was not an optimal solution. Koehn and Santomero (1980) examine 
33 The safety net is all government actions designed to enhance the safety and ｳｯｵｮｾｮ･ｳｳ＠ of the ｢｡ｾｫｩｾｧ＠ system 
apart from regulation and enforcement of capital ｲ･ｱｵｩｲ･ｭ･ｮｾｳＬ＠ The safety net mcludes, depOSit msuran,ce, 
unconditional payment guarantees, and access to the discount wmdow, as well as all regulatlOn and supervIsion 
procedures that are not directly related to capital. 
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the portfolio reaction to capital requirements by investigating the effect of capital regulation 
(minimum capital-to-asset ratio) on the portfolio behaviour of banks. They fmd that as a 
reaction for increasing capital requirement, banks have reshuffled their portfolios. For a bank 
with a low degree of risk aversion, its reaction to an increase in capital-to-asset ratio is a larger 
shift towards riskier assets, which more than offsets the effect of increasing capital. Therefore, 
the chance of failure increases. Conversely, if the bank is sufficiently risk-averse, the 
movement towards riskier securities will be small, relative to the increase in capital. In this 
case, the chance of failure decreases. So, risky institutions react to spoil the regulatory 
objectives, and uniformly increase of capital requirements of the banking sector makes the 
relatively safe banks safer, while risky institutions become more risky. In addition, Kim and 
Santomero (1988) argue that an inflexible capital regulation via a simple capital-to-asset ratio 
gives banks an incentive to increase their business risk by portfolio realignment, especially 
under a regulation that does not consider asset quality in determining capital requirements. 
They show that the traditional uniform capital ratio regulation is an ineffective way to control 
the probability of bank insolvency and, thus, to maintain a "safe and sound" banking system. 
The reason is that it ignores the individual banks different preference structures and permits 
risky banks to avoid the restrictions via financial leverage and/or business risk. Bichsel and 
Blum (2004) examined the relationship between the leverage ratio and the risk of Swiss banks 
between 1990 and 2002. They found a positive correlation between change in capital and risk. 
34 They argue that these results indicate that simple leverage restrictions may not be sufficient 
regulatory instrument to ensure the stability and soundness of banks. 35 So, capital regulation 
intention was to strengthen the soundness and stability of banking systems by forcing banks to 
boost their capital position, where higher capital levels allow the bank to absorb greater losses 
in the event of failure and enforce additional prudence of the management. However, capital 
regulation via a flat capital-to-asset ratio permits banks to increase their business risk by 
34 However, they did not find a significant relationship between changes in the capital ratio and the default 
probability of banks (the likelihood of bank failure). . . . . ,. 
ｾＵ＠ Additionally, Barber et al. (1996) examined the effect of capital regulatIon on ｴｨｾ＠ nskme.ss of a ｢｡ｾｫ＠ s capital 
and the probability of bank failure. Firstly, they showed that an increase in the capital reqUirement Will ｣｡ｾｳ･＠ ｾｮ＠
increase in the riskiness of the asset portfolio, but not sufficiently to offset the effect of a mandatory reductIon m 
leverage. Thus, bank's equity risk declines in response to an increase in ｴｨｾ＠ capital requirements. Secondly, ｾｨ･Ｎｹ＠
showed that the probability of bank failure increases with the capital ｲｾｱｾｬｲ･ｭ･ｮｴｳＮ＠ But ｴｨ･ｾＮ＠ argued that th.ls IS 
not caused only by the riskiness of asset portfolio. The reason for thiS IS that th.e ｰｲｯ｢｡ｾｬｨｴｹ＠ of ｢｡ｮｾ＠ ｦ｡ｾｬｵｲ･＠
depends upon both risk and return. An increase in the capital requirements results m an optimal portfoho With a 
risk-return combination with a higher probability of failure. 
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portfolio reshuffling. Bank avoidance of the capital requirement has increased bank regulators 
concerns and has led to the Risk-based capital proposal. 
3.5.2 The Risk-Based Capital (RBC) 
Failure of the uniform capital ratio regulation in limiting bank bankruptcy risk has led 
to the devising of new standards for capital adequacy. Banking regulators have proposed a 
framework that makes capital requirements vary according to the structure of assets and their 
riskiness. Different capital adequacy rules were introduced in 1988: the risk-based capital (the 
RBC). In 1988, the Basle Committee of the Bank for International Settlements introduced a 
capital measurement system commonly referred to as the Basle Capital Accord. This system 
provided for the implementation of a credit risk measurement framework with a minimum 
capital standard of 8% by end-1992. Since 1988, this framework has been progressively 
implemented in all other countries with active international banks. The framework established 
a structure that aimed at: (1) making regulatory capital more sensitive to differences in risk 
profiles among banking organisations, (2) taking off-balance sheet exposures into 
consideration when assessing capital adequacy, and (3) lowering the disincentives to liquid 
assets with low risk. In June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a New Capital 
Adequacy Framework to replace the 1988 Accord. The proposed capital framework consists 
of three pillars: (1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review of an institution's 
internal assessment process and capital adequacy, and (3) effective use of disclosure to 
strengthen market discipline. Extensive interaction with banks and industry groups, have led to 
a final consultative document, which was issued in April 2003, with a view to introducing the 
new framework at end-2006 (BIS 1999). 
So the main difference between the flat-rate and the RBC is that, according to the 
latter, an individual bank's unique risk profile is evaluated in determining its capital adequacy, 
by imposing risk weights that specify the minimum capitalisation rates on assets. Hence, 
banks engaged in less secure banking practices, including off-balance sheet activities, would 
be required to hold more capital. The new plan places bank assets into several categories and 
assigns risk weight to each category to determine the minimum capital that should be 
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maintained against it, therefore, the minimum required level of equity depends on the riskiness 
of asset portfolios. Besides, off-balance sheet items that have not been previously considered 
in evaluating the minimum required level of equity capital, are now included and considered. 
3.6 The Detenninants of Bank Capital 
Berger et al. (1995) defme two types of capital requirements that determine the level of 
bank's capital: (a) capital market requirements, and (b) capital regulatory requirements. A 
bank's market capital requirement is the capital ratio that maximises the value of the bank in 
the absence of regulatory capital requirements, but in the presence of the rest of the regulatory 
structure that protects the safety and soundness of banks. This capital market requirement, 
which is different for each bank, is the ratio toward which each bank would tend to move in 
the long run in the absence of regulatory capital requirements. Unlike regulatory requirements, 
sanctions for departures from market capital requirements are two-sided, where the value of 
the bank will decline if it has either too little or too much capital. Billet et al. (1998) add that 
the combination of regulatory discipline and the market discipline determine a bank's cost of 
risk taking. Markets penalise banks for increasing risk, by increasing the costs of debt 
financing and by limiting the types of claims a bank may issue. On the other hand, regulators 
impose discipline through risk-based capital requirements and insurance premiums, 
examination frequency and intensity etc. According to them, banks balance between the 
market discipline and the regulatory discipline and substitute towards the cheaper one. The 
substitution may be accomplished by varying the bank's reliance on insured deposits relative 
to uninsured liabilities. 36 Finally, Alexander (2004) went further to say that there is evidence 
that suggests that bank capital is increasingly determined by market forces rather than by 
36 Billet et al (1998) argue that regulatory discipline is less costly t? ｾ｡ｮＮｫ＠ shareholders th.an .m.arket discipline and 
thus banks can shield themselves from the impact of market dIsclplme through the JUdICIOUS use of msured 
､･ｰｾｳｩｴｳＮ＠ They examined the relationship between changes in bank ｾｲ･､ｩｴ＠ rating ｾｮ､＠ the use of insured deposits. 
Firstly, they found that downgraded banks with larger .insured ､･ｰｾｳｉｴ＠ bases ･ｸｰ･ｮｾｮ｣･＠ ｳｭ｡ｬｬｾｲ＠ declInes m equity 
value. Second, they found that downgraded banks I.ncrease their .use of deP?SIts followmg the downgrade,. 
indicating that bank managers perceive the costs of msured ､Ｎ･ｰｯｾｬｴｾ＠ ｾｯ＠ have mcreased less than the costs ot 
. d l' b'l't' Th efore the market's ability to discipline IS dimInished by the relatIve low cost of msured 
msure Ia Illes. er , . I' b'I" . db) 
deposits and the ability of banks to substitutes these claims for market-pnced Ia 1 Ities (I.e. e t . 
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regulatory requirements. 37 He adds that an explanation for this issue is that although 
regulators have set the right level of capital requirements, the market has coordinated on 
standards for prudent banks that exceed the true economic level of capital and the socially 
optimal level of capital. Moreover, even though these standards are excessive in terms of 
economic capital, banks have to follow them otherwise they would be punished by the market, 
where depositors could withdraw their funds or banks become unable to access certain 
markets anymore if their capital levels fall below their peers' levels. 
We are going to assess the effect of each type of capital requirements on banks, but 
with taking into consideration the effect of ownership. In other words, we will try to detect the 
importance of regulation and market forces on domestic and foreign banks separately. We will 
try, in addition to detect some important issues, for instance: (1) how domestic and foreign 
banks are affected (and react) to capital requirements, (2) how the effect of regulation vs. the 
effect of market forces changes between domestic and foreign banks, and (3) whether 
domestic and foreign banks are affected by the market forces in the same way and the same 
magnitude. We will start by shedding a light on the findings of the literature on bank capital 
and we will see the empirical findings on the effect of regulation and market forces on bank 
capital. Moreover, we will extract some hypotheses that will be tested empirically in the 
following sections. 
3.6.1 Capital Regulation 
Deposit insurance may give banks an incentive to increase risk by increasing the risk 
of their assets or increasing their leverage. This risk-shifting incentive and the potential 
externalities resulting from bank failures, has been among the reasons for regulating bank 
capital. Depositors are fully insured and therefore, they have no incentive to adjust the demand 
returns for the risk undertaken by the bank. Moreover, because sometimes the deposit 
insurance charges banks flat insurance premium, this gives them an incentive to increase risk. 
37 He says that in the 1990s and early 2000s, banks in the G 10 countries ｾ｡ｶ･＠ ｣ｯｮｳｩｳｴｾｮｴｬｹ＠ held capital that far 
exceeds the regulatory minimum requirement. For instance, US bank holdmg compan.les. have ｾｮ＠ .average held 
between 12 and 13 percent capital throughout the 1990s. Similarly, UK banks and bUlldmg socletIes have held 
between 12 and 14 percent throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
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Santos (2000) argues that the need to regulate banks is caused by corporate governance 
problems arising from the separation of ownership from management. When frictions prevent 
the writing of complete contracts between shareholders and managers, the financial structure 
of a firm is important because it determines the allocation of control rights among the firm's 
claimholders. In the case of banks, an efficient allocation of control rights need to take account 
of the fact that bank debtholders (depositors) are not in a position to monitor managers 
because they are small and uninformed and thus, they need a representative. Banks' 
shareholders favour no interference, while depositors are more conservative. Moreover, the 
lower the bank's solvency, the stronger the shareholders' bias towards more risk and the 
weaker the depositors' bias against risk. According to Santos, an efficient regulation requires 
an increase in interference when bank performance deteriorates and includes a credible 
mechanism to transfer control to the regulator when the bank's solvency is low. The minimum 
solvency requirement could be part of such regulation if it defines the threshold for the 
transfer of control to the regulator. 
Bank regulators face agency conflict regarding the firms they supervise because of 
different goals and objectives, asymmetric information, or dishonesty. Banking authorities use 
the regulatory interference in an attempt to correct an unsafe or unsound banking practice. The 
major instrument of regulatory interference is capital regulation. 38 As other forms of 
regulation are removed, capital adequacy regulation gets relatively more important. In 
addition, the experience from banking crises in several countries during the last decades have 
made both regulators and the banks themselves more aware of the importance of a sufficient 
capital-to-asset ratio. Both the 1988 Basle Capital Accord (Bas Ie I) and the proposals from the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision to update and revise legislation (the forthcoming 
Bas1e II) include minimum capital requirements. 
Many empirical studies have tried to assess the impact of capital requirements on 
banks' capital level, and how important regulations are in determining banks' capitalisation. 
Those studies have found that regulators represent an important factor in determining banks' 
38 Other instruments include cease-and-desist orders, removal of officers and directors, the threat of termination 
of deposit insurance, and denial of requests for expansion into new products or markets. 
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capital level, not dominant though. In our analysis, we will detect the effect of regulation on 
banks, with considering the separation between domestic and foreign banks. For both groups, 
we do not expect that the capital regulation will be able to explain the entire behaviour and 
variability of bank capital. 39 In order to test the regulatory effects, we will try to fmd out the 
relationship between three variables (the risky assets, the off-balance sheet activities and the 
treasury bills) and the bank capital of domestic and foreign banks, and how the two groups of 
banks adjust their capital according to these factors. 
3.6.1.1 Risky Assets 
According to RBC rules (to which banks operating 10 the Lebanese market are 
subject), the level of bank capital should vary according to the riskiness of the bank's 
portfolio. Therefore, the more the percentage of risky assets in the bank's portfolio, the more 
the required capital. Several empirical studies employed the loan-to-asset ratio as a proxy for 
bank risky assets and tried to find out its influence on the level of capitalisation. For instance, 
Dahl and Shrieves (1990) included this ratio to proxy portfolio risk since it is positively 
correlated with the probability that a bank will increase equity in anticipation of higher loan 
losses. They find a positive and significant impact for this variable on bank's capital and that 
banks need more capital to fund potential losses on their loan portfolio. Dahl and Spivey 
(1996) also fmd a positive and significant relation between banks' loan-to-asset ratio and 
equity acquisition. They claim that the greater portfolio risk increases subsequent need for 
capital. 
39 Barrios and Blanco (2003) developed two models to explain the way Spanish banks set their capital level. The 
first is a "market model", which contains banks that are not affected by regulation since their capital level is 
higher then regulated one, and depends on a set of variables (e.g. bank size, liquidity premium, ｯｰ･ｲ｡ｴｩｮｾ＠ costs, 
variance of ROA, credit risk and liquidity risk). The second, the "regulatory model", explains the behavIOur of 
banks whose capital ratio is below regulator one. They found that the market model explains better the behaviour 
of Spanish commercial banks, and the average probability of belonging to either regime. (the market or the 
regulatory regime) was close to 0.7 and 0.3 respectively, which provides evide.nce ｯｦｾｨｾ＠ dominance ｯｦＮｴｾ･＠ market 
model. They declare that capital adequacy regulation is a factor related to capItal ､･｣ｬｳｾｯｮｳＬ＠ ｨｯｾ･ｶ･ｲＬ＠ It IS not the 
most important, and the pressure of market forces is the main determinant of banks capItal reqUIrements. 
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3.6.1.2 Treasury Bills Investments 
Again according to the RBC rules, different assets with different riskiness, require the 
hold of different capital. Capital requirement represents a motive for banks to shift their 
balance sheet assets from investments that require high capital (e.g. commercial loans) 
towards investments that require less capital (e.g. treasury bills). So higher capital 
requirements push banks to invest more in T -bills since they require less capital to be held. 
Dietrich and James (1983) employ the ratio of U.S. treasury securities to total deposits as a 
proxy for default risk, and claim that the higher this ratio, the less risk from default associated 
with the portfolio and hence, the less capital desired. Their empirical findings support this 
hypothesis, and show a negative and significant effect of treasury investments on capital 
changes. 
3.6.1.3 Off-Balance Sheet Activities 
Off-balance sheet activities are subject to capital requirements, just as are on-balance 
sheet items and any expansion in OBS requires additional capital. Empirical studies claim that 
aBS activities are positively correlated with higher capital level. Rime (2001) says that capital 
regulation in Switzerland was revised in 1989 to take account of the development of off-
balance sheet and securitisation activities. This reform, which constituted a partial 
harmonisation with the Basle accord, introduced heavier charges for off-balance sheet 
activities (i.e. more capital). 
We believe that banks react to regulation and specifically to capital regulation 
differently according to ownership (domestic vs. foreign). We will test this empirically and 
therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
HI: domestic banks and foreign banks are affected differently by regulation and the 
reaction of domestic banks and foreign banks to a change in regulation is different 
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3.6.2 Effect of Deposit Insurance 
Although capital requirements represent the main way of intervention of the authorities 
in the banking system, it is not the only instrument that guarantees the stability and soundness 
of banks. These ways of intervention are, for instance, the deposit insurance, the unconditional 
payment guarantees, and the lender of last resort. The lender of last resort (the central bank) 
provides banks with the liquidity (when needed) by discounting their assets, thus, banks avoid 
liquidating them and realising losses from the distress sale of assets. Therefore, the central 
bank plays a very important role in providing solvent but illiquid banks with needed liquidity. 
Therefore, it is important to test the influence of the safety net on banks, and how significant 
this influence is. In our case study, the safety net is formed by deposit guarantee (provided by 
the National Deposit Insurance Company) and the lender of last resort (the central bank). 
Berger et al. (1995) compared the effect of the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1914 and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933 on banks capital levels. They say that 
the creation of both institutions has reduced the risk of bank failures: the Federal Reserve by 
permitting banks to obtain liquidity through discounting assets and the FDIC by providing 
unconditional government guarantee for most bank creditors. Although the establishment of 
the two institutions has led to a decrease in banks capitalisation, they find that the creation of 
the Federal Reserve led to a small reduction in capital ratios, whereas the FDIC establishment 
had a larger and more-lasting effect. Hence, we will focus on the effect of deposit insurance on 
bank capital. We will proxy for this effect by the deposit-to-total liability ratio, assuming that 
the more the bank is financed by deposits the lower would be the market capital requirements 
(since all depositors are guaranteed even if the bank failed). 
Government deposit insurance may protect banks from runs, but at a cost because it 
leads to moral hazard. By offering a guarantee that depositors are not subject to loss, the 
provider of deposit insurance bears a risk. This diminishes depositors' incentive to monitor 
banks and to demand an interest payment appropriate with the risk of the bank. Furthermore, 
when the insurance scheme charges the bank a flat rate premium, the bank does not intemalise 
the full cost of risk and therefore it has an incentive to take on more risk and its appetite for 
risk taking increases with an increase in competition in the banking sector. For instance, 
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Dietrich and James (1983) claim that a conflict arises between the level of equity desired by 
bank shareholders and the level desired by the deposit insurance. With partial insurance, 
shareholders benefit from additional equity fmancing through a reduction in the required 
contracted rate on partial insured deposits. Therefore, the expected sign on the insurance 
variable is negative. The larger the proportion of completely insured deposit the less benefit 
accrues to shareholders from augmenting capital. Allen and Rai (1996) say that an increase in 
government subsidies may encourage banks to view the governmental safety net as a 
substitute for capital and, hence, reduce their capital levels. So, creditors and other bank 
shareholders may require lower capital in the presence of extensive and generous government 
guarantees. Cull et al. (2002) argue that deposit insurance schemes are primarily intended to 
reduce the risk of systemic failure of banks and to stabilise the payments and financial system, 
however it could lead to greater systemic instability. In typical deposit insurance scheme, if a 
depository institution becomes insolvent, the insuring government agency absorbs all (or 
nearly all) of the depositors' losses. This engenders a moral hazard problem because it creates 
an incentive for depository institutions to engage in excessively high-risk activities. They add 
that capital regulation is one way to mitigate the distortionary effects of deposit insurance, but 
it effectiveness is limited. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) argue that deposit insurance invites banks 
to seek excessive portfolio risk and keep lower liquidity reserves relative to the social 
optimum. Thus, regulatory restriction aimed at limiting risk taking may be necessary, in the 
form of cash-asset reserve requirements and the risk-sensitive capital requirements and deposit 
premia. Finally, because the deposit insurance makes banks carry more risk, it could even 
have a negative on the entire banking system. For instance, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000) 
studied the effect of deposit insurance in 61 countries and found that variations in coverage, 
funding or management of deposit insurance schemes are significant determinants of the 
likelihood of banking crisis, especially across countries where interest rates have been 
deregulated and the overall institutional framework is weak. 40 Cooper and Ross (2002) claim 
that although deposit insurance avoids bank runs, it implies less monitoring by depositors. 
40 The trade-off introduced by deposit insurance - ruling out bank runs at the expen,se of moral hazard - has 
motivated proposals to change the design of the deposit insurance ｳ｣ｾ･ｭ･＠ or mt:0duce complementary 
regulations aimed at reducing the moral hazard while maintaining the protectIOn to deposltor,s, The ｭｯｳｾ＠ frequent 
proposals to deal with the moral hazard caused by deposit insurance are to charge banks nsk-related msurance 
premiums and to regulate their capital structure, 
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which allows banks to hold riskier portfolio. If deposit insurance is complete enough, 
depositors and bank's interest are aligned: both are keen to hold risky portfolio, "effectively 
gambling with taxpayers' money". They demonstrated that a potential consequence of the 
combination of an inadequate capital requirement with a generous deposit insurance fund is 
the type of banking instability observed in the US during the 1980s. 
3.6.3 Asymmetric Information and Signalling 
The private information produced by banks regarding their loan customers creates an 
asymmetric information problem for banks vis-a-vis financial markets. Bank managers have 
more information about their banks' financial condition than the capital markets. Because of 
this opacity, the market draws inferences from the actions of the bank and managers may 
signal information to the market through capital decisions. If it is less costly for a "good" bank 
to signal high quality through increased leverage than for a "bad" bank, a signalling 
equilibrium may exist in which banks that expect to have better future performance have lower 
capital. Alternatively, a signalling equilibrium may exist in which higher capital signals 
favourable private information. Asymmetric information combined with transaction costs of 
new issues may also influence the relative costs of internal versus external finance and the 
relative costs of debt versus equity. When raising funds from external sources, especially the 
costs of issuing equity, transaction costs may be substantial. 
Hughes and Mester (1998) say that managers use the level of financial capital to signal 
the level of risk, where an increase in financial capital reduces the probability of insolvency. 
Since financial capital constitutes the bank's own bet on its management of risk, it conveys a 
credible signal to depositors of the resources allocated to preserving capital and insuring the 
safety of their depositors. (Sinkey 2002, pp 269-270) claims that the confidence in a bank is a 
function of the real or economic net worth, the stability of economic or real earnings, and the 
information quality. Each of these factors has a positive and direct effect on confidence for 
individual banks and the banking system. The more economic net worth a bank has and the 
more stable a bank's (real) earnings are, the safer it is perceived to be. Besides, the better the 
quality of information available about a bank's financial conditions, the more confidence 
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interested parties have in the banle Because banks hold capital to resolve agency conflicts 
between shareholders and depositors, creditors, and guarantors, equity capital provides 
assurances to these parties that banks will not take on excessive risk. Moreover, because it is 
common to view bank capital or net worth as a cushion to absorb unexpected losses arising 
from credit, interest rate, and operating risks, bank capital can be viewed as the critical 
element in generating confidence about a bank's ability to handle uncertainty. 
Do all banks "signal"? In other words, do all banks use their capitalisation level to 
signal for confidence? We believe that this (costly) strategy is not implemented by all banks 
all times to attract depositors. 41 To detect this issue, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: signalling is a (costly) strategy that is not adopted by all banks, and implemented in 
certain circumstances. 
3.6.4 The cyclicality of bank capital 
Berger et al. (1995) argue that banks may hold excess capital to be able to exploit 
unexpected investment opportunities. This argument, in fact, depends on how difficult it is for 
a bank in the short run to increase its capital, and may expect banks' buffer capital to decline 
in periods of high economic growth, since more profitable projects are likely to exist. It is 
important to analyse the variation of banks' capital level over the business cycle from the 
perspective of the pro-cyclicality of both the present and the forthcoming capital requirement. 
As a result of their evaluation of future risk and investment opportunities today versus 
tomorrow, banks may use their buffer capital to either dampen or increase the pro-cyclical 
effects embedded in the legislation. (Cull et aI., 2002) claim that the pro-cyclicality comes 
from the closer link between risk and capital requirement. In an economic downturn, risk is 
more likely to increase, and the capital requirement may therefore increase. Banks are 
expected to respond by reducing their supply of new loans, and this will slow down economic 
growth, while the opposite is expected to happen in an economic development. Therefore, 
41 Another way for "signalling" may be the issuance of bonds. We focus on the ｵｳｾｧ･Ｎｯｦ＠ capital to signal because 
only recently banks in Lebanon started expanding their issuance of different financlal Instruments. 
106 
banks may use their buffer capital to either dampen or increase the pro-cyclical effects as a 
result of their evaluation of future risk and investment opportunities today contra tomorrow. 
Does this theory applied for all banks at all times? In other words, is bank capital 
cyclicality applied for all banks in all times? This could not be the case. To test for this issue , 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: the cyclicality of bank capital does not apply for all banks, and is limited by certain 
eirc umstances. 
3.6.5 Size Effects and the "Too-Big-to-Fail" Theory 
O'Hara and Shaw (1990) tested the effect of the Too-Big-to-fail policy implemented to 
some banks by the regulator in the US in September 1984, and found a wealth creation to the 
banks subject to this policy. 42 The claim that the market reaction to this policy was because it 
could have an effect on bank's cost of funds. Because its cost of funds no longer tied to its 
riskiness, the bank has an incentive to increase the risk of its operations, which should also 
lead to a higher expected return. 
Studies that try to find the market capital requirement and the determinants of banks 
capital level show a negative impact of the size on the level of capital. Among those studies, 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Rime and Stiroh (2003) who find a negative and significant 
relation between size and capital, indicating that bank size has a negative effect on capital 
level. Bongini et al. (2001) found evidence of too-big-to-fail policies pursued by national 
authorities in the East Asian countries included in the crisis countries sample. Chiuri et al. 
(2002) tested the effect of capital adequacy requirements (according to Basle Accord) on bank 
lending policies in 15 emerging markets. They found that changes in deposits and in loans are 
42 Kaufman (2002) illustrates the emergence of the Too-big-to-fail theory in 1984, where this term is frequently 
used in banking to describe how bank regulators deal with troubled banks. He says that the term came into usage 
when the regulators in the US were faced with the insolvent Continental Illinois National in Chicago, which was 
the largest seventh bank in the country and the largest correspondent bank having interbank deposit and Fed 
funds relationship with more than 2200 other banks. Rather than allowing the bank to fail, ｴｾ･＠ federal regulators 
protected all uninsured deposits and creditors against loss by recapitalising the bank and kept It solvent. 
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positively affected by changes in capital. Moreover, they found that both deposits and loans 
grow at a higher rate for larger banks. They argue that this is consistent with the Too-Big-To-
Fail hypothesis, according to which consciousness that the risk of closure during the crisis is 
lower for larger institutions drives depositors to move their deposits to larger banks. 
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) also found a negative relation between capital-to-asset ratio 
and bank size and that increasing in bank size is associated with lower capital ratios, 
suggesting that larger internal capital markets allow banks to operate with a smaller cushion 
against insolvency. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) studied the riskiness of Japanese banks, and 
found that bank total assets were negatively and significantly related to bank riskiness, 
suggesting that large banks are more capable of managing risks than small banks. By 
managing their risk, large banks may be able to hold relatively less capital than smaller banks. 
Finally, Lindquist (2004) found a negative effect of size on Norwegian banks' buffer. He 
claimed that this could be due to the higher level of monitoring and screening in large banks 
due to scale economies may reduce the need for buffer capital as insurance. The negative size 
effect may also come from a diversification effect not captured by the measure of credit risk. 
A third explanation is related to the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. 
Besides, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) studied the determinants of U.S. bank's capital 
changes ＨｾｃａｐＩ＠ between two periods of time. Their results show a negative impact of size on 
.1CAP. However, the size variable was more significant for low capitalised banks than for 
high-capitalised banks. They argued that this could be interpreted as indicating that large 
banks were either subject to less regulatory pressure to increase capital, or that pressure 
exerted was less effective. Rime (2001) repeated the same test for Swiss banks. He also finds 
that the size of banks has a negative and significant impact on capital changes, indicating that 
large banks increased their ratio of capital to risk-weighted-assets less than other banks. 
Moreover, he finds that large banks have excess capital less than smaller ones do. He argues 
that their lower excess capital may be related to their easy access to capital markets, which 
allows them to raise capital quickly. Also Godlewski (2005) has recently applied a similar 
equations framework to those of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) but for emerging markets and 
found similar results: the size of banks has a negative and significant impact. 43 Dahl and 
43 His sample consists of 30 emerging markets from Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and South America. 
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Shrieves (1990) and Dahl and Spivey (1996) analyse the factors influencing equity issuance of 
U.S. banks. They include the lagged size of banks in their model to account for the influence 
of banks' size on target capital levels. They fmd that the size has a negative and significant 
effect on the required amount of equity issuance. This means that the bigger the bank, the 
lesser the required amount of equity to be acquired is. Houston and James (1998) argue that by 
establishing an internal capital market within a bank holding company, larger and diversified 
banks can more efficiently allocate funds within the organisation and avoid or lessen external 
financing costs. Such transfers of capital across regions may be difficult and costly if the bank 
is not affiliated with a bank holding company. They find that although both affiliated and 
unaffiliated banks appear to be cash flow constrained and both types of banks find it relatively 
costly to raise external capital, but the wedge between the cost of internal and external capital 
is larger for unaffiliated banks. The reason may be that bank holding companies are typically 
much larger than the average unaffiliated bank and their size is likely to make it easier for 
them to raise external capital, thereby reducing the wedge between the cost of internal and 
external capital. 
3.6.6 Performance Effects 
Profitability may have a positive impact on bank's capital when a bank can increase its 
capital through retained earnings rather than through equity issues, since the latter may signal 
negative information to the market about the bank's value. The literature has shown a positive 
impact of profitability (ROA) on bank's capital. For instance, Marcus (1983) fmds a positive 
influence of ROA on capital-to-non cash assets for U.S. banks. Allen and Rai (1996) detected 
the determinants of bank capital level and used the NIM as a proxy for the profitability. Their 
results show a positive and significant effect of this factor on banks capital level. Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) tested the relation between banks' inefficiency and their capital level. They 
discover that cost-inefficient banks are likely to have low or even negative earnings, which 
reduce their capital. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) find a positive and significant relation 
between ROA and capital. They also find that the capitalisation is driven positively by ROA 
confirming that profitability leads to higher capital. Dietrich and James (1983), Jacques and 
Nigro (1997) and Rime (2001) find that current earnings (ROA) have a positive and 
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significant impact on capital changes, indicating that profitable banks can more easily improve 
their capitalisation through retained earnings. Regarding the factors influencing equity 
issuance of U.S. banks, Dahl and Shrieves (1990) and Dahl and Spivey (1996) tested the 
impact of profitability on the required equity acquisition (equity issuance). They found that the 
higher the expected ROA, the lower the desired amount of required equity acquisition in order 
to realise the targeted capital level. This negative and significant relation between ROA and 
the equity acquisition implies that profitability is an indication of the expected capability of a 
bank to generate equity internally through retained earnings. 
3.6.7 Credit Risk Effects 
Credit risk and the quality of assets have a direct effect on banks' survival. Therefore, 
regulators require from banks to have a higher capital according to its risk level since heavy 
losses resulted from investments and lending reduce the capital. Dahl and Shierves (1990) 
argue that the higher the credit risk facing a bank's loan portfolio, the higher the needed 
capital to absorb the potential losses. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) show that changes in capital 
levels are positively related to changes in asset risk and changes in non-performing loans 
(NPLs). Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) find a negative and significant relation between capital 
and bad loans indicating that credit risk and financial leverage reinforce each other. They 
claim that greater financial leverage tends to have a positive effect on credit risk, and 
capitalisation responds negatively to higher credit risk. Berger and DeYoung (1997) studied 
the effect of previous losses on bank's capital, and used lagged NPLs (for years t-l to t-4). 
Their results show has a positive and significant coefficient suggesting that high levels of 
NPLs require high capital ratios. This positive relation was significant only for low-capital 
banks, which shows that these banks take action to increase capital after NPLs increase, 
perhaps under pressure form regulators or capital markets. According to Blose (2001) loan 
loss provisioning (LLP) affects a banking firm in several ways: first, the reported net income 
will be less for the period in which the LLP is taken. On the other hand, if the bank eventually 
writes down the asset, the write down will reduce taxes and thus increase the firm's cash flo\\,. 
Second, since measures of capital adequacy are generally calculated using the book value of 
assets and book value of equity, the provisioning of loans and their associated write-downs 
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will cause a decline in these capital adequacy measures. Blose finds that LLP announcements 
have more effects on less capitalised banks, which indicates that the associated write-downs 
worsen capital adequacy problems for banks. Chen (2001) studied the interactions between the 
banking sector, asset prices and aggregate economic activity. In a basic model without asset 
fluctuation, when banks suffer capital erosion due to loan losses, banks with weak capital 
positions find it difficult to seek alternative sources of finance and are forced to cut back 
lending. With less investment from the previous period, entrepreneurs and banks earn less 
revenue and end up with a lower level of net worth, which further weakens the lending 
capability of banks and borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs. When fluctuations of asset prices 
are taken into account, the asset price becomes a dominant factor in determining the bank's 
capital-to-asset ratio and entrepreneurial leverage. 
3.6.8 Deposit Growth Effects 
High deposits and high deposit growth represent a very important (relatively cheap) 
source of funds to finance the bank's investments. Empirical work finds a positive correlation 
between deposit growth and bank's capital. Dietrich and James (1983) tested the effect of 
deposit growth on capital changes and found that the former has a positive effect on the later. 
They claim that to maintain a particular capital structure, the bank will increase its use of 
capital as deposits grow. Swindle (1995) also found a positive and significant impact of 
deposit growth on capital changes. Dahl and Shrieves (1990) find a positive and significant 
impact of deposit growth on equity issuance. They explain that issuing banks are characterised 
by rapid growth, and those banks need more capital to fund expected future asset growth. 
Finally, Allen and Rai (1996) found that deposit growth affects positively bank capital level. 
On the other hand, Soledad et al. (2001) and Chiuri et al. (2002) find that deposits respond to 
bank risk taking, particularly to capital adequacy risk. A rise in the capital-to-asset ratio leads 
to an increase in the growth rate of deposits, which conclude that depositors tend to prefer 
well-capitalised banks and higher capitalisation attracts more deposits. 
III 
3.7 Methodology 
3.7.1 Model Specification 
We assume that a bank capital is determined by two types of variables: market capital 
requirements and regulatory capital requirements. So the capital level (C) depends upon a set 
of exogenous internal variables X, exogenous external variables, Y, the regulatory R, and a 
stochastic disturbance term E: 
C = aX + bY + cR + E (3.1 ) 
Among the internal factors, we can cite the bank's size, profitability, ownership 
structure, etc ... , and for the external factors there is GDP. On the other hand, the regulatory is 
the capital requirements and reserve requirements set by the regulators. The exogenous 
variables in equation 3.1 are related to the capital level as follow: 44 
CAF:t = f30 + f31 R04/ + ｦＳＲｓｉｚｾＯ＠ + ｦＳＳＰｂｾＯ＠ + f34DEI?t + f35 RISKJ; + ｦＳＶｄｅｐｉｎｾ＠
+ f37 CRDRIS1), + ｦＳＸｔｂｉｌｌｾ＠ + f39 L1Q/ + ｦＳＱＰＰｾＯ＠ + f311 FOREIGlYr + f312SIGNAIn (3.2) 
+ f313 CONC; + f314 GD/?+C/ 
3.7.2 The Implication of the Explanatory Variables 
Regarding the explanatory variables, we will employ the following. 45 Firstly, for 
foreign ownership, we define a bank as "foreign", if it has more than 50% of its equity under 
foreign control. Consequently, this will include domestic banks under foreign control and the 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. We proxy for this factor by a dummy variable (FOREIGN) that 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is "foreign", zero otherwise. We detect the effect of bank 
profitability (ROA) on their capital. CRDRISK will control for the effect of credit risk. SIZE 
44 Same as in the previous chapter, we will not include all the control variables in one single model, because 
including perfectly correlated variables will lead to a misspecification problem. The test for multicolinearity will 
show what variables should not be included together. 
45 For the calculation of the variables, see Appendix 3.B 
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of a bank will be utilised to control for the effect of bank size. The risky assets (RISKY), off-
balance sheet activities (OBS) and t-bills investments (T -bills) to control for the effect of 
regulation. OEPINS 46 and OEP controls for the effect of deposit insurance and costumer 
deposit growth on bank capital. LIQ is utilised to detect the effect of liquidity 
requirements/reserves on bank capital. We test for the effect of institutional ownership on 
banks by employing a dummy variable (OWN) that takes the value of 1 in the presence of an 
institutional ownership in the bank, zero otherwise. For the effect of asymmetric information 
and how banks use their capital as signal for solvency, we employ SIGNAL. 47 To proxy for 
the effect of competition on banks profits and consequently on their capital, we utilise the 
proportion of the top 5 banks' assets of the entire banking sector's assets (CONC). Finally, to 
control for the effect of the economic environment on banks' capital and to detect the 
cyc1icality of bank capital, we exploit the GOP growth (GOP). The expectations reported in 
Table 3.1 are based on the findings of previous empirical studies. The variable reported with 
"?" have no a priori expectations, due to the lack of relevant empirical studies. 
46 A note on the deposit insurance in Lebanon is that the National ｄ･ｰｯｾｩｴ＠ Guarantee Institu,tion (NDGI) ｰｲｯｶｩ､ｾｳ＠
the insurance to deposits in Lebanon, which was established after the faIlure of Bank Intra In 1966. T?e NDGI IS 
a cooperative joint stock company, where banks participate in half of , its ,capital and the government In t,he, other 
half, and this capital is increased or decreased whenever a new bank IS hsted or Ｌ､･ｬｾｴ･､＠ from the banks hst, by 
the amount of the bank's contribution plus the equivalent government contrIbut,lOn. ｔｨｾ＠ NDGI guarantees 
resident and non-resident deposits in all currencies, except foreign currency depOSIts held In ｢ｲ｡ｾ｣ｨ･ｳ＠ ｾ｢ｾｯ｡､Ｌ＠
The board of directors of the NDGI is formed of seven members: three are appointed by the Council of Ministers 
and they represent the government, and four are elected by the member ?anks in a general assembly, The ｾｄｾｉ＠
source of funds is the annual premium paid by banks, and an amount paId annually by the government, which IS 
equal to the total annual premium paid by all banks. Source: the cen,tral bank of ｌ･ｾ｡ｮｯｮＬ＠ , 
47 Lindquist (:2004) tested the effect of competition on NorwegIan bank's, capItal ｾｵｦｦ･ｲＮ＠ To 'proxy for, thiS 
variable, he used a bank's competitors' average capital. We use the same varIable but Implementing the avt:rage 
113 
e n eoen ent ana TabI 3 1 I d d V' bI es. Exoected ｓｩｾ＠ of Coefficients 
I Variable I Expected sign 
ROA + 
SIZE 
-
OBS + 
DEP + 
RISKY + 
DEPINS 
-
CRDRISK + 
TBILLS 
-
LIQ 
-
OWN ? 
FOREIGN 
-
SIGNAL + 
CONC + 
GOP + 
3.8 Data 
To estimate Equation 3.2, we use a panel data set for the Lebanese commercial banks 
between 1993 and 2003, i.e. 11 years. Annual data (balance sheets and P&L accounts) are 
used for almost all of the population of Lebanese commercial banks. Few banks were dropped 
from the study because of lack of data. Data for some banks for some years were not available 
therefore we are analysing an unbalanced sample. 
The source of data is BilanBanques. Regarding the macroeconomic variables, we use 
end of year figures (reported by the central bank of Lebanon) to be consistent with the year 
end banks' data. Banks' balance sheets show that most banks hold a capital ratio well above 
of the entire banking sector, since although these banks differ in size and ownership, they are all commercial 
banks and they serve the same markets and have similar activities. 
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the required mInImUm, however, and a better understanding of how these capital are 
determined and how they vary across banks and over time may help us to understand the effect 
of capital adequacy regulation for domestic banks and foreign banks. 
The study focuses on the differences in capitalisation between domestic and foreign 
banks, thus, we split the sample into three sub-samples according to their ownership: the first 
sub-sample contains domestic banks with domestic control, the second contains domestic 
banks with foreign control, and the third contains foreign banks. The following figure shows 
the evolution of the equity-to-asset ratio for the entire sample and for the three sub-samples: 
Figure 3.1: The Evolution orBank Equity-to-asset ratio (According to Ownership) 
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To understand the data subject to analysis, we present some descriptive statistics for 
the period 1993-2003 in the following two tables. Table 3.2 contains the descriptive statistics 
for domestic banks, and Table 3.3 contains the descriptive statistics for foreign banks. 
115 
Table 3.2: D 
Iii tive Statistics for D tic C . 1 Bank 
CAP ROA DEP I RISKY I DEPINS I CRDRISK I T-BILLS I LIQ 
1993 Mean 4.42 0.36 27.88 66.54 81.40 67.95 23.30 64.61 
Median 3.58 0.17 27.47 67.58 85.68 14.16 19.83 66.02 
SD 4.25 0.46 28.01 12.79 14.17 309.63 10.00 12.39 
Maximum 19.33 1.70 135.80 94.63 94.14 2019.76 47.17 89.79 
Minimum 0.02 0.00 -15.43 29.59 14.36 0.00 2.18 23.03 
1994 Mean 6.19 1.22 33.20 56.58 79.93 20.12 28.77 62.83 
Median 4.95 0.97 32.50 56.57 83.72 10.60 27.68 61.39 
SD 4.63 1.55 23.81 11.18 12.99 35.43 9.42 10.46 
Maximum 19.29 7.12 89.62 81.79 93.92 194.22 51.07 94.53 
Minimum 0.06 -2.80 -32.34 29.84 17.78 0.00 7.47 36.13 
1995 Mean 10.35 1.05 25.57 58.72 74.93 19.78 27.78 58.25 
Median 6.72 0.96 17.90 59.06 81.54 11.24 27.42 57.43 
SD 14.35 1.77 31.27 13.27 20.28 39.14 10.47 12.02 
Maximum 98.09 6.86 160.55 100.00 90.69 246.76 47.93 97.10 
Minimum 2.55 -5.30 -47.55 16.40 1.46 0.00 0.00 32.72 
1996 Mean 9.02 1.34 33.37 55.38 76.63 19.46 31.73 61.23 
Median 7.14 1.20 31.28 54.15 80.59 8.18 31.82 61.51 
SD 5.34 1.87 20.66 12.37 17.27 41.78 11.33 12.10 
Maximum 25.05 11.66 87.60 100.00 90.51 270.66 55.39 97.78 
Minimum 3.38 -2.38 -8.32 22.41 3.31 0.00 0.00 25.17 
1997 Mean 13.85 1.20 27.47 56.68 76.62 15.78 26.55 61.58 
Median 9.03 1.28 23.20 56.27 80.82 12.21 26.81 60.72 
SD 15.37 1.20 21.96 13.61 15.76 15.82 11.41 11.92 
Maximum 89.26 5.62 88.72 81.53 87.56 74.74 49.48 97.87 
Minimum 3.61 -0.69 -25.88 14.59 3.91 0.00 1.43 35.69 
1998 Mean 12.49 1.17 36.80 56.88 75.85 14.20 31.32 60.83 
Median 8.78 1.10 21.50 57.56 80.73 10.32 31.24 62.06 
SD 10.81 1.24 65.57 12.51 12.34 13.04 10.86 10.35 
Maximum 49.87 6.89 363.41 81.67 92.82 67.85 57.85 78.32 
Minimum 3.28 -0.08 -54.73 30.84 40.74 0.00 5.57 36.06 
-
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1999 Mean 10.37 0.63 26.93 54.83 79.53 14.24 33.85 59.25 
Median 8.08 0.75 15.65 53.88 81.59 11.38 34.19 59.40 
SD 7.77 0.77 54.02 11.43 7.49 11.14 10.62 11.16 
Maximum 41.72 1.91 295.54 81.54 89.09 57.85 57.57 76.09 
Minimum 3.07 -1.23 -66.67 26.05 54.90 0.34 8.85 22.06 
2000 Mean 9.97 0.50 18.93 56.18 80.58 15.37 31.46 61.46 
Median 7.84 0.56 14.69 56.57 82.10 13.01 30.91 64.87 
SD 6.70 0.84 26.37 13.07 8.15 12.26 12.30 11.23 
Maximum 39.01 1.78 111.35 85.29 89.88 62.75 64.02 76.86 
Minimum 3.99 -2.57 -21.04 24.29 54.69 0.13 4.43 34.99 
2001 Mean 9.49 0.47 23.73 53.06 82.37 18.86 30.03 64.82 
Median 7.71 0.58 9.77 49.17 83.74 15.44 32.01 68.03 
SD 6.81 0.71 59.11 12.65 6.73 15.52 11.67 11.52 
Maximum 39.88 1.61 327.14 85.11 89.88 75.74 56.13 80.36 
Minimum 3.51 -2.21 -6.73 27.32 55.94 0.06 5.02 39.73 
2002 Mean 9.25 0.68 22.04 51.01 81.80 20.91 33.51 67.08 
Median 8.12 0.72 10.62 47.34 84.48 17.94 35.62 67.36 
SD 6.71 0.49 34.63 14.72 7.26 13.60 12.69 10.06 
Maximum 38.45 1.84 184.94 96.67 89.05 62.11 58.77 83.00 
Minimum 3.69 -0.07 -1.72 24.47 54.54 3.79 2.75 41.80 
2003 Mean 7.70 0.70 20.45 45.66 81.75 24.60 24.27 70.92 
Median 6.73 0.82 16.95 43.06 84.46 22.34 25.96 74.26 
SD 3.89 0.62 14.29 13.55 6.34 17.72 9.00 10.71 
Maximum 18.06 1.67 54.41 78.52 91.13 82.28 38.73 87.40 
Minimum 2.29 -1.41 -0.37 16.39 62.56 4.82 1.96 45.35 
Notes: 
CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; ROA is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; DEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY 
is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-
gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio. 
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Table 3.3: D 
- - --Ii bve Statistics for F - -1Il-- c . I Bank - ------ - - - ---
CAP ROA I DEP I RISKY I DEPINS I CRDRISK I T -BILLS LIQ 
1
1993 Mean 4.83 2.26 17.92 53.37 78.50 136.68 18.26 69.59 
Median 2.71 0.74 16.93 57.74 88.76 19.22 19.11 71.77 
SD 7.07 5.93 20.11 20.41 21.35 436.17 9.39 14.81 
Maximum 31.77 27.05 49.86 92.51 95.01 1971.20 35.21 97.07 
Minimum 0.47 0.00 -13.55 21.02 21.46 0.00 5.56 39.03 
1994 Mean 7.79 1.51 24.07 47.81 75.30 100.82 20.81 68.05 
Median 4.55 1.55 27.00 46.11 84.07 16.52 20.53 70.10 
SD 12.04 1.88 31.72 14.02 21.20 348.35 10.99 13.66 , 
Maximum 56.88 4.94 129.08 76.78 93.96 1577.42 41.62 95.24 
Minimum 0.69 -3.72 -43.05 27.97 22.13 0.00 2.39 40.90 
1995 Mean 9.51 1.69 12.64 48.04 74.49 51.62 21.06 61.92 
Median 6.91 1.56 9.91 50.29 79.77 11.72 18.99 63.39 
SD 9.92 1.49 21.23 16.59 19.47 164.20 10.17 15.83 
Maximum 44.54 5.46 87.25 81.80 92.51 764.19 38.03 92.12 
Minimum 0.75 -0.69 -22.59 23.25 19.60 0.00 1.18 25.64 
1996 Mean 10.08 1.39 21.03 48.32 75.51 40.22 25.83 61.94 
Median 7.48 1.22 23.98 45.03 84.24 7.52 24.34 60.84 
SD 9.20 1.31 16.83 17.89 19.45 122.69 13.12 15.02 
Maximum 40.32 4.82 57.53 89.62 93.98 572.02 50.56 90.86 
Minimum 0.96 -1.27 -8.63 21.15 21.29 0.00 1.82 26.27 
1997 Mean 11.85 1.50 42.35 46.97 71.48 38.22 23.66 63.59 
Median 7.92 1.53 20.79 43.20 79.13 13.20 22.99 66.14 
SO 10.59 1.13 105.06 16.51 19.08 103.54 11.46 15.38 
Maximum 44.77 4.25 481.43 82.27 90.75 475.20 49.16 93.19 
Minimum 1.50 -0.14 -33.74 26.62 34.34 0.00 4.42 30.84 
1998 Mean 8.40 1.00 19.17 16.36 23.66 121.52 12.76 15.97 
Median 7.30 0.97 18.59 47.86 81.13 13.08 20.20 63.04 I 
SO 8.40 1.00 19.17 16.36 23.66 121.52 12.76 15.97 
Maximum 37.16 3.16 60.07 78.69 91.74 568.17 51.08 93.37 
Minimum 2.46 0.00 -40.40 16.97 27.24 0.00 6.73 27.40 
- - -
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! 1999 Mean 14.18 0.58 13.16 45.80 67.77 32.63 29.31 62.38 
Median 8.53 0.83 6.14 44.10 79.81 11.37 24.17 61.24 
SD 17.78 1.77 22.95 18.24 24.26 88.77 15.86 16.39 
Maximum 84.79 3.45 101.48 79.28 93.54 427.00 59.97 91.15 
Minimum 1.58 -4.79 -2.98 17.55 11.73 0.00 8.27 26.69 
2000 Mean 12.48 0.86 32.62 44.67 69.10 34.51 25.07 63.89 
Median 9.94 0.78 9.86 42.84 76.50 19.94 24.40 65.97 
SD 12.56 1.48 81.65 15.66 20.22 82.08 14.70 15.19 
Maximum 57.15 3.23 380.15 79.56 91.54 387.39 51.58 91.42 
Minimum 0.72 -3.08 -5.68 17.79 32.51 0.00 1.45 25.38 
2001 Mean 10.19 0.82 19.00 44.61 74.29 26.73 21.73 65.17 
Median 7.74 0.58 1.28 46.74 84.21 23.51 20.57 61.95 
SD 7.65 1.60 55.65 16.06 18.65 35.50 13.35 15.01 
Maximum 25.79 3.82 203.00 72.89 91.42 152.25 51.72 83.14 
Minimum 2.91 -3.62 -16.55 18.97 27.28 0.00 1.64 28.26 
2002 Mean 9.31 0.96 26.35 42.52 77.17 22.58 22.13 68.23 
Median 6.93 0.74 1.19 42.87 82.37 21.29 19.62 63.37 
SD 6.63 1.14 84.71 14.74 11.97 19.35 13.29 13.49 
Maximum 27.11 3.26 346.36 66.65 90.23 68.82 53.05 89.72 
Minimum 2.97 -1.34 -20.50 14.58 52.76 0.00 5.24 46.18 
2003 Mean 12.76 0.62 -0.19 40.43 77.70 39.11 18.43 68.08 
Median 6.74 0.54 -2.83 40.94 80.91 32.72 14.95 72.47 
SD 17.45 1.05 12.91 13.52 11.56 44.23 12.36 15.49 
Maximum 77.09 2.46 18.27 61.09 90.11 180.17 41.11 92.59 
Minimum 3.03 -1.85 -37.28 14.95 51.33 0.00 4.66 43.37 
Notes: 
CAP is the equity-to-asset ratio; ROA is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; DEP is the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is 
the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross 
loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio. 
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3.9 Empirical Results 
3.9.1 Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects: the Hausman Test 
Firstly, we will perform the Hausman test in order to test the existence of Random 
effects, and thus choosing between the Fixed Effects or the Random Effects model. We run a 
regression model using both the Random Effects and the Fixed Effects, and the results of the 
test of individual coefficient are reported in Appendix 3.e. The critical %12 value is 3.84 at the 
5% level and as we see from column four, the null hypothesis that the two coefficient 
estimates are equal is accepted in 11 cases out of the 13 cases. 
Next, we undertake a joint %2 test of all the coefficients. This results in an m-statistic 
of: m = q'M(q tl q = 153.77 . Since m is distributed asymptotically as %123 which has a critical 
value of 22.36 at the 5% level, this gives evidence of the presence of misspecification in the 
Random Effects model and therefore, we will run all the regressions using the Fixed Effects 
models (LSDV). 
3.9.2 The Entire Sample 
In this section, we include all the banks in our sample regardless of their ownership. 
By doing this, we will be able to compare our results with those reported by the literature. The 
outcomes of the first regression are reported in Table 3.4. 48 Before analysing the individual 
coefficient, we look at the explanatory power of the entire models. These models seem to be 
satisfactory for estimating the determinants of banks' capital since they generate an adjusted 
R-squared of more than 75%. Besides, the F-test shows the significance of the models. 
48 We present different regression models in each section, where each one does not include all the ｣ｯｮｾｯｬ＠
variables. We do this to avoid any multicolinearity among the regressors. The tests ｳｨｯｾ＠ that LIQ and T-bdls 
should not be included together in one single model, as well as OWN and FOREIGN, SInce they are perfectly 
correlated. 
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Table 3.4: The Determinants of Commercial Bank Capital- Regression Estimates for 
h t e Entire Samole 0993-2003) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 46.06** (2.32) 39.17*** (3.02) 47.57** (2.27) 40.26*** (2.88) 
LAG CAP 0.35* 0.91) 0.34* 0.91) 0.34* (1.91) 0.34* 0.91) 
ROA 0.37** (2.12) 0.32** (2.38) 0.45** (2.48) 0.40*** (2.94) 
SD ROA 0.35** (2.16) 0.33 ** (2.18) 0.34** (2.18) 0.33** (2.20) 
SIZE -0.23*** (-2.61) 
-1.85*** (2.68) 
-2.24** (-2.44) 
-1.86** (-2.52) 
OBS -0.11(-1.03) 
-0.12 (-1.04) 
-0.12 (-1.13) 
-0.14 (-1.13) 
DEP -0.003 (-0.30) 
-0.003 (-0.24) 
-0.003 (-0.30) 
-0.003 (-0.25) 
RISKY -0. 1 0 (-1 .44 ) 
-0.09* (-1.82) 
-0.10 (-1.44) 
-0.08* (-1.78) 
DEPINS -0.30*** (-2.98) 
-0.30*** (-2.87) 
-0.29*** (2.98) -0.29*** (-2.8i) 
CRDRISK -0.005* (-1.88) 
-0.005* (-1.73) -0.01 * (-1.86) 
-0.005* (-1.75) 
TBILLS -0.07 (-0.92) 
-0.07 (-0.95) 
LIQ 
-0.04 (-1.14) 
-0.03 (-1.09) 
OWN 0.46 (1.01) 0.67 (l.44) 
FOREIGN -3.59*** (-3.38) -3.55*** (-3.58) 
SIGNAL 0.28*** (5.56) 0.21 ** (2.38) 0.29*** (6.10) 0.23*** (2.69) 
CONC 0.39*** (3.39) 0.44*** (2.75) 0.39*** (3.56) 0.45*** (2.84) 
GDP 0.01 (0.03) 0.12** (2.19) 0.04 (0.15) 0.09** (2.10) 
Adiusted R-squared 0.7506 0.7491 0.7535 0.7518 
TxN 605 605 605 605 
F -statistic 22.909 22.737 23.246 23.049 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 70 commercial banks (domestic 
and foreign) and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of commercial bank capital. 
The dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG _CAP is the year t-1 CAP; ROA is the 
after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SD _ROA is the standard deviation of ROA for the years 1-2, 1-1 and t; 
SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is 
the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total 
liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-
total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals I if the bank 
has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals I if the bank is foreign, 0 
otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total 
banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
From Table 3.4, we conclude the following: the profitability has a positive and strong 
effect on bank's capitalisation and it suggests that banks rely mainly on their (retained) profits 
to increase their capital. Thus, banks (domestic or foreign?) that have higher profitability have 
better ability to boost their capital. The volatility of earnings has a positive effect, which may 
suggest that when these earnings become volatile, banks boost their capital using (external) 
funds. Larger banks keep lower capital than their smaller counterparts, which is shown by the 
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negative and significant effect of SIZE. Thus, we can see clearly that the diversification effects 
and the too-big-to-fail doctrine hold in this context. This is consistent with the findings of the 
literature, which suggest that larger banks have better ability to access capital markets (local 
and/or international) and increase their capital when needed. Larger banks tend to keep lower 
capital, and when they observe new investment opportunities or when capital requirements 
increase, they can "easily" adjust their capital. Regarding OBS activities, RISKY and T -bills, 
we do not see the expected sign and there is no evidence that banks change their capital 
according to the increase or decrease of such items, which is required according to Basle 1. 
This means that the regulatory effect is not binding. 49 By looking at DEPINS, we see that it 
has a negative and significant effect on bank capital. Banks rely on deposits to increase their 
investment capabilities (loans and advances) and when the proportion of deposits among the 
liabilities increases, the importance of the capital decreases. The problem of moral hazard is 
clear here, where banks use the deposit insurance privilege to increase their leverage. 
FOREIGN shows a negative and strong influence effect on capital. However, we have to 
deepen our analysis to see "which" foreign banks are behind this result. The results show 
support for the signalling theory in our case study: banks do use their solvency as a signal to 
depositors and other interested parties. The concentration shows a positive effect on bank's 
capital. Finally, we fmd that GDP has a positive and significant influence on bank's capital. 
This gives support to the theory of bank capital cyclicality and banks do adjust their capital 
according to the economic cycle. 
We can claim that our findings are generally in consistence with the literature when we 
analyse the entire sample of banks and ignore the ownership effects on one hand, and any 
"structural breaks" on the other. Thus, the principles (theories) cited previously, hold in this 
case. However, we will see if by splitting (1) the sample and (2) the time period under study, 
new results will emerge, and if all these principles will still hold. 
49 These findings are consistent with those of Billet et ｡ｾＮ＠ (.19.98), who show that banks consider the market 
discipline (reaction) more importantly than the regulatory dlsclplme. 
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3.9.3 The Determinants of Bank Capital and the Effect of Foreign Ownership 
In this section we split the sample into three sub-samples: (1) domestic banks with 
majority domestic control (ownership), (2) domestic banks with majority foreign control, and 
(3) foreign banks. This division allows detection of the effect of foreign ownership on bank's 
capital shown in Table 3.4 on one hand, and what factors are important in affecting the 
capitalisation level of domestic and foreign banks, on the other. In Table 3.5 we include 
domestic banks only regardless of their ownership to detect the determinants of domestic bank 
capital and to test the effect of foreign investment in domestic banks on capitalisation level. 
The results are as follows. 
The results reported for domestic banks only show some differences from the entire 
sample. The remarks from Table 3.5 are: the profitability of domestic banks has a significant 
positive effect on their capital. Domestic banks depend on retained profits to increase their 
equity. More profitable banks have better ability to meet higher capital requirements. The 
volatility of earnings has lost its effect. This may show that because domestic banks rely 
mainly on retained profits to boost their capital, the volatility of earnings weaken the 
capability of these banks to increase their capital. SIZE shows a negative impact and larger 
domestic banks hold less equity than smaller ones and have higher leverage. Larger domestic 
banks consider themselves "too-big-to-fail" and therefore, they keep less capital. By focusing 
on the effect of regulation, it seems that domestic banks do not adjust their capital according to 
OBS activities, where we do not see an effect of such activities on bank's capital. Regarding 
RISKY, this factors also does not show the expected sign. According to Basle I, the increase 
in risky assets should be accompanied by an increase in capital. However, we do not see that 
domestic banks modify their equity according to the growth of risky assets in their portfolio. 
T -bills show some negative impact on banks' capital and domestic banks tend to invest in 
government bonds because it requires holding less capital according to Basle I. The main 
conclusion from testing the effect of these last three variables is that regulation is not 
significantly binding and it does not have a strong effect on domestic banks behaviour. 
Deposit growth does not show to have a significant influence on domestic banks' capital. But 
DEPINS shows a negative impact on capital, which suggests the existence of the moral hazard 
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problem because they rely on the deposit insurance to lower their capital. The credit risk has a 
positive strong effect on the capital, which means that domestic banks adjust their capital with 
the quality of their asset portfolios and adopt the RBC here. The data show that LIQ is 
negatively correlated with capital, which means that additional liquidity and reserve 
requirements affects negatively the ability of banks to boost capital. 
Table 3.5: The Determinants of Commercial Bank Capital- Regression Estimates for 
Domestic Banks 0993-2003) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 65.29** (2.25) 52.44*** (2.77) 65.23** (2.20) 52.25*** (2.66) 
LAG CAP 0.36* (1.76) 0.340.61) 0.36* (1.79) 0.35 (1.63) 
ROA 0.69** (2.16) 0.55** (2.38) 0.75** (2.35) 0.62** (2.59) 
SD ROA 0.18(0.57) 0.13 (0.45) 0.16 (0.51) 0.10 (0.40) 
SIZE -2.86*** (-2.76) -2.31***(-2.77) -2.90** (-2.59) -2.34*** (-2.68) 
OBS -0.09(-0.92) -0.12 ( 0.96) -0.1 (-1.04) -0.14 (-1.06) 
DEP 0.002 (0.19) 0.004 (0.27) 0.002 (0.19) 0.004 (0.26) 
RISKY -0.14 (-l.21) -0.11(-1.39) -0.13 (- l.21) -0.10 (-1.36) 
DEPINS -0.40*** (-3.15) -0.40*** (-3.01) -0.39*** (-3.12) -0.39*** (-2.98) 
CRDRISK 0.04** (2.20) 0.04** (2.42) 0.03* 0.86) 0.03** (2.07) 
TBILLS -O.13t (-l.27) -0.12t (-l.26) 
LIQ -0.06t (-l.23) -0.05t (-1.22) 
OWN -0.23 (-0.32) 0.14 (0.22) 
FOREIGN -2.73*** (-3.41) -2.77*** (-3.39) 
SIGNAL 0.23* 0.82) 0.15 (0.85) 0.22* (1.78) 0.15 (0.85) 
CONC 0.42*** (3.55) 0.53** (2.56) 0.43*** (3.64) 0.54*** (2.62) 
GDP 0.21 (0.52) 0.20** (2.08) 0.21 (0.54) 0.19*** (2.67) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6789 0.6740 0.6812 0.6765 
TxN 402 402 402 402 
F -statistic 14.900 14.596 15.049 14.747 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSOV). For a sample of 48 domestic commercial banks 
and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of domestic commercial bank capital. 
The dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG_CAP is the year t-1 CAP; ROA is the 
after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SO _ROA is the standard deviation of ROA for the years t-2. t-1 and t; 
SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is 
the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total 
liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-
total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank 
has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals I if the bank is foreign, 0 
otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total 
banking sector assets; GOP is the real GOP (percentage) growth. 
t-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
t Significantly different from zero at the 12% level. 
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Institutional ownership does not show any effect on bank's capital. On the other hand, 
foreign ownership in domestic banks does have a significant effect on bank capital and thus, 
domestic banks capital differs according to ownership. Interestingly, we find a support for the 
signalling theory among domestic banks and we see that they use their capital level as a sign 
of confidence to depositors and maybe to other parties about their solvency. The cyclicality of 
domestic bank capital is obvious in the reported results. GDP has a positive effect on domestic 
bank's capital and thus, domestic banks do adjust their equity according to the economic 
cycle. In the case of economic growth, domestic banks boost their capital and decrease it in the 
cases of economic recession. 
Next, we consider the subsidiaries of foreign banks as "foreign" and we include them 
with domestic banks with domestic control to detect the difference between the two categories 
and how foreign banks differ from domestic banks in terms of capitalisation. The results 
reported in Table 3.6 show clearly that foreign banks hold less capital than domestic banks. 
Foreign banks hold capital less than domestic banks for - at least - two reasons: 
a. Firstly, since capital is costly, they try to keep the minimum (costly) capital in their 
subsidiaries and when needed, they can channel funds to these subsidiaries. 
b. Second, their existence in the host market is to collect deposits and channel them to 
their home market or to some other markets where investment opportunities are better. 
Therefore, they try to keep the minimum (unemployed) funds in the host market. 
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Table 3.6: The Detenninants of Commercial Bank Capital Regression Estimates for 
Domestic Banks with Do t' C tid F . mes IC on ro an OreH!n Banks (1993-2003) 
! !I ｰｾ＠ I (2) 
C 43.07*** (2.68) 41.07*** (3.60) 
LAG CAP 0.40*** (2.65) 0.40*** (2.75) 
ROA 0.20 (0.78) 0.19 (0.74) 
SD ROA 0.23** (2.02) 0.23** (2.07) 
SIZE 
-2.29*** (-3.09) 
-2.19*** (-3.27) 
OBS 
-0.08 (-0.91) 
-0.08 (-0.91) 
DEP 
-0.01 (-1.00) 
-0.001 (-1.01) 
RISKY 
-0.04 (-1.58) 
-0.04 (-1.39) 
DEPINS 
-0.26*** (-2.80) 
-0.26*** (-2.75) 
CRDRISK 
-0.01* (-2.19) 
-0.01* (-1.95) 
TBILLS -0.02 (-0.45) 
LIQ 
-0.005 (-0.13) 
FOREIGN -3.37*** (-2.84) 
-3.31 *** (-3.79) 
SIGNAL 0.35*** (6.65) 0.34*** (3.64) 
CONC 0.31 *** (3.73) 0.32*** (4.04) 
GDP 0.03 (0.17) 0.06 (0.44) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8459 0.8458 
TxN 517 517 
F -statistic 40.367 40.330 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 59 commercial banks (domestic 
with domestic control and foreign) and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the determinants of domestic and 
foreign bank capital. 
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The dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG_CAP is the year 1-1 CAP; ROA is the 
after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SD_ROA is the standard deviation ofROA for the years 1-2,1-1 and I; 
SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is 
the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total 
liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-
total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank 
has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 
otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total 
banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
3.9.4 The Determinants of Foreign Bank Capital 
In this section, we include only foreign banks to detect the important factors that affect 
their capitalisation level. The results are presented in Table 3.7. Firstly, the profitability of 
foreign banks does not show to have any effect on their capitalisation. Thus, foreign banks do 
not rely on retained profits and do not modify their capital according to the annually realised 
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profits. Foreign banks channel their profits abroad to their home market and they do not keep 
these profits in their subsidiaries as reserves because they can inject funds when needed. SIZE 
loses its significant effect here and this shows that foreign banks hold similar capital 
regardless of their size. In contrast to domestic banks, foreign banks rely on deposits to boost 
their investment capability. Foreign banks share the domestic banks the moral hazard problem 
where the deposit insurance has a negative effect on their capitalisation. OBS activities and 
risky assets have no effect on foreign bank capital. Additionally, foreign banks do not adjust 
their capital according to the credit risk. This last point gives support to H J and shows that 
domestic banks and foreign banks differ in the way they follow regulation. On the contrary to 
domestic banks, T -bills and liquidity do not have a significant effect on foreign bank capital. 
These banks do not hold government bonds to avoid holding more capital and liquidity 
requirement do not impact their capital. The findings show that foreign banks do not use their 
capital level as a signal for confidence, which is used by domestic banks as shown above and 
this gives support to H2. The literature argues that banks use their capital level to signal, but it 
is interesting to find that this theory does not apply for foreign banks. It could be that foreign 
banks rely on their "name" and reputation as a confidence sign rather than their capital. The 
concentration does not influence foreign bank capital. Finally, we see that GDP does not have 
any effect on foreign bank capital. This also gives support to H3 and suggests that the 
cycIicality of bank capital does not apply to foreign banks. Foreign banks do not modify their 
capital according to the host market economic conditions. It could be that those banks operate 
in the host market to collect deposits and channel them abroad. 50 
50 Lindquist (2004) studied the determinants of Norwegian ba.nks' buffer during the pe.riod ＱＹＹＵｱｾＭＲＰＰＱｱＴＮ＠ H.e 
found a negative (insignificant) relationship between economic growth and buffer ｣｡ｾｬｴ｡ｬＮ＠ He claimed that thiS 
rna su ort the hypothesis that banks hold excess capital to be ｡ｾｬ･＠ to explOl.t ｾ･ｸｰ･｣ｴ･､＠ ｉｮ｜Ｇｾｳｴｭ･ｮｴ＠
y P? H bell'eve that the "no effect" of GDP on foreign bank capital IS due to the tact that 
opportunities. owever, we ..'. . 11 
foreign bank may channel their funds abroad to invest them In better Investment ｯｰｰｯｲｴｵｮｉｴｾ･ｳ＠ .. ThiS actua y 
consists with our findings in the previous chapter, where we found that foreign bank profitablhty IS not affected 
by the economic conditions of the host market. 
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Table 3.7: The Determinants of Commercial Bank Capital- Regression Estimates for 
F . oreign Banks 0993-2003) 
Ie I ｰｾ＠ I ｾＲｾ＠11.38 (0.48) 12.87 (0.66) 
LAG CAP 0.31 * (1.93) 0.30** (2.02) 
ROA 0.39(1.55) 0.40 (1.61) 
SD ROA 0.41 ** (2.15) 0.41** (2.12) 
SIZE 
-0.14 (-0.08) 
-0.09 (-0.05) 
OBS 
-0.10 (-0.68) 
-0.10 (-0.67) 
DEP 
-0.05* (-1.68) 
-0.05* (-1.72) 
RISKY 
-0.01 (-0.27) 
-0.02 (-0.58) 
DEPINS 
-0.18** (-2.45) 
-0.18** (-2.49) 
CRDRISK 
-0.01 *** (-3.24) 0.01 *** (-2.78) 
TBILLS 0.01 (0.20) 
LIQ 
-0.01 (-0.27) 
SIGNAL 0.37 (1.62) 0.36 (1.34) 
CONC 0.19 (1.21) 0.19 (0.98) 
GDP 0.29 (0.89) 0.28 (1.05) 
Adiusted R-squared 0.7345 0.7345 
TxN 207 207 
F -statistic 17.288 17.288 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSDV). For a sample of 23 foreign commercial banks 
and for a period of 11 years, we estimate the detenninants of foreign commercial bank capital. 
The dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG_CAP is the year t-1 CAP; ROA is the 
after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SD _ ROA is the standard deviation of ROA for the years t-2, t-1 and t; 
SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is 
the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total 
liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-
total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank 
has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 
otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total 
banking sector assets; GDP is the real GDP (percentage) growth. 
t-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
3.10The Reaction of Banks to Changes in Regulation (Tighter Capital 
Requirements) 
I 
In the prevIOUS sections, we have analysed and tested the differences between the 
capitalisation of domestic and foreign banks operating in the Lebanese market during the 
period 1993-2003. Since 1993, all banks operating in Lebanon are subject to the capital 
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adequacy standards as implemented by the Basle Accord in 1988. Thus, all banks were 
required to hold a minimum of 8% risk-adjusted capital. In September 1999, these capital 
requirements were increased by the central banks and banks were required to increase this 
ratio to 10% by the end of 2000 and 12% by the end of 2001. 51 It is important to test the 
reaction of banks to these new capital requirements and if (and how) the factors tested in the 
previous section change of importance when regulation becomes tighter. We assume that the 
behaviour of banks changes when they are required by regulators to boost their capital. This 
important change in legislation may cause a change in the behaviour of banks and 
consequently, it will change the effect of the employed factors before and after it. 52 This may 
result in instability in (some of) the parameters and thus a "structural break". A structural 
break may cause a different effect between the two sub-periods and of some the previously 
reported result may not hold. 53 To test for this matter, we will perform the Chow test. We 
divide the period under study into two sub-periods: the first from 1993 to 1998 and the second 
from 1999 to 2003. 54 Then, we run the same regression with the same variables for each of 
the two sub-periods. The F statistic of the Chow test is based on the comparison of the 
restricted and unrestricted Sum of Squared Residuals, and it is computed as: 
F = (RSSR -RSSUR)jk ｾ＠ ｾ＠
RSSUR /(N - 2k) k,N-2k (3.3) 
where, the RSS R is for the restricted model (no structural break), and RSS UR is the sum of the 
RSS of the two sub-periods. 
For the first regression model reported in Table 3.5, the Chow test is: 
RSS R = 9556.73 and the RSSUR = 7320.94 + 592.00 = 7912.94 
51 In fact this policy has had - additionally - another important objective, which is contracting the increased 
competition among banks operating in the Lebanese market that may lead to ･ｾ｣･ｳｾｩｶ･＠ risk-takin.g by banks (we 
will see how this policy was implemented also to push banks towards mergmg m the followmg ｣ｨｾｰｴ･ｲＩ＠ .. A 
support to this policy is suggested by the findings of Acharya (2001). Acharya argues that ｴｾ･＠ Ｎｭ､ｵｳｾｉ｡ｬ＠
organisation of the banking sector, in particular the degree of competition among ｢｡ｮｾｳ＠ affects theIr nsk-takmg 
incentives. More precisely, a more competitive banking sector has banks that may realise ｾｾｷ･ｲ＠ profits. and ｴ｡ｾ･＠
greater risk. Hence, the optimal design of capital adequacy regulation should be senSItIve to the mdustnal 
organisation of the banking sector. . 
52 i.e. the variables-regressors employed in the regressions in the previous sectIOns. 
53 The first division of our panel data was "horizontal", i.e. the sample of banks was ｢ｲｯｾ･ｮＭ､ｯｷｮＮ＠ "!'I.e .found ｴｾ｡ｴ＠
it has resulted in finding several different results from those found by the literature: ThIS second dIVISIon, whIch 
is "vertical" this time, i.e. the time period will be split, may allow for some more dIfferent results to emerge and 
thus, more findings of the literature may not hold. . 
54 We include the year 1999 with the second sub-period ｢･｣｡ｾｳ･＠ ｩｾ＠ is ｫｮｾｷｮ＠ that banks start ｰｲ･ｾ｡ｮｮｧ＠ themselves 
for the new capital requirements and start increasing their capItal ImmedIately after the new law IS passed. 
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F = (9556.73 -7912.94)/14 = 8.77 
7912.94/577 
The critical F..4,577 = 1.67 . Since the computed F is greater that the critical F, we reject the null 
hypothesis of no structural break. We found similar results for the first model reported in 
Table 3.4 and Table 3.6. This shows that the effect of variables changes between the first and 
the second sub-period, and therefore, we have to run different regressions for each of them. 
The literature has looked at the effect of new (binding) regulations and the effect of 
tighter capital requirements on banks and the reaction of banks have been analysed by many 
empirical studies. However, those studies have looked at the effect on the banking as a whole 
without considering how banks react to tightening capital requirements taking into 
consideration the ownership effects. For instance, Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) who studied 
the effect on introducing the Risk-Based Capital on banks, showed that the tighter capital 
requirements has reduced the optimal bank size that achieves maximum scale and scope 
economies: large banks that previously were efficient became too large and inefficient. They 
argue that these results suggest that regulations that encourage large banks to expand their 
production and product mixes may result in a less efficient banking industry. Schargrodsky 
and Sturzenegger (2000) studied the effect of tighter capital requirements on Argentinean 
banks. They found that tighter capital requirements induce banks to chose a lower degree of 
product differentiation. They also found that although the higher degree of concentration 
provides finns with enlarged market power, the lower degree of differentiation forces banks to 
compete more intensively in prices. 
3.10.1 The Response of Domestic Banks 
We present two different models in the Table 3.8. The second and the third column are 
for the same model but ran in the two sub-periods. Also the fourth and the fifth column are for 
the same model, but ran also in the tow sub-periods. It is clear that some of the previously 
reported results do not hold in the two sub-periods giving additional evidence to the existence 
of structural break. 
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Table 3.8: The Determinants of Commercial Bank Capital- Regression Estimates for 
Domestic Banks 0993-1998 and 1999-2003) 
(1) 2) 
1993-1998 1999-2003 1993-1998 1999-2003 
C 36.27 (0.80) -14.66 (-0.81) 41.26(0.81) 6.38 (0.30) 
LAG CAP 0.350.42Y 0.68*** (6.36) 0.27 (0.92) 0.67*** (4.68) 
ROA 0.95*** (3.45) 
-0.03 (-0.05) 0.98*** (3.46) 0.04 (0.17) 
SO ROA 0.21 (0.43) 
-0.25(-1.18) 0.13 (0.33) 0.290.18) 
SIZE -1.35 (-0.46) -0.50** (-1.65) 
-3.10 (-0.94) 
-0.59** (-I. 76) 
OBS -0.09 (-1.07) 0.18* (1.75) 
-0.27* (-1.67) 0.10 (0.98) 
OEP 0.040.35) -0.03*** (-4.81) 0.04 (1.42) 
-0.03*** (-3.67) 
RISKY -0.32 * (-1.66) -0.03 (-0.74) 
-0.21 * (-1.77) 
-0.00 I (-0.06) 
OEPINS -0.50*** (-3.17) -0.21 * (-1.97) -0.52*** (-2.84) 
-0.25*** (-6.30) 
CRDRISK 0.06*** (2.99) -0.04* (-1.87) 0.04*** (2.72) -0.06** (-2.38) 
TBILLS -0.29 (-1.39) -0.06t (-1.23) 
L1Q -0.11 * (-1. 93) 0.15** (2.31) 
OWN 1.57 (1.65) 0.84* (1.82) 
FOREIGN -3.53** (-2.31) -1.38 (-1.07) 
SIGNAL -0.16 (-0.43) 0.56** (1.86) -0.18 (-0.43) 0.38** (1.82) 
CONC 1.12*** (6.00) 0.64*** (2.68) 1.44*** (4.37) 0.58***(7.55) 
GOP 0.93* (1.62) -0.85** (-2.38) 1.07** (1.60) -0.56*** (-3.86) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6189 0.9328 0.6070 0.9283 
TxN 245 157 245 157 
F -statistic 7.497 45.238 7.180 49.995 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSOV). For a sample of 48 domestic commercial banks 
and for two periods of 6 and 5 years consecutively, we estimate the determinants of domestic commercial bank 
capital. 
The dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG_CAP is the year t-l CAP; ROA is the 
after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SO_ROA is the standard deviation ofROA for the years t-2, t-l and t; 
SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP is 
the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; OEPINS is the deposit-to-total 
liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-
total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank 
has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 
otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total 
banking sector assets; GOP is the real GOP (percentage) growth. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
**'" Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
'" Significantly different from zero at the 1 0% level. 
t Significantly different from zero at the 12% level. 
The first remark is that Lag capital captures a significant influence in the second sub-
period only. This may show that the persistency of capital emerges when capital requirements 
become tighter. The profitability variable is positively correlated with capitalisation only in 
the first sub-period. When capital requirements become more binding, domestic banks start 
131 
relying more on external funds to boost their capital. It seems that retained profits became 
insufficient in increasing domestic bank capitalisation. The volatility of earnings does not have 
an influence in both sub-periods. SIZE that was not able to distinguish between domestic 
banks during the first period became able to classify these banks afterwards. This means that 
smaller banks responded more to the new capital requirements, and the difference emerges 
when regulation became tighter. The interesting remark is that the principle of too-big-to-fail 
emerges actually after capital requirements become tighter. Thus, we could argue that this 
doctrine does not hold always. Regarding OBS and RlSKY, we see that domestic banks 
started to justify their capital according to the change of such variables. In the first model OBS 
captures a positive effect between 1999 and 2003 and in the second model the negative effect 
has diminished. Similarly, RlSKY has lost its negative effect in both models. For these two 
variables, it seems that the new regulation has forced banks to adopt more strictly Basle I 
requirements. DEP that did not have any effect between 1993 and 1998 captured a negative 
and significant effect. So, after tightening capital requirements, domestic banks started relying 
more on deposits to increase their loans and advances. The deposit insurance has a negative 
effect during the entire period under study, and thus, regardless of capital requirements the 
problem of moral hazard exists. Regarding CRDRlSK, we saw in Table 3.5 that domestic 
banks adjust their capital according to the credit risk. However, the results in Table 3.8 show 
that domestic banks became unable to do this after 1998. The positive effect captured by 
CRDRlSK in the first sub-period turned to be negative in the second sub-period. Also 
regarding the negative effect for TBILLS shown in Table 3.5, it seems that banks start 
investing more in government bills to minimise the capital requirements according to the new 
regulation. Surprisingly, the negative effect captured by the LIQ before 1999 turned to be 
positive afterwards. Previously, liquidity requirements affected negatively domestic bank 
capital; however, afterwards liquid banks were more able to boost their capital. By linking 
these findings to the effect of Size, we fmd that smaller banks in the second sub-period started 
holding higher equity and more liquid assets (relative to total assets) than larger banks. 55 The 
advantages of institutional ownership appeared actually when requirements become tougher. 
OWN captures a positive impact and banks with institutional ownership become more solvent 
55 Regarding the issue of capital requirements and reserve requirements, we mention here that the central bank of 
Lebanon has required Lebanese banks to start implementing the new Basle Accord (Bas1e II) at the end of year 
2006 and 2007. 
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and have better ability to meet the new regulation than those individual- or family-owned 
banks. Contrary, the advantage of foreign ownership in domestic banks diminished in the 
second sub-period. The negative effect captured by FOREIGN between 1993 and 1998 has 
disappeared afterwards. Interestingly, SIGNAL captures a significant influence after 1999 
with the existence of tough regulation! It seems that domestic banks with better solvency start 
using their capital level to signal and to send a sign of soundness when requirements became 
hard in order to differentiate themselves from the other banks. Therefore, this theory does not 
apply always and this - costly - tool (signalling) is not used always, but only when not 
everyone is able to use it and this gives an additional support to H2. Finally and interestingly 
also, because capital regulation became tighter, domestic bank capital has lost its cyclicality 
and domestic banks became unable to adjust their capital according to the economic condition. 
The positive effect has changed to negative effect and capital changed from being cyclical to 
be "counter-cycle"! This may suggest that same as the signalling theory, the cyclicality theory 
does not apply always and rigid capital requirements eliminates the ability of banks to signal 
(using the capital level) and to modify their capital according to economic conditions. Again, 
this gives support to H3. 
3.10.2The Response of Foreign Banks 
For foreign banks, the results show that the response to tighter capital requirements 
was different from that of domestic banks. Firstly, the lag dependent variable has no effect in 
both periods and thus, foreign bank capital is not persistent. For foreign banks, profitability is 
not associated with higher capitalisation. Foreign banks do not rely on retained profits to 
increase capital regardless of regulation. Between 1993 and 1998 the volatility of earnings was 
positively correlated with capital, where foreign banks increased their capital with external 
funds. But afterwards this variable has lost its effect. SIZE does not have any impact during 
the entire period and foreign banks hold similar capital regardless of their size. It seems that 
the diversification effect or the too-big-too-fail theory do not apply for foreign banks. 
Regarding OBS and RISKY, it seems that foreign banks started adjusting their capital more 
according to these investments. DEP captured a significant effect only in the second sub-
period, which may show that foreign banks started relying more on deposit to increase their 
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investment capabilities. Interestingly in contrast to domestic ba k fi d h 
' n s, we oun t at the effect of 
DEPINS loses its significant in the second period and the mo 1 h d bl '" ra azar pro em dlffilll1shed! 
CRDRISK shows a consistent effect as profitability· since the profit b'l'ty d h 
. all oes not ave an 
impact on capital, credit risk that affects negatively this profitability does not have an impact 
as well. All these findings show that the reaction of foreign banks t th 1 . o e new regu atIOn was 
different from domestic banks and this gives in fact support to H 1. 
Table 3.9: The Determinants of Commercial Bank Capital- Regression Estimates for 
Forei1!n Banks (1993-1998 and 1999-2003) 
(1) 2) 
1993-1998 1999-2003 1993-1998 1999-2003 
C 0.60 (0.02) 152.70* 0.89) 
-4.03 (-0.14) 186.92* (1.84) 
LAG CAP 0.11 (0.73) 0.21 (1.03) 0.12 (0.76) 0.06 (0.25) 
ROA 
-0.44 (-1. 13) 
-0.53(-0.79) 
-0.48 (-1.55) 
-0.15 (-0.32) 
SO ROA 0.27* (l.40) -0.90 (-0.40) 0.28** (1.67) 0.67 (0.20) 
SIZE 1.87 (0.97) 
-6.89 (-1.16) 3.10 (1.27) 
-9.707-1.31 ) 
OBS -0.35* (-1.71) 
-0.17 (-0.25) -0.39* (-1.86) 
-0.04 (-0.06) 
OEP 0.02 (0.39) -0.05 (-1.53) 0.02 (0.61) -0.05 (-1.56) 
RISKY -0.08* (-1.76) 0.02(0.11) -0.14*** (-3.25) 0.01 (0.06) 
OEPINS -0.44*** (-3.87) -0.02 (-0.25) -0.42*** (-3.84) -0.12 (-0.66) 
CRDRISK -0.01 (-1.31) -0.03 (-1.58) -0.005 (-0.93) -0.04 (-1.57) 
TBILLS 0.04 (0.46) 0.22 (0.86) 
LIQ -0.14 (-1.37) 0.09 (1.57) 
SIGNAL 0.09 (0.45) -1.31 (-1.50) -0.08 (-0.26) -0.89* (-1.87) 
CONC5 0.49** (2.29) -0.94** (-2.26) 0.54** (2.29) -0.84*** (-2.81) 
GOP 1.62 (0.75) 1.68 (0.52) 1.76 (0.531 1.21 (0.60) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8698 0.5538 0.8732 0.5440 
TxN 115 92 115 92 
F -statistic 24.088 14.322 24.806 14.194 
Prob(F -statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSOV). For a sample of 23 foreign commercial banks 
and for two periods of 6 and 5 years consecutively, we estimate the determinants of foreign commercial bank 
capital. 
The dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG_CAP is the year 1-1 CAP; ROA is the 
after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SD_ROA is the standard deviation ofROA for the years t-2, 1-1 and t; 
SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; OEP is 
the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky asset-to-total asset ratio; OEPINS is the deposit-to-total 
liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-
total asset ratio; LIQ is the liquid assets-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank 
has institutional ownership, 0 otherwise; FOREIGN is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank is foreign, 0 
otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total 
banking sector assets; GOP is the real GOP (percentage) growth. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
• Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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Finally, two important remarks are reported in Table 3.9: foreign banks do not signal at 
all and there is no cyclicality of foreign bank capital. Foreign banks do not use their 
capitalisation level to signal regardless of the capital requirements and they do not modify 
their capital according to the economic cycle. Thus, the signal theory and the bank capital 
cyclicality theory do not apply for foreign banks at all. The last two remarks give additional 
support to H2 and H3. 
3.11 Conclusion 
The literature on bank capital proposes several propositions: the reaction of banks to 
capital requirements, the signalling theory, the too-big-to-fail theory, the pro-cyclicality of 
bank capital theory, etc ... Empirical studies on bank capital have analysed the determinants of 
bank capital regardless of the ownership of banks (i.e. whether they are domestic or foreign). 
Moreover, when those studies look at the reaction of banks to tighter capital requirements, 
they do not take into consideration the effect of ownership. In this chapter, we ftrstly analysed 
the determinants of bank capital for a sample of domestic and foreign banks together. Our 
ftndings consist with the literature and all the theories hold in our case studies. 
Then, we have divided our panel data "horizontally" (according to the ownership of 
banks) and "vertically" (by time). Different result emerged from this and most of these 
principles did not hold in all the cases. For instance, we found that the reaction of domestic 
banks to capital requirements differs from that of foreign banks and the effect of deposit 
insurance is different for the two categories of banks. We found also that foreign banks do not 
use their capital level as a signal for soundness. Moreover, we found that domestic banks 
adopt this - costly - policy only when few other banks are able to adopt it. On the cyclicality 
of bank capital, we found that foreign bank capital does not vary according to the economic 
cycle, and even domestic bank capital loses this feature when capital requirements become 
tighter. On the too-big-to-fail, this doctrine does not hold in all cases even for the same 
category of banks. 
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Appendix 3.A: Summary of Cited Empirical Studies 
Study Market Period Sample Findings 
Alexander (2004) Switzerland 1990-2002 19 banks - A positive correlation between change in capital and risk 
- No significant relation between changes in capital ratio and 
the default probability. 
Allen and Rai (1996) Europe, Japan and the 1991-1993 (174), (175) and (163) - Deposit insurance, the size, and loans have a negative 
U.S. banks successively. effect on capital level 
- profitability and deposit growth have a positive effect on 
capital level 
Altunbas et a1. (2002) 11 EMU 1991-1999 - Undercapitalised banks respond more to regulatory 
changes regardless their size 
Barrios and Blanco Spain 1985-1991 76 banks - Higher LLP reduces the needs for capital augmentation 
(2003) 
- higher deposit share needs more capital 
- market model is better to explain banks' behaviour for 
capital requirements 
Berger and DeY ong U.S. 1985-1994 Entire bank population - Cost-inefficiency reduces bank capital 
(19971 - A positive relation between NPLs and capital 
Billet et a1. (1998) US 1990-1995 58 banks - Downgraded banks with larger insured deposit bases 
experience smaller declines in equity value. 
- Downgraded banks increases their reliance on insured 
deposits 
- Banks reduce their use of insured liabilities following I 
upgrades 
Blose (2001) U.S. 1980-1993 213 LLP - LLP causes a decline in capital adequacy 
announcements - LLP announcements affect more the less capitalised banks 
Cebenoyan and Strahan U.S. 1988-1993 Entire bank population - A negative relation between size and capital 
(2004) - OBS activities increase risk-weighted assets. A negative 
relation between capital-to-risky assets and OBS activities 
Chiuri et a1. (2002) Developing countries 1992-1997 10 crisis countries and - Higher capitalisation attracts more deposits 
5 non-crisis countries - More strict capital requirements have lower effect for 
foreign banks 
Dahl and Shrieves (1990) U.S. End-1985 to 11,800 banks per year - The size has a negative effect on required equity 
end-1986 acquisition 
- The higher the ROA, the lower the required equity 
acquisition 
- The higher the credit risk, the higher the needed capital 
- Deposit growth has a positive and significant impact on 
equity issuance 
-- Market power has a positive effect on under-capitalised 
banks and negative effect on well-c<!Qitalised banks 
Dahl and Spivey (1996) U.S. 1982-1991 1,289 undercapitalised - The size has a negative effect on required equity 
banks acquisition 
- The higher the ROA, the lower the required equity 
acquisition 
- Loan-to-asset ratio has a positive effect on equity 
acquisition 
Dietrich and James U.S. 1971-1975 10,000 banks - ROA, deposit growth have a positive impact on capital 
(1983) change 
- T-bills has a negative impact on capital changes 
- Market power has a positive effect on under-capitalised 
banks and negative effect on well-capitalised banks 
Docking et al. (1997) U.S. 1985-1990 578 LLR - LLR announcement has a negative impact on share price 
announcements (492 
banks) 
Godlewski (2005) 30 Emerging markets 1996-2001 2,779 banks - Size has a negative effect on capital issuance 
- Capital accumulated in the past allows banks to avoid new 
capital issuance 
- Banks with positive evolution of capital engage in risky 
activities and/or positive evolution in risk contributes to 
recapitalisation 
Houston and James U.S. 1985-1989 1976 subsidiaries of - Affiliated banks are able to increase capital by creating an 
(1998) 178 BHCs, and 4778 internal capital market 
unaffiliated banks 
Hughes and Mester US 1989-1990 Banks with assets more - financial capital serves as a signal of risk 
( 1998) than $1 billion 
Jacques and Nigro U.S. 1990 2,570 banks - A negative relation between size and capital-to-risk 
( 1997) weighted assets 
- ROA has a positive effect on capital changes 
Jagtiani and Khanthavit U.S. 1984-1991 91 banks - RBC reduced the optimal size of bank that achieves scale 
(1996) and scope economies 
- RBC discourage OBS activities 
Konishi and Yasuda Japan 1990-1999 48 banks - The introduction of RBC reduced the total risk, the firm-
(2004) specific risk, and interest-rate risk of Japanese banks, 
Kwan and Eisenbeis U.S. 1986Q2- 352 banks - Finn with more capital operate more efficiently 
( 1997) 1995Q4 - A positive relation between ROA and capital 
- A negative relation between size and capital 
- A negative relation between credit risk and capital 
Lindquist (2004) Norway 1995Q4- 147 banks - larger banks hold less ｣｡ｾｴ｡ｬ＠
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200lQ4 - GOP growth has a negative effect on bank capital \ 
- credit risk has a negative effect on bank capital 
Marcus (1983) u.s. 1965-1977 44 banks - ROA and government bonds have a positive effect on 
capita1-to-non cash asset ratio 
O'Hara and Shaw 19901 us 1984 63 banks - wealth creation for banks subject to the TBTF policy 
Rime (2001) Switzerland 1989-1995 154 banks - Size has a negative effect on capital changes 
- Large banks have easy access to capital markets 
- ROA has a positive effect on caQital chan_ges 
Rime and Stiroh (2003) Switzerland 1996-1999 289 banks - The size has a negative and significant effect on banks 
excess capital 
Shierves and Dahl (1992) U.S. 1983-1987 1,800 insured - The size has a negative effect on capital change 
commercial banks - A positive correlation between capital change and NPLs 
Soledad et al. (2001) Argentina, Chile and 1981-1997 (155), (37), and (34) - Higher capitalisation attract more deposits 
Mexico banks successively 
Swindle (1995) U.S. 1984Q1- 51 BHCs - A positive relation between deposit growth and capital 
ＱＹＸｾＴ＠ change 
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Appendix 3.B: Calculation of Control Variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
CAP Equity-to-asset ratio 
Independent variables 
ROA After tax net income divided by average assets 
SD (ROA) The standard deviation of ROA for the last 3 years 
SIZE Natural log of assets 
OBS Log off-balance sheet (assets side) 
DEP Costumer deposit growth (percentage) 
RISKY Total assets - cash and central bank - T -bills - deposits with 
head office and branches divided by total assets 
DEPINS Costumer deposits-to-total liability ratio 
CRDRISK Provisions for doubtful loans divided by gross loans 
TBILLS T -bills-to-asset ratio 
LIQ Cash and central bank + T -bills + marketable securities + 
deposits with head office and branches and with the other banks 
divided by total assets 
OWN Dummy variable (1 for institutional ownership, zero otherwise) 
FOREIGN Dummy variable (1 for foreign ownership, zero otherwise) 
SIGNAL Total sector average capital 
CONC Assets of top 5 banks divided by sector total assets 
GDP Real GDP growth (percentage) 
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Appendix 3.C: the Hausman Test 
Fixed Effects Random Effects A q m 
LAG CAP 0.344406 0.658885 
-0.314479 
(0.178015) (0.031231 ) (0.030714) 
3.219937 
ROA 0.376498 0.458233 
-0.081735 
(0.181874) l.l55648 (0.165219) (0.005781) 
SIZE 
-2.168905 
-0.619281 
-1.549624 3.456833 (0.855699) (0.193798) (0.694663) 
OBS 
-0.132990 
-0.014649 
-0.118341 1.659884 (0.llO038) (0.060591 ) (0.008437) 
DEP 
-0.002957 
-0.024667 0.021710 3.264009 
(0.013060) (0.005115) (0.000144) 
RISKY 
-0.lOI553 
-0.032840 
-0.068713 1.075017 
(0.068180) (0.016016) (0.004392) 
DEPINS 
-0.293961 
-0.146443 
-0.147518 2.296879 
(0.098812) (0.017012) (0.009474) 
CRDRISK 
-0.005900 
-0.005913 0.000013 0.000021 
(0.003169) (0.001477) (0.000008) 
TBILLS 
-0.064264 0.002867 
-0.067131 0.917353 
(0.072816) (0.019738) (0.004913) 
OWN 0.608637 -0.759115 1.367752 
-60.473958 
(0.433739) (0.468043) ( -0.030935) 
SIGNAL 0.302251 0.213833 0.088418 -0.683529 
(0.050535) (0.118284) (-0.011437) 
CONC5 0.351894 0.166748 0.185146 3.092460 
(0.112440) (0.039472) (0.011085) 
GOP 0.018613 0.444445 -0.425832 5.558295 
(0.232923) (0.147069) (0.032624) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7507 0.7251 
d{ 595 595 
F -statistic 22.9lO 112.205 
Critical %12 value 3.84 
Notes: 
The first regression is estimated with Fixed Effects model (LSDV) and the second regression with the Random 
Effect model (GLS); the dependent variable is CAP, which is the equity-to-asset ratio; LAG_CAP is the year /-1 
CAP; ROA is the after tax net profit-to-average asset ratio; SIZE is the natural log of assets; OBS is the natural 
log of off-balance sheet activities on the assets side; DEP in the deposit (percentage) growth; RISKY is the risky 
asset-to-total asset ratio; DEPINS is the deposit-to-total liability ratio; CRDRISK is the provisions for doubtful 
loans-to-gross loan ratio; TBILLS is the treasury bills-to-total asset ratio; OWN is a dummy variable which equals 
1 if the bank has institutional ownership, and 0 otherwise; SIGNAL is banking sector average CAP; CONC is the 
top 5 banks assets as a percentage of the total banking sector; GOP is the real GOP (percentage) growth. dfis the 
degrees of freedom. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
140 
4 Chapter Four: Motives and Outcomes of Bank 
Mergers 
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Abstract 
Bank mergers in developed markets have been analysed by a large body of literature, 
where the motives and the outcomes of bank mergers have been detected. We add to the 
literature by analysing the experience of bank mergers in an emerging market. We study the 
bank merger experience in Lebanon, where between 1994 and 2002, 25 bank mergers 
occurred. Firstly, we detect the characteristics of merging banks in order to understand the 
motives behind bank mergers. We find that larger and healthy banks target small, 
underperforming and undercapitalised banks. Moreover, the targets are characterised by a 
larger share of non-interest income than acquiring banks. The regulatory authorities play an 
important role in bank mergers by providing acquiring banks with several incentives. 
Regarding the outcome of bank consolidation, we find that - on average - the merger 
operations under study show a significant enhancement in profitability, efficiency and in 
liquidity risk. However, credit risk deteriorates and growth decelerates post-merger. In 
addition to the two previous issues, we notice that the effect of the wave of bank 
consolidations (that have eliminated about 35% of banks), on concentration was offset by the 
openness of the Lebanese banking system to the entry of foreign banks. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The increasing integration of international markets over the last three decades and the 
rise of restructuring activity across economic sectors have made business increasingly global. 
As manufacturing and trade become global, service firms have to follow this development and 
become bigger and more efficient. Besides, the implementation of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation all over the world have led to an increase in the number of institutions merging 
within the domestic markets or across the borders that was in the interest of financial 
institutions and banks particularly. Hence, the banking industry has seen high numbers of 
mergers and acquisitions among large and small institutions. Consolidation is an important 
factor that may help realising large business's growth strategy and expanding its activities to 
new markets. 
Mergers and acquisitions 56 have substantial effects on the performance of the firms 
merged. It is hypothesised that: 
1. The economies of scale and increase in the average size of banks resulting from 
consolidations may permit banks to operate more efficiently. 
11. Consolidation is a useful way of transferring Excess Capacity and mobilising resources 
from an entity to another. 
111. Bank consolidations may increase monopoly power, which affects the profitability of 
banks (although this may not be socially acceptable). 
Mergers and acqUISItIOns are important corporate extemal- and indirect-investment 
decisions with long-term effects on the companies involved. These effects are related to the 
capital, organisational and ownership structures, product mix, and nature of the business's 
activities. It aims at removing identical and duplicate costs from each organisation - such as 
personnel, offices and machinery - whilst increasing the overall market share. As a result, 
mergers and acquisitions aim at achieving growth of company's size and value, market share 
56 A Merger is the consolidation of two firms, where the assets of both firms are combined together. Whereas an 
Acquisition occurs when a firm acquires the majority of another firm's shares, but the two firms remam as 
separate entities. 
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and profits. Expenditure reduction, increased market power, reduced earnings volatility, and 
scale and scope economies could achieve these targets. 
Finally, acquisition particularly is based on a theory of efficiency differences. This 
theory proposes that the more efficient management team of the bidder finn can run the 
corporate and financial resources of target companies more efficiently, and the assets of the 
target will be put to a higher value use by the acquirer. 
4.2 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
The motives for bank merger and acquisition decisions are complex and overlapped. 
Often there is not just one reason for these decisions, but a variety of reasons that represent the 
strategy of the firm. In other words, they are the objectives and targets, which combine 
together to form the firm's strategy. Merger and acquisition choices are undertaken by the 
management of the company to realise its strategy. These decisions are based on the theory 
that managers serve the interest of the finn's shareholders and their main objective is to 
maximise shareholders' wealth. This objective could be achieved by aggregating the values of 
the merged firms, which implies cost reduction, efficiency enhancement, and optimal running 
of the target's assets. But, sometimes, the decision-makers (the management) in a finn might 
put into action a merger and/or acquisition to achieve goals for their own benefit and 
sometimes at the expense of shareholders. Thus, they might pursue their own interests rather 
than those of shareholders. In the following, we will look at the motives for bank M&As and 
shed light on some points that are not investigated by the literature. 
4.2.1 Synergy 
Synergy is the concept that when two or more finns combine, they increase their value. 
The new fused entity should be more efficient, profitable and stable than the separate 
individual firms before the combination, through fusion of their individual skills and 
capabilities. The synergy from a merger is therefore defined as the difference in the market 
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value of the post-merger firm relative to the pre-merger value of the two firms as separate 
entities. According to Kaen (1995, p 869) synergy is calculated using the following equation: 
Synergy = PVAT - (PVA + PVT ) 
where, PVAT = market value of the post-merger firm. 
PVA = pre-merger market value of the acquirer. 
PVT = pre-merger market value of the target. 
(4.1) 
A portion of the synergy achieved is retained by the target-firm shareholders, and the 
expenses of the acquisition operation. But the predictable existence of synergetic benefits 
allows firms to incur the expenses of the acquisition process and still be able to pay target 
shareholders a premium for their shares. Thus, the Net Present Value of the acquisition is: 
NPV = [PVAT - (PVA + PVT )]- P - E (4.2) 
where, P = premium paid for the target. 
E = expenses of the acquisition operation. 
Also, NPV = [PVAT - (PVA + PVT )]- (p + E). 
The term [PVAT - (PVA - PVT )] is the synergistic effect. This effect must be greater than the 
sum (P + E) to give reason for the acquisition otherwise the bidder would have overpaid the 
target. The shareholders of the acquiring firm benefit only if these benefits are not offset by an 
excessive price paid to the shareholders of the target institution (Ely and Song, 2000). The 
synergy has two subdivisions: financial and operating synergies. 
4.2.1.1 Financial Synergy 
Financial synergy is the impact of a corporate merger or acquisition on the cost of 
capital of the acquiring firm or the merging entities. In financial markets, larger companies 
have advantages that may lower their cost of capital and the cost of raising capital because 
they are considered to be less risky than smaller firms are. So the costs of borrowing by 
issuing debts are lower for a larger firm, which would be able to offer a lower interest rate 
than a smaller one. Moreover, the fixed costs of the issuance (registration costs, legal fees, 
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etc.) would be spread out over a greater money volume of securities because the larger 
company borrows more capital with each issue. (Gaughan 2002, pp121-123) 
4.2.1.2 Operating Synergy 
Operating synergy is the real value gains from combining two (or more) individual 
companies. The main source of operating synergy is the relative cost reductions with the 
increased production, which are a result of economies of scale and scope (since the "per unit" 
cost declines, as the output levels rise). The other source of operating synergy is the 
transferability of managerial and labour skills, where the excess capacity of managerial capital 
or particular employee skills of one of the merging companies can be utilised to cover the 
required skills in the other company to improve its performance. The operating synergy theory 
is rather based on the "differential management efficiency" hypothesis, which indicates that 
the management of target firm is relatively inefficient. (Gaughan 1991, pp 103-104) 
4.2.1.3 Scale and Scope Economies as Sources of Synergy 
4.2.1.3.1 Scale Economies 
In banking, production requires utilisation of costly resources such as fixed branch 
costs, data processing systems, teller expenses, etc. In a high level of production, these costs 
could be spread over an expanded product mix, and so the profit margin will be higher. 
Economies of scale occur when there is ability to reduce costs per unit of output, holding all 
other factors constant, and the average cost of a product in the long run decreases as more 
units are produced. 
Mergers and acquisitions result in an increase of the bank's size, hence, to understand 
the relation between mergers and acquisitions and scale economies, it is important to find out 
the effect of size on scale economies. Miller and Noulas (1996) investigated technical 
efficiency of large-sized banks. They found that bank size is significantly positively related to 
their measure of pure technical efficiency. Berger et al. (1999) found that large institutions 
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increase scale economies and have the ability to produce more services due to the use of 
technological innovations, such as phone centres, A TMs, and e-banking, and at lower costs 
than traditional branching networks. Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987, p 202) show that small 
banks (with less than $25 million in deposits) were not able to implement automated services 
as cost-effectively as larger banks can do. Another gain from bank M&As is the savings from 
holding less cash reserves. Banks hold cash reserves to protect themselves against liquidity 
shocks, i.e. early deposit withdrawals, occurring before the maturity of loans. Large banks 
may need to hold lesser amount of liquid reserves. Since holding cash balances is costly, 57 
larger banks may incur lower costs of holding cash balances than small banks do. By 
decreasing cash holding, a bank could move funds from non- or low-interest earning to higher-
return assets (loans and securities). Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) find that large U.S. banks 
hold fewer liquid assets than smaller banks. They detected a negative correlation between 
bank's size and liquid assets held, and the more the bank's size, the less the proportion of 
liquid assets to total assets. 
Conversely, Gilligan and Smirlock (1984) found that banks with less than $25 million 
ill deposits are characterised by increasing returns to scale while the larger banks are 
characterised by diseconomies of scale, with the largest banks experiencing the most severe 
diseconomies of scale. Shaffer (1993) simulated megamergers between pairs of banks with 
assets more than $1 billion, by comparing the sum of predicted costs for a given pair of banks 
with the predicted cost of the merged entity. 49% of possible pairs showed a reduction in cost, 
with 16-17% exhibit an improvement of more than 10%. Among banks with assets exceeding 
$10 billion, the merger increased costs by 6-7% and fewer than 15% of possible mergers 
reduced costs. 
4.2.1.3.2 Scope Economies 
Economies of scope represent the ability of reducing the average per unit cost by 
producing more than one product. Economies of scope can be realised through joint 
57 Liquid assets involve additional transportation cost, storage and protection ｾｯｳｴｳＬ＠ and labour c.osts. K wan 
(2003) found a positive and significant relation between ｣ｾｳｨＭｴｯＭｴｯｴ｡ｬ＠ asset ratIO and total operatIng cost-to-
earning asset ratio, which means that liquid assets raise operatIng costs. 
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production and marketing. On the production side, scope economies may be achieved where 
facilities applied to one objective or to serving a single market are not fully utilised and are 
capable of being deployed simultaneously to serve other targets and other markets. Gilligan 
and Smirlock (1984) explain that economies of scope over the production of goods A and B 
exist if: 
(4.3) 
where C(QA,QB) are the firm's (minimised) costs of producing QA units of good A jointly 
with QB units of good B at a given vector of input prices. They add that this interdependence 
is especially common in banking, when outputs (e.g. demand and time deposits) need similar 
technology and use the same personnel, such as tellers and supervisors. The literature has 
somehow provided evidence about the relation between size of banks and scope economies. 
For instance, Zardkoohi and Kolari (1994) claim that there are economies of scale and scope 
for branch offices representing 43 Finnish saving banks. Their results show that large branch 
offices operate more efficiently than smaller branches. 
4.2.2 Diversification 
Gaughan (2002, pp 123-126) identifies the diversification as "growing outside a 
company's current industry category". Diversification plays a major role in conglomerate 
mergers where management may go for diversified expansion to enter more profitable 
industries when the company faces competitive pressures in its current industry. Salter and 
Weinhold (1979, pp 6-8) define the diversification as "the heterogeneity of output from the 
point of view of the number of markets served by that output". They consider that products 
belong to separate markets if their cross-elasticity of demand is low and if (in the short run) 
the necessary resources employed in the production and distribution of one cannot be changed 
by another. The degree of diversification of a firm increases as it produces a broader range of 
independent products, and the heterogeneity of the markets served by this firm. 
Why do firms diversify? Jones (1982, p 46) says that mergers can introduce greater 
stability of profits into cyclical or seasonal business by acquiring firms with counter-cyclical 
characteristics. Canals (1994, pp 222-224) declares that banks that face several types of risk 
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can deal with them by entering into other activities through an appropriate diversification of 
investment portfolios that, additionally, provides greater profitability. He cites the following 
advantages of diversification: (1) it expands the range of activities, (2) achieves scope 
economies by distributing a large number of services, (3) permits a complementary links 
between different kinds of services, (4) allows a more efficient uses of office networks, and 
(5) reduce the variability of revenues in relation to a given amount of capital. Finally, Allen 
and Hodgkinson (1989, p 16) claim that there are many types of threat that push firms to 
diversify: one is the fear of being acquired. We distinguish between geographical 
diversification and product diversification. 
4.2.2.1 Geographical Diversification 
This is the result of expanding the activities beyond the current market being served by 
a bank. Eun et al. (1996) argue that since corporate earnings are less correlated across 
countries than within a country, a firm's earnings can be stabilised more effectively by 
acquiring a foreign firm. Besides, when a domestic firm faces weak growth prospects at home, 
overseas investment may be a preferred option. Berger (2000) claims that diversification of 
risks associated with the merger from an improved mix of geographic areas, industries, loan 
types or maturity structure might allow consolidated banks to shift their output mixes from 
securities toward both consumer loans and business loans, raising expected revenues. 
4.2.2.2 Product Diversification 
This is referring to adding new non-traditional products that provide non-interest 
income (e.g. insurance, brokerage, real estate, etc.). Empirical findings of diversification found 
different effects on banks. For instance, Swary (1981) found that mortgage banking 
investment results in significant losses to the parent bank holding companies (BHes). Boyd et 
al. (1993) argue that BHe mergers with life and property insurance firms are less risky than 
BHe mergers with securities firms, insurance agentibrokers, and real estate firms. Altunbas 
(1995, p 270) says that when BHes combine with securities firms or real estate developers, 
the volatility of returns and the risk of failure increase. But combinations of BHes and life 
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insurance companies seem to reduce the volatility of returns and the risk of failure. Brewer et 
al. (1996) declare that diversification by real estate specialised savings and loans firms appears 
to lead to lower total risk and higher average return. 
4.2.3 Managerial Motives 
Sometimes, the management may pursue their own alms rather than those of 
shareholders and acquire other firms to increase the size of the firm under their control in 
order to enjoy higher compensation and benefits. Hubris, or the pride of the managers of the 
acquiring firm, might represent another main reason for takeovers where managers see great 
reputational benefits in doing so even though they may not be completely rational in assessing 
the expected value of these benefits. Amihud et al. (1986) declare that managers of "manager 
controlled" (MC) firm whose compensation depends on the firm's outcomes exploit benefits 
from a merger beyond those which accrue to the shareholders and view it as more valuable 
than the manager of a "shareholder controlled" (SC) firm whose compensation depends on 
their efforts. MC managers are more willing to pay a higher price for a given acquisition and 
their shareholders are expected to earn lower returns from conglomerate mergers than in SC 
firms. Rose and Fraser (1988) say that, after a merger, the bank size rises and the prestige of 
management enhances and sometimes management salaries as well as benefits improve, but 
stockholders benefits may be insignificant. Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) compared banks with 
different managerial stake ownership. They found the greater the managerial stake, the more 
active the merger policy. The most active acquirers were the firms with the most powerful 
managers, and MC firms are more likely to engage in risk reducing mergers and pursue 
acquisitions to increase size than are SC firms. Berger et al. (1999) propose that a managerial 
objective may be empire building, where management rewards tend to increase with the firm 
size. Hence, managers may hope to achieve personal financial gains, or to protect their firm 
specific human by diversifying through mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, Saunders et al. 
(1990) argue that when managers' wealth is largely in non-diversifiable human capital form, 
they may act in a risk-averse way, in which case their degree of risk taking would be less than 
that desired by stockholders. On the other hand and from the target perspective, Hadlock et al. 
(1999) studied successfully acquired banks and compared them to a matched sample of banks 
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that were not acquired. Their results show that banks with higher management ownership are 
less likely to be acquired, because they use their shareholdings to block acquisitions that may 
lead to their departure. 
Besides, there is the Free Cash Flows issue, where the management does not distribute 
free cash flows to shareholders as dividends and use it to acquire other firms. Harford (1999) 
finds that the behaviour of cash-rich firms is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis: 
cash-richness predicts that a firm will become a bidder, and the cash-rich firms engage in 
value-decreasing behaviour. Moreover, he shows that the targets of cash-rich firms are also 
significantly less likely to attract other bidders and the cash-rich bidder's stock price reaction 
to acquisition announcements is negative. 
4.2.4 Elimination of Inefficient Management 
Inefficient management can exist for a limited period of time but, over the long period, 
the market mechanism should ensure that they are replaced. In other words, more efficient 
firms tend to take over less efficient ones. Thus, banks with significant lower performance 
might have a higher probability of being targeted and acquired than well-managed banks. 
Mueller (1977) says that mergers are seen as an economical way to eliminating bad 
management. It occurs by replacing inefficient management and the transfer of assets from 
failing to rising firm. Berger et al. (1999) claim that mergers and acquisitions solve the 
problem of excess capacity, inefficient scale, inefficient product mix, and financial distress 
problems. They found that troubled or under-performing banks are often taken over as a better 
alternative to bankruptcy. We base on this to argue that acquired firms have lower 
performance and higher riskiness (poor risk management) than acquiring banks and we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hl: acquired banks are less efficient and more risky than acquiring banks. 
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4.2.5 To Achieve (or Increase) Growth 
Mergers and acquisitions are external alternatives, and sometimes cheaper, then 
internal organic growth. Firms seeking to expand their business have a choice between internal 
growth and growth through mergers and acquisitions. Internal growth may be a slow process, 
while growth through mergers may be a more rapid process. Mergers and acquisitions may be 
the best way to facilitate the growth in another geographical region especially in the 
international markets where it may be less risky to expand geographically through acquisitions 
than through internal development. Two studies have considered the effect of mergers on bank 
assets growth, and reported opposing results. But no studies have looked at the growth 
changes in deposits, loans, and shareholders' equity particularly. 58 We will test the asset 
growth for our case study, and compare it to the two mentioned studies. We propose the 
following hypothesis that will be tested empirically: 
H2: banks increase their growth through mergers. 
4.2.6 Increasing Market Share/ Market Power 
Mergers could increase the market share of the consolidated banks, which may 
increase their market power. Market power is referred to as monopoly power, and it is the 
ability to set and maintain price above competitive levels. Mergers tend to reduce competition, 
which may open the way for improve profit from higher prices. Gaughan (2002, pp 136-138) 
cites three sources of market power: product differentiation, barriers to entry, and market 
share. A company is able to increase its market share through horizontal integration. However, 
an increase in market share in the lack of significant product differentiation or barriers to entry 
does not always allow a firm to raise its prices significantly because, in such an industry, 
raising price above marginal cost may only attract new competitors who will drive prices 
down. Davis (2000) says that from point of view of executives, the gain of market share could 
58 These studies are Cornett and Tehranian (1992) who found that banks experience significant asset growth after 
the merger, and Focarelli et al. (2002) who found that the growth rate of total assets decreases in the year of the 
merger and keep decreasing in the long run. 
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be achieved only through acquisitions and being a market leader brings advantages of pricing 
power and cost economies. He adds that building market share is a natural strategic objective. 
particularly in a desirable business with attractive profit and growth potential. 
4.2.7 Taxation Considerations and Advantages 
A firm with tax losses can offset the profits of the other firm with which it merges. 
There is an incentive to acquire firms that have accumulated losses to take advantage of these 
unused allowances that can be used to reduce the acquirer's taxable profit in the future. Ross 
et al. (1996, pp 779-781) claim that tax gains may be a powerful incentive for some 
acquisitions. The possible tax gains that come from an acquisition could come from tax 
deduction from net operating losses, or the use of unused debt capacity, when the acquiring 
firm may be able to increase its debt-to-equity ratio after a merger creating additional tax 
benefits. Besides, authorities may use it as an incentive to encourage well-performing banks to 
acquire targets that suffer from continuous losses. Baer and Nazmi (2000) give an example, 
and say that in order to deal with public and private problem banks, the Central Bank of Brazil 
employed several tools, one of them was bank M&As. This tool was advanced through the 
Programme of Incentives for the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial 
System (PROER). PROER offers a system of tax incentives and credit facilities to encourage 
rapid consolidation of the banking sector and acquiring banks were permitted to absorb the 
losses of the acquired banks on their balance sheet through tax write-offs. 
4.2.8 Entry to New Markets 
To grow into the market organically by attracting new business through internal efforts 
and realising the critical size to become an effective competitor, may need many years. The 
quickest way to enter a new market could be through the acquisition of an existing "player" in 
that market. Acquisitions can provide access to new markets and technologies, which would 
take a long time for a company to develop. Hadlock et al. (1999) and Davis (2000) state that 
entering new markets is an understandable motive for mergers and acquisitions, particularly 
for banks that have reached the practical limits of expansion in their home markets. Ely and 
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Song (2000) add that this option was most attractive to institutions located in markets with 
little potential for growth, especially if they needed to grow larger to remain competitive. 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) add that banks extend their activities in order to provide services 
to their home-country clients in international transactions. Eun et al. (1996) claim that 
sometimes foreign acquisitions are better than domestic acquisitions, since earnings are less 
correlated across countries, and overseas investment may be the preferred option to achieve 
growth and diversification. 
4.2.9 Bank M&As as a Tool of Solving (or Avoiding) Banking Crises 
Acquisitions seem to be the more efficient technique that provides a way for banks to 
exist from business. Bankruptcy and liquidation involve several problems for individual banks 
and the entire banking system. In the U.S., the wave of bank failures that started in the early 
1980s triggered a wave of bank M&As to avoid the liquidation of large number of failed 
banks. Hempel et al. (1994, pp 659-663), Mishkin (2000) and Boyd and Graham (2000) have 
found that there was a significant decline in the number of U.S. banks during 1980s and early 
1990s, which was the direct result of bank failures. Due to the competition from financial and 
non-financial firms, such as brokerage firms, finance companies, insurance companies, 
investment banks, credit institutions, and mutual funds, banks realised a continuous decline in 
the ROA and ROE. In order to survive and maintain adequate profit levels, banks needed to 
develop more cost-effective structure, and bank consolidations were the logical way of 
achieving gains in efficiency. The trend of bank M&As in the U.S. was driven by market 
forces that have found that consolidations represent a way to stop the collapse of more banks. 
Besides, it was driven at the same by regulators that aimed at avoiding bank failures. 
On the other hand, in emerging markets, the authorities interfere directly in M&As. 
They tend to encourage and support efficient and healthy banks to acquire underpcrforming 
and unstable banks to avoid banking crises caused by bank failures. Sometimes, they even go 
further and enforce M&As amongst banks. For instance, Gelos and Roldos (2004) claim that 
the consolidation trend that began gradually in Central Europe since 2000 is being driven by 
strong banks being forced to absorb weaker ones to ensure continued stability of national 
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banking systems. In Argentina and Brazil, the authorities also carried through a process of 
guided consolidation that has dramatically reduced the number of banks. Shih (2003) argues 
that some governments of the Asian crisis countries, like Philippines and Thailand, have 
encouraged or even forced failing banks to merge in order to avoid the forthcoming collapse 
of banking sector. Policy makers in those countries believed that merging weak banks creates 
healthier ones, and merging weak banks with healthier ones reduces the risk of bank failures. 
Moreover, in crisis environment, authorities may force many failing banks, not just two to 
merger to create a super bank in an attempt to save all the failing banks at the same time. 
When the banking sector is relatively healthy, there is no urgency for policy makers to take 
actions to strengthen the banking sector, but they are likely to take interventionist measures, 
such as encouraging or even forcing banks to merge, when the banking sector is ailing and 
banks come under severe stress. 59 
The case study under analysis differs from the case of Asian countries. Although the 
central bank of Lebanon has encouraged and assisted bank mergers, but it did not guide it or 
force banks to consolidate. Besides, the merger operations have occurred gradually between 
1994 and 2002. Therefore, we expect that the empirical findings of our case study should be 
different from the theoretical findings of Shih (2003) and the experience as a whole should 
have a positive outcome in general. 
4.3 Consequences of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
There has been an extensive argument about the consequences of bank mergers and 
acquisitions and whether the consolidation of banks results in favourable or unfavourable 
outcomes. This argument is due to the different results found by studies that analysed bank 
M&As all of which tried to assess the effects of this controversial issue. Clearly, bank , 
59 Shih says that when policy makers merge a failing bank into a less distressed ｢ｾｾｫ＠ in attempt to save it,. ｴｨ･ｲｾ＠ ｾｳ＠
no guarantee that the bank created by the merger will be safer than the ｦ｡ｉｬＱｏｾ＠ bank. Moreover, 10 cnSlS 
Co '1' b k t t a super bank 10 an attempt to save all the environment, policy makers may force many lal 109 an s 0 crea e .. 
failing banks at the same time. He shows that it is probable that the more fallIng banks are ｾ･ｲｾ･､＠ to [on; a 
super bank, the greater is the bankruptcy risk that the super ｢｡ｮｾ＠ would be. But the .result ｾｾＬ､ｬｦｦ｣ｲ･ｮｴ＠ ＬｾＧＬｾ｣ｲｾ＠
merging a group of healthy banks in a non-crisis ･ｮｶｩｲｯｮｾ･ｮｴＮ＠ So 10 case of sever banklOg ｣ｭｾｳＮ＠ bank me g , 
are likely to create even weaker banks and worsen the bankmg sector problems. 
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consolidations affect firstly and directly the institutions involved in this operation. Since there 
are motives to be achieved through the merger, post-merger status will be different from pre-
merger status when these targets are realised. The changes could be better performance, higher 
profitability, reduced risk, growth, etc. Otherwise, the decision would not be rational. Even 
though what is realised could sometimes be below expectations, or even below what had 
existed. Besides, M&As affect the entire banking system and the national economy as a 
whole. From monopoly and concentration matters, to redundancies and unemployment, to 
changes in bank's policies towards small business lending, all are results of bank mergers and 
acquisitions. 
4.3.1 Consequences for Merged Banks 
In analysing the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions, studies typically try to 
observe the outcomes (positive or negative) through examining three phenomena: 
1. The reaction of stock price to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions (the Event 
Study) and any abnormal returns realised. 
11. The changes in corporate performance. 
111. The correlation between changes in corporate performance and the stock returns. 
4.3.1.1 Event Studies 
The intention of event studies of bank consolidations is to discover if there are any 
abnormalities (and their magnitude) in stock returns to the acquiring banks, andlor to the 
acquired banks in reaction to the merger announcement. The rationale behind this, is that the 
market "predicts" the success (failure) of the merger and reacts positively (negatively), this 
prediction reflects in the stock price. According to Weston et al. (1998, pp 93-95) the first step 
in measuring the effect of the event (here is the acquisition) on the stock is to define the event 
period. Usually this is centred on the announcement date, which is designated day 0 in event 
window. The purpose of the event window is to capture the event's effect on stock price and 
the longer the periods assure that all the effects are captured. The next step is to compute the 
predicted return for each day in the event period, which is the return that would be expected if 
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no event (merger), took place. Then, calculate the daily "residual" that is the actual return for 
that day for the bank minus the predicted return. The residual represents the abnormal return 
or the part of the return that is not predicted and is therefore an estimate of the change in firm 
value on that day caused by the event. 
Studies that implemented this methodology have found a variety of results, according 
to the period studied, the length of the event window, the type of deal (merger or acquisition), 
the sample size etc. Baradwaj et al. (1990) found that targets of hostile bank takeovers 
expenence significant abnonnal returns, while those for nonhostile takeovers were 
insignificant. On the other hand, bidders in both hostile and nonhostile acquisitions experience 
negative abnormal returns however, the abnormal returns to bidders in hostile acquisitions 
were not more negative than those of bidders in nonhostile acquisitions. They concluded that 
hostile bank acquisitions produce more net wealth than nonhostile acquisitions do. Madura 
and Wiant (1994) show strong evidence that banks experienced negative abnormal returns on 
average over the 36-month period following the acquisition. They argue that the immediate 
market reaction to an announced acquisition depends on the financial characteristics of the 
acquirer and/or the target. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) found that the targets positive returns 
were offset by negative returns to bidders. For cross-border bank mergers, Cakici et al. (1996) 
found that foreign acquirers experience positive and significant abnormal returns. In addition, 
Eun et al. (1996) claimed that target shareholders realised significant wealth gains regardless 
of the nationality of acquirers. In contrast, the wealth gains to foreign acquirer shareholders 
varied greatly across countries of acquirers. Zhang (1997) studied the difference in 
Cumulative Abnonnal Returns (CARs) for first-time and repeated acquirers, and the 
difference between FDIC assisted and non-assisted acquisitions. They observed that first-time 
acquirers CARs were statistically insignificant, and the average CARs for the repeated and 
FDIC assisted acquirers are positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the differences 
were statistically significant, implying that markets appreciate the experienced and assisted 
bidders. Grullon et al. (1997) examined the market reaction to bank merger announcements, 
and focus on (1) the method of payment, (2) the banks' capital adequacy, (3) characteristics, 
and (4) their ownership structure. For a sample of 146 US bank mergers, they found that the 
target's stock price reacts more favourably when its capital ratio is low, when its size is 
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smaller, when the bidder's profitability is higher, and when the bidder and the target are in the 
same state. On the other hand, the bidder's stock price reacts more favourably when the 
method of payment is cash rather than stock, when the premium paid to the target's 
shareholders is low, and when the target is in the same state. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
observed a positive and significant increase in stock market value for the average European 
bank mergers at the deal announcement. Acquirer banks witnessed a positive and significant 
market revaluation in the shorter event window. For target banks, they detected a positive and 
significant effect in all event windows analysed. Finally, Hart and Apilado (2002) show that 
acquirers tend to receive negative and insignificant abnonnal returns, whereas targets tend to 
show significant positive abnonnal returns. They argued that for the entire sampled period, net 
wealth was created by these mergers. 
The above cited studies show different results, however, the majority claimed that 
acquiring bank tend to realise negative CARs around the merger announcement date, and 
target banks receive positive CARs. This indicates that there is a transfer of wealth from 
acquiring to acquired banks' shareholders. 
4.3 .1.2 Operational Perfonnance Studies 
This approach analyses the accounting data of merged banks before and after the 
merger to detennine if there have been any significant changes in the merged banks' 
performance. Studies that look at the changes in perfonnance examine a variety of measures, 
however, they focus mainly on changes in profitability, efficiency and riskiness. 
Operational performance studies found variety of results according to the markets, 
samples or period studied as in event studies. For example, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) 
found that merged banks in the U.S. experience greater improvements in their corporate 
perfonnance than the banking sector as a whole. That was due to, at least partly, to a greater 
ability to attract loans and deposits and to improve employees' productivity and asset growth. 
Rhoades (1993) finds no indication of efficiency gains from horizontal bank mergers, which 
indicates that horizontal mergers with a relatively large degree of overlap do not result in 
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efficiency gams. McAllister and McManus (1993) found that consolidation amona small 
b 
banks would be likely to lead to improved cost efficiency. In contrast, they did not find gains 
resulted from mergers between large banks. Vennet (1996) finds that domestic acquisitions did 
not realise any efficiency gains. He argues that managerialist motives provide an explanation 
for these mergers. For a sample of US bank mergers, Peristiani (1997) found that in-market 
mergers do not yield any significant perfonnance improvements post-merger. Chamberlain 
(1998) found significant gains realised by reduction of premises and salary expenses, but in 
small acquisitions these gains were offset by increases in other non-interest expenses. Hart and 
Apilado (2002) claim to find a statistically significant improvement in profitability for 
merging banks post-merger. Focarelli et al. (2002) find no evidence of an improvement in 
profits. The post-merger increase in revenues from a larger market for services and from the 
growth of loans relative to total assets is offset by an increase in labour costs. They find that 
mergers are followed by an increase in ROE caused by a reduction in capital. Regarding 
acquisitions, they detected a post-acquisition long-run increase in profitability for acquired 
banks, due to a pennanent decrease in bad loans accompanied by a long-tenn reduction in 
lending. Finally, Diaz Diaz et al. (2004) studied the effect of acquisitions on European Union 
credit entities performance. They found that these acquisitions had a positive influence on 
bidders' perfonnance two to three years after the acquisitions. They also found that mergers 
that fonn financial conglomerates do not generate higher gains than those obtained in banking 
concentration. 
All the above-cited studies have used similar methodologies but they have studied 
different markets, periods, and data sets. The common factor among them is that they looked 
at unassisted bank M&A operations. Our case study therefore differs, since it analyses a 
sample of assisted bank mergers where all acquirers have been offered several incentives. We 
see that different studies have reported different results on bank M&As, but we expect that the 
merger cases under study have - on average - succeeded. We propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: assisted mergers should result - on average - in an improvement in performance. 
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4.3.1.3 Market Accuracy Studies 
Financial market accuracy studies show how a market stock price reacts to a merger 
announcement corresponding to the banks' actual performance change. The studies combine 
the two previous approaches (event study and operational performance study) to determine the 
accurate forecast of the financial markets to the potential changes of performance of the 
merging banks. So far, three studies applied this methodology: Cornett and Tehranian (1992) 
detected a correlation between the abnormal announcement-period stock returns and the 
various performance measures, indicating that the market anticipates improved performance 
when the acquisition is announced. In contrast, Pilloff (1996) find that correlations of 
abnormal return with performance measures are consistently insignificant, providing an 
evidence that market expectations are unrelated to subsequent merger-related gains. Hart and 
Apilado (2002) combined the examination of stock market reactions to the merger 
announcements and the operating performance changes after the bank merger. They 
investigated the precision of stock market reactions with respect to the subsequent operating 
performance changes. They noticed that financial markets have not been particularly 
statistically accurate in predicting subsequent changes in profitability for the combined banks. 
4.3.2 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 
4.3.2.1 Monopoly and Concentration 
In studying the consequences of bank consolidations on national economy, several 
critical questions arise: Does the society benefit from bank mergers? What are the costs to 
society resulting from increased concentration in banking sector? What is the state of 
competition after a wave of bank mergers and acquisitions? Merger activities could be 
motivated by the potential benefits from achieving greater market power resulted from 
increasing the market shares of the merging banks. The traditional structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis asserts that this reflects the setting of prices that are less favourable to 
consumers (lower deposit rates and/or higher loan rates) in highly concentrated markets as a 
result of competitive imperfections. 
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The society could benefit from a bank merger if it implies the production of goods and 
services at a lower cost as a result of economies of scale. However, studies indicate that the 
cost is seen greater than the benefit when combinations concentrate businesses in fewer hands 
without benefiting the economy to any significant degree. In a high concentrated market with 
high market shares of few firms, the setting of prices will be less favourable to consumers, and 
result in collusion or other forms of non-competitive behaviour to increase their profits. Berger 
and Hannan (1989) argue that prices will be less favourable to consumers in concentrated 
markets because of the non-competitive behaviour exhibit in such markets. Their results show 
that banks in the most concentrated local market pay a money market deposit account rate 
(MMDA) that range from 25 to 100 basis points less than those in the least concentrated 
markets. Similar results were found for short-term certificate of deposits. Corvoisier and 
Gropp (2002) claim that the ongoing process of consolidation in the banking systems in the 
Euro zone countries may substantially reduce competition. In more concentrated markets 
banks may behave less competitively and may use their market power to extract rents from 
their customers. For loans, Corvoisier and Gropp results indicate an increase of banks' margin 
by 100-200 basis points. For savings and time deposits, they find that higher concentration 
resulted in spreads which are 100-200 basis points higher in more concentrated markets. 
Finally, Sapienza (2002) argues that in-market mergers involve the acquisition of a large local 
market share and mergers between banks that have a significant market overlap increase both 
local market concentration and interest rates. He adds that efficiency gains are offset by 
monopoly power, when borrowers suffer from increased lending interest rates. On the other 
hand, in studying the monopoly risk of bank mergers and acquisitions in Poland, Bonin and 
Leven (1996) argue that foreign competition can provide the necessary market discipline in 
commercial credit markets. They add that if consolidation is practised for economic reasons it 
should be accompanied with significant openness of the domestic banking sector to foreign 
competition. 
4.3.2.2 Enhancing the Performance of the Banking System 
Globalisation, deregulation, and lifting the restrictions on mergers and acquisitions 
(especially cross-border consolidations) force local banks to improve their performance. 
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otherwise larger and more efficient banks (local or foreign) would consider them as potential 
target for friendly or hostile takeover. Banks with low performance represent a prospective 
target, and may have a higher probability of being acquired than well-managed banks. Avkiran 
(1999) says that relative efficiency can be an indicator of likelihood of bank failure or 
becoming a takeover target. She found that the effect of deregulation appears when a bank is 
underperforming and it will be a takeover target. As a result, the overall efficiency of the 
Australian banking sector has improved during the post-deregulation period, where results 
show a steady rise in employee productivity and ROA. Ely and Song (2000) claim that bank 
consolidations would improve the sector performance when managers of acquiring banks seek 
to exploit economies of scale and scope or replace underperforming management of target 
banks. They add that bidders will be attracted to underperforming firms and corporate control 
can resolve agency problems since current managers know that more efficient managers can 
replace them. 
4.3.2.3 Employment 
After an acquisition, the acquirer starts to discover the potential areas of cost reduction 
by eliminating or reducing any overlaps or duplicate activities. The main cost reduction 
potential is the branch network and staff. Therefore, consolidations - especially horizontal -
will definitely lead to job losses according to the degree of overlap. Mergers affect negatively 
the employment level. Rhoades (1998) explained this matter in comparing eight empirical 
studies done on bank M&As in the U.S. He found a reduction in staff costs accounted for over 
50% of total cost reduction, which indicates the significance of staff redundancies. Davis 
(2000) adds that closing duplicate branch networks (which means job losses) represents a 
major potential saving, since two-thirds of a typical retail bank's cost base in the branch 
network. 
4.3.2.4 Lending to Small Business 
The structural changes that occur in the banking sector may affect directly the credit 
flows to small businesses. Small banks tend to specialise in small business lending because of 
162 
their limited lending capacity, and because their role in local communities gives them an 
advantage in acquiring information about borrowers. So bank mergers may imply a loss of 
information or an interruption of previously established relationships caused by post-merger 
restructuring. Moreover, large borrowers can access national or international credit markets 
directly by issuing bond and debts, while small borrowers rely on banks to provide their credit 
needs. Thus, small borrowers that are bank dependent are particularly sensitive to structural 
changes of the banking system. 
Peek and Rosengren (1998) observed that after a merger, large business loans grow 
more rapidly than small business loans. At small banks, small business lending grew more 
rapidly than at large banks. Besides, they found that large acquirers are less active small 
business lenders than small acquirers are and bank's portfolio share of small business loans is 
inversely related to the size of the bank. Berger et al. (1999) argue that banks created by 
consolidation may reduce their services for small depositors because of new opportunities to 
provide wholesale services for large capital market participants. They observed that banks 
with less than $100 million assets invested about 9% of their assets in domestic small business 
loans, where only about 2% of assets for banks with over $10 billion. DeYoung et al. (1999) 
found a negative relation between a bank's size and its small business lending. They say that 
larger banks with extensive local branching networks may not be able to replicate the 
advantages of the small local banks because branch managers may be frequently related and 
decision making may be centralised. Furthermore, larger banks have more extensive lending 
opportunities and may decide to ignore small business borrowers. Sapienza (2002) declares 
that changes in the market structure of banking could seriously affect a wide range of 
nonbanking industries. Small borrowers of target banks are less likely to borrow money in the 
future from the consolidated bank than small borrowers of banks that do not merge, because 
large acquirers tend to cut off more small borrowers than other banks do. Focarelli et al. 
(2002) detected a long-term reduction in lending, especially for small firms, confirming that 
there is a significant change in lending strategies. Acquiring banks end up in the long run with 
more lending but with a lower share of small business loans. 
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In contrast to prior studies, Strahan and Weston (1998) find no significant change 
following mergers or acquisitions between medium-sized and large banking institutions, on 
small businesses lending. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001) add that consolidations affect 
the volume of credit to both large firms and small and medium-sized ones. Specifically, 
mergers are followed by a temporary reduction in credit, and a cut in credits to "negative 
present value borrowers". They did not find that mergers and acquisitions reduce credits to 
small firms due to changes in bank size. 
4.4 Bank Mergers In Lebanon: Causes, Objectives and Related 
Regulation 
In developed economies, market forces dominate and control merger and acquisition 
processes, while in emerging markets the authorities playa major role in bank consolidations. 
Bank consolidations in emerging markets are one way of dealing with problems resulting from 
systemic banking crises or individual financial problems. Therefore, during or after banking 
crises the authorities encourage and sometimes enforce banks to consolidate to reduce the risk 
of bank failures and minimise the social cost of banking crises. We have cited previously three 
studies that looked at bank M&As in emerging markets. 60 All the three studies claim that 
bank M&As that occur in emerging markets are somehow guided and directed by the 
authorities, where market forces were absent in these processes. 
4.4.1 Regulatory Related to Bank Mergers in Lebanon 
The decline of the regulatory control and supervision on the Lebanese banking system 
during the 1980s has provoked a growth in the number of unstable, undercapitalised and 
inefficient banks. For instance, during the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 the banking sector 
average equity-to-asset ratios were 1.38%, 1.66% and 1.94% successively; the provisions for 
doubtful loans-to-gross loan ratios were 33.41 %, 27.46% and 24% successively; the average 
cost-to-income ratios were 82.53%, 80.74% and 71.61 % successively: and the average ROA 
60 Baer and Nazmi (2000), Gelos and Roldos (2002) and Shih (2003). 
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were 0.34%, 0.43% and 0.61 % successively. Besides, the sharp depreciation of the local 
currency in late 1980s and early 1990s caused high withdrawal of deposits from the Lebanese 
banking sector and raised the rates of default of stressed borrowers. Consequently, Lebanese 
banks have suffered from a severe decline in activity and profitability that has reduced 
severely their capital. Before a banking crisis emerged, the central bank decided to restructure 
the banking system and push banks to recapitalise in order to avoid the catastrophic effects of 
a malfunctioning banking system on the economy. Efforts have been undertaken to reform the 
national banking system gradually. Firstly, a law introduced in November 1991 aimed at 
reform of the banking sector and focused on the following issues: 
a- Giving the banks that have suffered losses of more than one quarter of their capital, one 
year to recapitalise otherwise they will be delisted from the list of approved banks. 
b- Giving the Higher Banking Committee the authority to liquidate insecure banks. 
c- Allowing the National Institute for Deposit Guarantee to guarantee the deposits of the 
relevant banks. 
The next step has been the decision of moving towards consolidating the banking 
sector by the law 192, dated January 1992. This law aimed at facilitating bank mergers and 
acquisitions and offered incentives for merged banks. 61 The central bank used this law 
repeatedly to encourage the consolidation of banks operating in Lebanon in order to stabilise 
and support the banking sector. The "Bank Mergers Law" has offered the following 
incentives: 62 63 
a- The banks' chairmen willing to merge have the right to exchange information about 
customers' accounts. 
61 This law was initially valid for five years, until law 679, dated March 1998, extended its validity for an 
additional period that ended in January 2003. 
62 This law has been implemented on mergers among Lebanese banks but it is not applicable when a Lebanese 
bank acquires a foreign bank. Besides, this law does not implement automatically, but it requires a demand from 
both acquiring and acquired banks to benefit from its incentives. . 
63 Offering incentives to acquirers was implemented in other countries. For instance, .the Central. Bank of Braz.Ii 
advanced a programme of incentives for the restructuring and strengthening ofthe.natlOnal ?na.nclal system. ｔｾｬｳ＠
programme offers a system of tax incentives and credit facilities to encourage rapid ｣ｯｮｳｯｨ､ｾｴＱｯｮ＠ of the bankmg 
sector. Acquiring banks were given line of credit at below the market interest rate to acqUire other ｢｡ｮｾｳＬ＠ and 
were permitted to absorb the financial losses of the acquired bank on its balance sheet through tax wnte-offs 
(Baer and Nazmi, 2000). 
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b- The central bank is allowed to give acquiring banks long-tenn loans to help them to absorb 
targets' losses and pay for redundancies. 
c- The central bank can absolve the merging bank income tax within certain limits, and all 
procedures required to complete the merger are absolved stamp, moving and registration 
fees. 
d- Merged banks are pennitted to tenninate employee contracts after providing them with 
benefits and legal indemnities. 
Vis-a-vis the law of facilitating bank mergers, the central bank has been issuing 
directives to push banks towards more mergers such as capital adequacy requirements and 
branch opening restrictions. The purpose is to force banks to enhance their capital bases to 
meet Basle Accord requirements and to encourage small- and medium-sized banks to merge 
with other banks or accept an acquisition offer from the larger ones. In addition, the central 
bank has restricted new branch opening to two per year, which had a direct influence on bank 
willing to expand their operation geographically (in-market), by pushing them to look for a 
target to acquire and exploit its branch network. 
4.4.2 The response of Banks 
In the early 1990s, Lebanese banks found themselves lagging behind in terms of 
capital, efficiency, technology, and services. Technological transfer to Lebanon and Lebanese 
banks was limited to the employment of some innovations and devices, in the form of 
computer hardware and software and communication technology, and the use of basic 
methods and infonnation in the fonn of tools of analysis and quantitative techniques. Thus, 
domestic banks directed their efforts to develop the sector through - amongst several 
procedures - rehabilitation and consolidation of their financial structures. Lebanese banks had 
to grow rapidly and develop their infrastructures to be able to offer competitive services, and 
playa leading role in financing the economy. The limited organic expansion opportunity and 
the limitation of new branch opening forced banks to look for external growth choice. 
Therefore, many large banks targeted medium and small banks to expand their branch 
networks. On the other hand, smaller banks that had been facing tough requirements from the 
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central bank, and the increasingly competitive environment accepted acquisition offers from 
larger banks. Twenty five mergers resulted from the law facilitating bank mergers. 64 These 
operations have led to the de Ii sting of the 25 target banks. 
4.5 Evaluating Bank Mergers in Lebanon: Methodology 
4.5.1 Analysing the Characteristics of Acquiring and Acquired Banks 
A deep understanding of the merged banks' characteristics allows recognition the 
variables that determine why a bank becomes a potential acquirer or a target. In addition, this 
could assist detecting the relationship between the success of a merger and the recent 
performance of merged banks, which may help in predicting the outcome of a merger. In this 
section we will implement two different methodologies: (1) comparing the average 
performance measures of acquiring and acquired banks pre-merger and (2) implementing a 
Logit Model. 
4.5.1.1 Comparison of Acquiring and Acquired Bank Means 
The test is based on the following equation: 
Mpre(i, j) = X pre (i)- xpre(j) (4.4) 
where, 
M pre (i, j) is the difference of pre-merger performance measures of acquiring bank i and 
acquired bank j. 
X pre (i) is the performance measure of acquiring bank i pre-merger. 
xpre(j) is the performance measure of acquired bank} pre-merger. 
64 Besides several bank acquisitions occurred during the same period, These acquisitions wi II, ｮｾｴ＠ be subject to 
, , , , fi' , d'ffi It t t t the SIgnIficance of the empirical analysis because their number IS lImIted and there ore, It IS I ICU 0 es , , 
differences between the pre- and the post-acquisitions measures, ｈｯｾ･ｶ･ｲＮＧ＠ w,e ｨｾｶ･＠ ,compen,sated ｾｨｬｳ＠ Issue by 
analysing the profitability of these banks in the second chapter and their capitalisatIOn 10 the thIrd one, 
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We will compare the "raw figures" and the sector-adjusted figures using the sector 
average as a benchmark. 65 
4.5.1.2 The Logit Model 
Regarding the second methodology, we will implement a Logit Model, which helps 
understanding the relation between the characteristics of a bank and the probability of that 
bank being an acquirer or a target. We will include in this model all the acquiring and acquired 
banks. This methodology explains the different characteristics of the two groups and the 
significance of these differences. The Logit Model is based on the cumulative logistic 
probability function. Specifically, 
Z, = IOgll ｾ＠ ｾ｝＠ = Po + PIXI + p,X, + ... + P,X. (4.5) 
and 
P = E(Y = lIX.)= 1 
I I 1 + e-z; (4.6) 
where log is the natural logarithm, ｾ＠ is the probability that a bank will be acquired. Xi is the 
jth independent variable, and Pi is the coefficient of the jth independent variable. The 
coefficients measure the effect on the odds (probability) of being acquired of a unit change in 
the corresponding independent variable. The dependent variables 1'; in this model take the 
value of zero or 1 as follow: 
{
I for y-
i - 0 for 
acquiring 
acquired 
banks 
banks 
(4.7) 
The reason behind using two different techniques is the sample size constraint. We use 
the first technique because it allows us pooling the data of three years pre- and three year post-
merger, which forms a larger data set, whereas using regression analysis will limit the analysis 
to analysing the means only. On the other, because we want to analyse additionally the 
characteristics of acquiring and acquired banks one year pre-merger, which limits the analysis 
65 For the calculation of these values, see section 4.5.2.3. 
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to around 50 observations, it may be more reliable using regression analysis. Moreover, the 
usage of two different methodologies shows the robustness of the empirical fmdings. 
4.5.2 Detecting the Changes in Corporate Perfonnance Post-Merger 
There are three methods used to assess bank mergers and acquisitions. These methods 
are: (1) Event studies, (2) Operational performance, and (3) Markets accuracy studies. Each of 
these methods has its advantages and disadvantages. They are implemented and perfonned 
according to the characteristics and circumstances of the market and the sample under study. 
The operational performance test will be implemented in our analysis for the following 
reasons: 
1. In Lebanon, the number of listed and publicly traded banks is limited and market data 
are available for few banks, so an event study could only be perfonned for a very small 
sample. Accounting data are available almost for all banks, thus, OP studies can 
include a much broader sample of banks. 
11. Event studies reflect expectations and changes in expectations, where infonnational 
asymmetries may generate misleading results. Sometimes the market reaction may be 
negative to a certain merger, whereas it leads to enhancement of perfonnance. But OP 
studies test the actual performance changes that follow a merger. 
111. 
IV. 
OP studies analyse the merger effects in a longer time horizon before and after the 
merger. 
In event studies it is difficult to isolate the effect of different events (such as merger, , 
dividends, restructuring, or other announcements) on stock price. Moreover, if a bank 
was involved in several mergers during one period, it should be excluded from an 
event study. An OP study considers these mergers and treats them as one operation 
(however, it is not possible to know which deal has added more value). 
This methodology (OP) will be employed and developed in a way to analyse more 
profoundly the bank mergers in Lebanon. The indicators utilised are diverse in order to 
capture more information about merged banks, and to observe all post-merger changes. The 
changes in corporate performance will be calculated as follow: 
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M ( .. ) XPOS1(' .) xpre (. .) 
cons 1, } = cons 1 + } - eons 1 + } (4.8) 
where, 
Means (i, j) is the difference of the post-merger performance measure of the consolidated 
entity and the weighted-average performance measures of acquiring bank i and acquired bank 
j, pre-merger. 
X ［ｾＺ＠ (i + j) is the performance measure of the consolidated entity post-merger. 
X :::s (i + j) is the weighted-average performance measures of the acquiring and acquired 
banks pre-merger. 66 
4.5 .2.1 Period Length 
It is very important to determine the period of time (time window) that has to be 
employed, in order to capture the effects of the merger. For the post-merger period, Rhoades 
(1998) summarised nine case studies about horizontal (in-market) mergers 67 and described 
their methodologies and findings. He found that roughly one-half of savings from mergers 
occurs during the first year, and all savings were fully achieved and all gains were realised 
within three years after the merger (with the majority of savings being achieved after two 
years). Thus, studies have analysed the ratios for three years preceding the year of the merger 
and three years after the merger. 68 Additionally, Davis (2000) fmds that the sources of savings 
resulting from bank mergers and the time necessary to captures these savings are as presented 
in Table 4.1. 
66 For the calculation of these values, see section 4.5.2.2. 
67 These case studies were done on U.S. banks by the Federal Reserve Board staff. Those studies are not 
Eublished as he mentions. 
8 Moreover, he argues that the three-year time period was used because of the almost unanimous agreement 
among the experts interviewed that about half of any efficiency gains should be apparent after one year, and a1l 
gains should be realised within three years. 
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Table 4 1 S 
· . 
ource 0 fM erger C ost S avings and Time Necessary to Caoture 
Range of cost savings Percentage Years of capture 
Executive and general administration 80 - 100 1 
Treasury 90 - 100 1 
Marketing 60-90 1 
Legal 50-70 1 
HR 40-60 1 
Audit and accounting 30- 50 2 
Facilities 20-30 2-3 
IT 20-30 2 
Credit! mortgage operations 30-40 2 
Payments operations 25 - 30 2 
Deposit operations 10 - 20 2 
Other operations 10 - 20 2 
Branch network 20- 30 3 
Source: DaVIS (2000) 
It is obvious that the majority of savings are achieved within two years, and all savings 
are achieved within three years after the merger. Moreover, many other empirical studies have 
employed a time window of three years before and after the merger. For instance, Cornett and 
Tahranian (1992), Healy et al. (1992) and Vennet (1996) studied a period of three years before 
and three years after the merger. 69 Therefore, our pre-merger analysis will cover a period of 
three years prior to the merger (t-3 to t-1) and a consistent post-merger period, i.e. three years. 
The year when the merger occurs (t) is left out of the analysis because it is considered a 
transition period. The differences/changes in the pre- and post-merger performance measures 
will be examined on bank-mean basis and on sector-adjusted bank-mean basis (i.e. employing 
a benchmark). Finally, the differences between pre-merger measures of acquiring and acquired 
69 However, there are some studies that have employed smaller time windows. For instance, Pilloff (1996) have 
employed a time period window of two years before and after the merger. Craig and Cabral dos Santos (1997) 
have employed two time frames according to the availability of data. The first time frame included eight quarters 
before and eight quarters after the acquisition. The second time frame included four quarters prior to the 
acquisitions and sixteen quarters after. 
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performance measures and the changes in pre- and post merger measures of merged banks will 
be tested using t-statistic. 
4.5.2.2 Pre-Merger Measures 
To obtain the pre-merger period performance (t-3 to t-1), the measures are calculated 
by aggregating the indicators for merged banks in each of the three years prior to the merger. 
The indicators of combined firms are weighted average, using the relative sizes (total assets) 
as weight. In fact, a hypothetical combined firm is created by this procedure and will be used 
as a proxy for the performance of firms before the merger. This value is calculated as follows: 
A pre ( .) A pre (.) 
X pre (i + }) - } X X pre (") I X pre (.) 
cons - Apre(j)+ A pre (i) } + Apre(j)+ A pre (i) X I 
where, 
A pre (i) is the acquiring bank assets pre-merger. 
X pre (i) is the performance measure of acquiring bank i pre-merger. 
A pre (j) is the target bank assets pre-merger. 
X pre (j) is the performance measure of acquired bank} pre-merger. 
4.5.2.3 The Benchmark 
(4.9) 
The performance measures could be affected by both firm-specific influences and 
industry-wide trends. Therefore, it is crucial to create a benchmark in order to evaluate the 
post-merger performance. Cornett and Tahranian (1992), Pilloff (1996), Vennet (1996) and 
Craig and Cabral dos Santos (1997) employ as a relevant benchmark the sector-adjusted 
performance of the merged banks under study. The sector-adjusted measures are calculated by 
subtracting the sector mean from the sample data. On the other hand, Healy et al. (1992) 
calculated their industry-adjusted performance measures by subtracting the sector median 
from the sample measures. Subtracting the sector mean (or median) from the obtained figures 
permits to assess if the observed differences/changes in the combined firm reflect changes in 
the combined banks or the whole sector. Moreover, this procedure eliminates the time effect. 
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since we will be comparing the abnormal sector-adjusted performance of merged banks before 
and after the merger. 
4.5.3 The Indicators (Performance Measures) 70 
4.5.3.1 Profitability Indicators 
The first set of performance measures is the profitability indicators. These indicators 
show how profitable were the banks under study, the diversification potential and income 
sources, and the efficiency in utilising the assets. Comparing the profitability of banks before 
and after the merger shows how profitable was the deal. 
4.5.3.2 Efficiency Indicators 
The second set of indicators is the efficiency indicators, to find out the efficiency of 
improvements (if any) resulting from the merger. It is important here to discriminate between 
cost reduction and efficiency improvements. Operating expenses may be reduced by cutting 
employees, closing branches, consolidating headquarters offices, closing computer and back-
office operations, etc. Such reductions in expenses do not automatically translate into 
improvements in efficiency, but may be accompanied by reductions in assets and revenues, 
which represent shrinkage of the firm rather than efficiency improvements. Therefore, 
absolute expense reduction would not be able to control this issue and instead the cost-to-
income ratio and the cost-to-asset ratio will be utilised. 
4.5.3.3 Risk Indicators 
Because changes in observed profitability following a merger may not only be the 
result of a cost reduction and/or higher revenue, but it may be the result of adopting risky 
strategies. A change in lending policies aimed at increasing revenues may worsen the quality 
of the loan portfolio, and a search for more profitable investments may endanger the bank's 
70 For the calculation of the ratios, see appendix 4.B. 
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liquidity position. Thus it is crucial to analyse and compare the changes in the risk profile of 
the merging banks before and after a merger. The third set of indicators will be to analyse 
capital adequacy, credit risk, and liquidity risk measures. 
4.5.3.4 Growth and Market Share Indicators 
We use those measures to determine the effect of this indicator on post-merger 
outcomes, and to detect growth and/or market share gains post-merger. Additionally, these 
measures allow us to detect the concentration changes in the market under study as a whole. 
4.6 Data 
Firstly, the period under study covers 14 years and includes 25 merger operations. The 
first acquisition occurred in 1994, and thus by going back three years before that operation, the 
first year included is 1991 and the last year is 2003. Theoretically, the total number of 
observations is 75 for both acquiring and acquired banks pre-merger and 75 observations for 
the merged entities post-merge. But in fact, some observations are missed. For the first section 
(comparing acquiring and acquired banks), data for two target banks were missing. The total 
number of observations for acquiring banks remains 75, but with 69 observations for acquired 
banks. For the second section (testing the effect of mergers on banks' performance), we lost 
some observations as well. Theoretically, the pre-merger observations were supposed to be 69, 
but we lost 7 observations due to overlapping merger (repeated acquirers). Additionally, two 
acquisitions occurred in 2001 and six in 2002 and therefore, we have lost 14 post-mergers 
observations since 2004 and 2005 accounts are not available. Thus, we have 62 pre-mergers 
observations and 61 post-mergers observations. 
The main source of data used in this chapter is BilanBanques. However, many target 
bank data were not reported in it. We have got some of the missing data from the central bank 
and some from the acquiring banks. 
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We analyse the acquiring and acquired data in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and we have found 
the following. For acquiring banks, the means and the medians are in general close, which 
shows that the distribution of the data is not skewed. On the other hand, for acquired banks the 
data are obviously skewed, as we notice large differences between the means and the medians. 
Besides, acquired banks indicators are more dispersed than those for acquiring banks. 
Regarding the differences, we notice that acquiring banks are more profitable and more 
efficient than acquired banks. Acquiring banks are less risky, which is clear from the higher 
capital adequacy, lower credit risk and better liquidity. Regarding the growth, acquiring and 
acquired banks have similar growth, except the equity growth where acquirers have higher 
growth rate. The difference in size and in market share is obvious between the two groups. 
The larger acquirer had a size of $4.65 billion with a 9% market share, whereas the larger 
target had $835 million assets with 2% market share. 71 From this general comparison, we 
notice that there are differences between the two groups of banks, however, a statistical 
analysis is needed to see if these differences are significant or not. 
71 All figures were converted into U.S. Dollar before being analysed. This is to minimise the effect of inflation. 
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Table 4.2: A 
- --- - - --- - - - - -1---- ---Ii Banks D -----ij tive Statist" -- -
Performance measures Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum Skeweness Kurtosis 
Profitability 
ROE 17.22 16.48 13.82 63.81 -8.99 0.60 0.50 
ROA 1.02 1.09 0.73 2.55 -0.93 -0.18 -0.33 
Net profit margin 24.46 27.40 18.22 59.27 -37.01 -0.75 0.67 
Asset utilisation 4.16 3.89 1.26 8.66 1.97 1.33 2.69 
IRS 3.17 3.12 1.01 6.13 1.22 0.51 0.40 
Non-interest income-to-total revenue 23.29 22.58 11.73 77.51 3.85 2.73 11.43 
Efficiency 
Cost-to-income ratio 70.00 65.90 21.05 136.57 37.96 0.77 0.13 
Cost-to-average assets ratio 2.67 2.41 1.19 7.99 1.04 2.04 6.27 
Staff expenses-to-average assets ratio 1.47 1.31 0.71 4.21 0.51 1.90 4.36 I 
Overhead efficiency 41.47 38.75 20.76 131.32 3.87 2.24 8.64 
Interest paid to interest received 66.74 71.43 15.69 85.15 15.13 -2.36 5.10 
Capital adequacy 
Equity-to-asset ratio 9.22 6.60 14.10 89.26 1.23 5.30 28.76 
Equity-to-risky asset ratio 31.61 13.09 99.20 611.41 1.99 5.78 32.64 
Loan-to-equity ratio 4.98 4.19 3.57 21.46 0.00 1.74 5.47 
Deposit-to-equity ratio 14.61 12.29 11.26 71.05 0.04 2.41 8.76 I 
Credit risk 
Bad debts & provisions-to-gross loans ratio 1.05 0.70 1.38 6.34 -1.55 1.88 4.22 
Provisions for doubtfulloans-to gross loans 13.40 9.38 14.47 73.82 0.00 2.05 4.77 
Liquidity risk 
Liquid assets-to-total assets ratio 67.99 68.04 9.39 97.87 51.69 1.53 3.81 
Loan-to-deposit ratio 32.58 33.69 11.41 58.09 1.06 -0.87 1.77 
Growth 
Assets 31.22 22.62 31.30 165.37 -2.98 2.52 X.I X 
Equity 124.81 27.60 443.22 2,690.93 -52.18 5.62 31.32 
DepOSIts 24.75 21.10 24.06 99.81 -45.92 0.40 2.74 
-
--
--
Loans 19.88 24.17 35.29 107.15 -73.49 - 0.71 1.41 
-----
---- - -- -
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Market Share 
Assets 3.61 3.63 2.74 8.98 0.02 0.15 -1.14 
Deposits 3.62 3.59 2.75 8.59 0.001 0.11 -1.27 
Loans 3.29 3.49 2.47 7.92 0.00 0.04 -1.34 
Assets ($ million) 1,211.842 1,010.868 1,159.096 4,650.681 4.548 1.037 0.547 
Notes: 
ROE is the after tax net income-to-average equity ratio; ROA is the after tax net income-to-average asset ratio; NPM is the after tax net income-to-total 
revenue ratio; Asset Utilisation is the total revenue-to-average asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; Overhead Ratio is the non-
interest income-to-general operating expenses ratio; Asset/Equity/DepositILoan growth is the year-to-year (percentage) growth; AssetlDepositILoan market 
share is the average of all acquiring/acquired banks assets/deposits/loans divided by total sector banking assets/deposits/loans; the other ratios are exactly as 
written. 
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Table 4.3: A T- . d Banks D Iii- s - -- -
Performance measures Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum Skeweness Kurtosis 
Profitability 
ROE 3.63 0.40 37.65 171.05 -116.66 1.12 9.21 
ROA 
-0.08 0.02 5.71 26.64 -25.09 0.34 14.09 
Net profit margin -31.43 0.92 134.99 97.75 -612.51 -3.35 11.34 
Asset utilisation 5.43 4.33 5.07 27.25 -1.26 2.57 7.83 
IRS 2.82 2.79 2.68 9.40 -6.96 -0.69 3.56 
Non-interest income-to-total revenue 29.68 26.66 96.32 378.98 -453.75 -2.21 16.03 
Efficiency 
Cost-to-income ratio 137.53 98.17 200.10 1204.48 2.25 4.48 20.82 
Cost-to-average assets ratio 4.91 3.43 4.35 23.48 0.57 2.55 7.56 
Staff expenses-to-average assets ratio 2.87 1.83 3.00 16.45 0.00 2.90 9.80 
Overhead efficiency 56.58 35.59 116.88 891.12 0.04 6.77 48.56 
Interest paid to interest received 74.05 73.40 24.46 160.65 4.80 0.44 3.62 
Capital adequacy 
Equity-to-asset ratio 5.01 7.00 33.26 89.26 -165.08 -2.94 16.46 
Equity-to-risky asset ratio 18.54 10.01 99.46 611.41 -276.76 3.19 23.77 
Loan-to-equity ratio 41.20 5.87 152.85 797.40 -29.78 4.46 19.27 
Deposit-to-equity ratio 33.99 11.20 100.09 538.80 -70.14 4.32 1 'd.57 
Credit risk 
Bad debts & provisions-to-gross loans ratio 1.13 0.53 1.67 8.89 -0.72 2.36 7.66 
Provisions for doubtful loans-to gross loans 126.39 15.05 382.63 2019.64 0.00 4.08 16.49 
Liquiditr risk 
Ｍｾ＠
Liquid assets-to-total assets ratio 53.32 54.21 15.77 97.87 20.14 -0.03 0.5.') 
Loan-tn-deposit ratio 52.37 46.07 36.28 178.91 1.06 2.IX 4.X I 
Growlh 
A""ets 25.13 14.56 47.76 219.27 -32.03 2.39 6.44 
--ｾＭ ----- --
hjlll!\, 23.50 2.95 81.42 286.55 -188.17 1.07 3.06 
-------
Deposits 23.21 12.20 56.65 380.20 -47.90 4.82 2972 
ｾＭＭＭＭＭ
Loans 19.34 14.24 41.40 199.43 -50.00 2.60 9.}4 
-----
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-Market Share 
Assets 0.54 0.28 0.57 1.96 0.02 1.18 0.13 
Deposits 0.54 0.30 0.58 1.98 0.001 1.22 0.22 
Loans 0.64 0.38 0.67 2.36 0.00 l.24 0.42 
Assets ($ million) 191.587 104.990 226.010 835.224 2.168 1.570 1.477 
Notes: 
ROE is the after tax net income-to-average equity ratio; ROA is the after tax net income-to-average asset ratio; NPM is the after tax net income-to-total 
revenue ratio; Asset Utilisation is the total revenue-to-average asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; Overhead Ratio is the non-
interest income-to-general operating expenses ratio; AssetiEquitylDepositILoan growth is the year-to-year (percentage) growth; AssetlDepositILoan market 
share is the average of all acquiring/acquired banks assets/deposits/loans divided by total sector banking assets/deposits/loans; the other ratios are exactly as 
written. 
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In Table 4.4 we show the annual average of acquiring and acquired banks' measures. 
For acquiring banks, the measures do not change significantly during the three years before 
the acquisition. The focus is on acquired banks. We notice that acquired banks' profitability 
deteriorates gradually before the acquisitions. Moreover, whereas it is somehow steady for 
acquirers, it is highly volatile for acquired banks where it is clear that they change 
significantly from one year to another. Also the capital adequacy of acquired banks is highly 
volatile, which may suggest that they were not able to maintain a steady capitalisation. We 
notice from the credit risk indicators that the credit risk increases for acquired banks gradually 
before the acquisition. Their quality of loan portfolios deteriorates before the merger, which 
affects negatively their profitability. Finally, acquiring banks grow rapidly pre-merger, but 
acquiring banks grow slowly. 
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- -- - - - . - .. - ---
-. --Ii------------iiI -----il -- - --iii --- ......... --- ..... --- - ... -- -- ... - -- ... --_ .... i- .... l -- - ｾＮ＠ - -- , 
Performance measures Acquirers Acquired 
T-3 T-2 T-l T-3 T-2 T-l 
Profitability 
ROE 19.40 (16.20) 16.95 (11.64) 15.31 (13.53) 8.10 (26.58) 9.64 (9.64) -8.94 (38.75 
ROA 0.99 (0.79) 1.01 (0.70) 1.04 (0.74) 0.33 (8.57) -0.04 (2.95) 0.21 (3.95 
Net profit margin 22.49 (19.88) 23.80 (17.23) 27.09 (17.91) -0.38 (50.63) -54.31 (191.38) -15.91 (69.39 
Asset utilisation 4.32 (1.30) 4.25 (1.37) 3.91 (1.12) 6.47 (6.46) 4.74 (3.06) 4.96 (5.10) 
IRS 3.35 (0.98) 3.32 (1.01) 2.84 (1.01) 3.21 (3.37) 2.76 (2.65) 2.43 J).621 
Non-interest income-to-total revenue 22.52 (7.66) 21.47 (8.95) 25.89 (16.57) 14.63 (109.72) 36.46 (118.41) 40.30 (29.69 
Efficiency 
Cost-to-income ratio 72.25 (23.11) 70.16 (20.23) 67.60 (20.35) 106.26 (73.22) 87.73 (29.84) 107.89 (71.52) 
Cost-to-average assets ratio 2.88 (1.36) 2.72 (0.73) 2.42 (0.97) 5.95(6.11) 4.53 (2.97) 4.07 (2.85 
Staff ･ｸｾ･ｮｳ･ｳＭｴｯＭ｡ｶ･ｲ｡ｧ･＠ assets ratio 1.59 (0.79) 1.48 (0.73) 1.34 (0.61) 3.57 (4.20) 2.64 (2.16) 2.26 (1.83) 
Overhead efficiency 38.24 (12.96) 39.04 (17.72) 47.11 (28.26) 43.10 (30.10) 79.20 (191.72) 45.81 (45.79 
Intcrcstpaid to interest received 66.58 (14.65) 66.63 ( 16.02) 67.02 (16.98) 68.79 (28.31) 75.35 (27.71) 79.03 ( 12.40) 
Capital adequacy 
E4Uity-to-assct ratio 6.33 (3.77) 7.17 (3.46) 14.17 (23.42) 7.64 (39.67) 0.99 (39.87) 6.71 (4.84) 
Fquity-to-risky asset ratio 13.90 (9.48) 16.33 (11.41) 64.60 (168.68) 37.54 (150.75) 4.93 (72.72) 11.89(8.93) 
ＱＮＨＩｾｉｬｬＭ to-e4uity ratio 6.16 (4.67) 4.66 (3.13) 4.12{2.30) 31.22 (101.00) 44.89 i 172.53) 48.96 (185.78) 
Deposit-to-equity ratio 18.42 (15.54) 13.37(9.12) 12.04 (6.58) 25.70 (66.32) 39.86 (115.28) 36.97 (118.59) 
Credit risk 
Had dehts & provlsions-to-gross loans ratio 0.97 (1.l5) 1.18 (1.30J 1.00 (1.69) 0.50 (0.83) 1.12 (1. 14) 1.92 (2.55) 
Provisions for doubtful loans-to gross loans 12.60 (12.84) 14.65 (17.20) 12.94 (13.52) 99.93 (284.45) 132.20 (392.24) 151.92 (485.41) 
Uquiditr risk 
Llyuid assets-to-total assets ratio 66.69 (6.47) 68.45 (10.70) 68.81 (10.63) 56.13 (17.78) 51.18 (14.78) 52.50 (14N) 
Loan-tn-deposit ratio 33.23 (10.91) 32.70(12.12) 31.77(11.62) 54.51 (41.70) 52.X2 (J6.59) 49.14 (30.17) 
Growlh 
A""ets 28.99 (19.44J 25.57 (23.20) 39.10 (44.78) 29.34 (4().1 0) 24.Xl (43.38) 20.51 (56.X(» 
hIli I!)' 51.89 (99.27) 63.33 (74.23) 259.22 (750.13) 50.25 (100.97) 1930 (5lU<X) 0.06 (n.ol) 
1 ｨＮｬＩＨＩｾ＠ ｴｾ｟＠ 23.63 (26.81) 24.46122 .52) 26.16 (23.62) 15.96 (32.72) ](). 1 6 (X 5 In ) . 1'\ (l}-.i 23.7 U 
.-
-
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Loans 22.02 (36.37) 18.73 (35.76) 18.89 (35.17) 24.96 (47.39) 14.64 (24.87) 18.54(51.21) I 
Market Share 
Assets 3.50 (2.75) 3.60 (2.76) 3.72 (2.83) 0.48 (0.57) 0.53 (0.57) 0.62 (0.59) 
Deposits 3.54(2.80) 3.63 (2.79) 3.68 (2.79) 0.48 (0.59) 0.51 (0.58) 0.63 (0.59) 
Loans 3.25 (2.51) 3.25 (2.45) 3.37 (2.55) 0.60 (0.68) 0.63 (0.66) 0.72 (0.69) 
Assets ($ million) 998.778 1,199.037 1,437.712 151.660 174.816 251.342 (1,039.606) (1,148.236) (1,283.484) (209.708) (226.220) (243.000) 
Notes: 
ROE is the after tax net income-to-average equity ratio; ROA is the after tax net income-to-average asset ratio; NPM is the after tax net income-to-total revenue ratio; Asset 
Utilisation is the total revenue-to-average asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; Overhead Ratio is the non-interest income-to-general operating expenses 
ratio; AssetiEquity/DepositiLoan growth is the year-to-year (percentage) growth; Asset/DepositiLoan market share is the average of all acquiring/acquired banks 
assets/deposits/loans divided by total sector banking assets/deposits/loans; the other ratios are exactly as written. 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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4.7 Empirical Results 
4.7.1 The Differences of Acquiring and Acquired Banks Characteristics 
4.7.1.1 Comparing the (Average) Performance Measures of Merged Banks 
The empirical results for this section are reported in Table 4.5. The first two columns 
show the average of all banks during the three years before the mergers. From comparing the 
figures in these two columns, we fmd that acquiring banks are more profitable and more 
efficient than acquired banks. They have better control of risks. Besides they are larger and 
have higher growth. These differences could be affected by firm-specific influences and/or 
industry-wide trends. Therefore, we compare the sector-adjusted measures of acquirers and 
targets by subtracting the sector average from all measures. The results are reported in the last 
five columns of Table 4.5. The fourth and the sixth columns show the proportion of banks that 
have higher measures than the sector average. The differences (and their significance) are 
reported in the last column. 
Acquiring banks sector-adjusted ROE is significantly higher than those of acquired 
banks. The difference is 12.69% and is significant at the 5% level. Besides, we notice that 
compared to the entire sector, acquired banks report lower ROE (by 15.70) and ROA (by 0.95) 
than the sector average. 72 Acquired banks shareholders find it no more profitable for them to 
hold the shares of their banks and thus, they accept the offer from other banks. Acquires have 
better ROA, net profit margin and IRS, although not significant. Acquiring banks may have 
relatively lower non-interest income than acquired banks. The negative difference in asset 
utilisation could be due to the fact that acquiring banks are much larger that targets. An 
important remark here is that acquiring banks have lower profitability than other banks that do 
not engage in acquisitions. This is shown by the lower profitability than the sector mean (-3.01 
for ROE and -0.11 for ROA). The interpretation for this could be the following explanation. 
72 This is consistent with the findings of Rose (1987) on US banks. He found that ｡｣ｱｵｾｲ｣､＠ banks reported 
significantly lower ROE and ROA than comparable non-acquired banks. Moreover, acqUired banb reported 
lower equity ratios. 
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Banks that have low profitability, hope that an acquisition of anoth b nk 
er a may create new 
investment opportunities for them and therefore this may enh th . fi' . . 
, ance elr pro ltablht\'. ThlS 
theory could be supported by looking at another ratio: the non-interest income-to-total ;evenue 
ratio. We notice that acquiring banks have lower non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio 
than the sector mean (by 0.33), whereas acquired bank have higher ratio than the sector mean 
(by 5.90). So acquiring banks may see this fact as an opportunity to benefit from the targets' 
ability to generate income from the non-traditional banking activities, in order to diversify 
their income. 
For efficiency indicators, target banks are significantly less efficient. Firstly, their cost-
to-income ratio, their cost-to-average asset ratio and staff expense-to-average asset ratio are 
higher by 30.80%, 2.24% and 1.40% respectively than acquiring banks, and all are significant 
at the 1 % level. Regarding the last ratio (staff expense-to-average asset ratio), acquiring banks 
may see this fact and consider redundancies as an opportunity for cost saving. In addition, 
acquirers have 7.18% lower interest paid-to-interest received ratios, which is significant at the 
10% level. Both categories have similar overhead efficiency. 73 
The capital adequacy ratios are better for acqUlnng banks than acquired ones. 74 
Although the differences for the first two indicators are not significant, the loan-to-equity ratio 
73 The performance differences between merging banks could represent a motive for the acquirer as explained 
before. Moreover, this difference affects the outcome of the merger and the post-merger performance of the 
merged entity. For instance, Peristiani (1997) argues that the relative performance of targets and acquirers plays a 
significant role in the post-merger performance and that the difference between acquirers and targets is 
particularly important in post-merger profitability and operating expenses. His empirical results show that 
acquiring banks realise higher gains in profitability, scale efficiency, and operating costs when they absorb under-
performing targets, which suggests that mergers are more beneficial to acquiring banks when the performance 
gap between targets and acquirers is wide. 
74 The issue of capital adequacy - for both bidder and target - in bank mergers is a crucial issue and it affects 
every aspect in it, including the method of payment and the premium paid. Therefore, the difference in 
capitalisation between the bidder and the target does not only motivate (and trigger) the acquisition but it plays an 
important role in the method of payment and the premium paid to the target's shareholders. For instance, Grullon 
et al. (1997) show that the most important factors that influence the payment medium are the relative size of the 
merging banks and capital adequacy of the acquirer. Their empirical results show that the smaller the acquircr 
relative to the target bank and the higher the acquirer's capital adequacy ratio, the more likely it is that the 
acquisition will be financed by a stock swap. Shawky et al. (1996) examined the merger premium paid for a 
sample of US bank acquisitions and focus - among other variables - on bidders' and targets' characteristics. 
They found that bank merger premiums were higher for (1) smaller target size, (2) targets with higher ROE, (3) 
targets in different state than the bidder, (4) transactions carried out through exchange of stock as opposed to a 
cash purchase, and (5) targets with higher leverage. 
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is less by 36.370/0 and the deposit-to-equity ratio is less by 19.93%, and both are significant at 
the 10% level. This shows that acquiring banks are better capitalised than their targets. 
Moreover, acquiring banks - in general - are better capitalised than all other banks. This is 
shown by the positive difference between the equity-to-asset ratio (3.45) and the equity-to-
risky asset ratio (22.55). 670/0 of those banks have higher equity-to-asset ratio than the sector 
mean and 63%) of them have higher equity-to-risky asset ratio than the sector mean. 
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Table 4.5: C [theM d the S d· d f4 f4 dA . d Bank 
-iii ＭＭｾＭＭＭＭ - -- ---_ .... -I - - - - iii -- Ii -iii -- - . ｾ＠
Bank Means Sector-adjusted means 
Performance measures % 0/0 Difference Acquirers Acquired Acquirers positive Acquired positive 
Profitability 
ROE 17.22 (13.82) 3.6313 7 .65) -3.01 (13.60) 46 -15.70 (35.86) 15 12.69** 
ROA 1.02 (0.73) 0.1715.751 -0.11 (0.64) 38 -0.95 (5.74t 14 0.85 
NPM 24.46 (18.22) -23.53 (122.461 -4.71 (16.53} 33 -53.04 iI23.98)_ 24 48.33 
Asset utilisation 4.16 (1.26) 5.43 (5.07) 0.33(1.13) 63 1.60 (4.87) 67 -1.26* 
IRS 3.17 (1.01) 2.82 (2.68) 0.25 (0.92) 58 -0.09 (2.69) 45 0.34 
Non-interest income-to-total 23.29 (I 1.73) 29.68 (96.32) -0.33 (11.60) 
I revenue 
42 5.90 (96.16) 57 -6.23 
Efficiency 
Cost-to-income ratio 70.00 (21.05) 100.68 (61.35) 7.27 (19.64) 67 38.07 J62.11) 76 -30.80*** 
Cost-to-average assets ratio 2.67 (1.19) 4.91 (4.35) 0.51 (1.11) 54 2.74 (4.27) 95 -2.24*** 
Staff expenses-to-average 1.47 (0.71) 2.87 (3.00) 0.28 (0.69) 67 1.68 (2.95) 86 -1.40*** 
assets ratio 
Overhead efficiency 41.47 (20.76) 56.58 i 116.881 -3.60120.40) 29 11.29 (116.47) 33 -14.88 
Interest paid to interest 66.74 (15.69) 74.05 (24.46) -5.17 (15.51) 42 2.00 (24.61) 52 -7.18* 
received 
Capital adequacy 
Equity-to-asset ratio 9.22 (14.10) 5.01 (33.26) 3.45 (14.19) 67 -1.26 (33.24) 55 4.72 
Equity-to-risky asset ratio 31.61 (99.201 18.54 (99.46) 22.55 (l01.53J 63 6.51 f99.32J 41 16.04 
Loan-to-equity ratio 4.98 (3.57) 41.20 (152.85) -0.34(3.18) 33 36.03 (151.32) 59 -36.37* 
Deposit-to-equity ratio 14.61 (11.26) 33.99 (100.09) 0.04 (8.56) 42 19.97 (94.70) 45 -19.93* 
Credit risk 
Bad debts & provisions-to- 1.05 (1.38) 1.13 (1.67) -0.05 (1.17) 42 0.07 (1.82) 41 -0.12 gross loans ratio 
Provisions for doubtful loans- 13.39 (14.47) 126.39 (382.63) 0.43 ( 13.50) 33 113.78 (380.14) 55 -113.36** to gross loans 
Liquidif}' risk 
LiqUid assets-to-total assets 67.99 (9.39) 53.32 (15.77) 3.72 (9.63) 71 -10.87 (15.78) 18 14.59*** 
ratio 
ｉｾ｡ｮＭ ｴｬＲＭ､｣ｰｾＲＮｳ＠ i t ratio 32.57 ( I I .41) 52.37 (36.28) -4.91 (11.30) 21 14.63 (37.40) 73 -19.54*** 
Grind" 
-------
;\,,'-,L'h 3 I .22131.30) 25. I3 (47.76) 9.12 (29.26) 71 2.69 (48.87) 36 6.44 
-------
124.Rl (443.22) 98.54 (450.921 -13.64 (76.71) I ｾｬｊｬｴ［｟＠ 23.50 (81.42) 71 40 112.18** 
-
- --- ---- ----- -
24.75 (24.06) 23.21 (56.651 3.21 i21.531 Ikl1ll'-,lh 58 1.52 (58.59) 36 I.(ll) 
-
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-Loans 19.88 (35.29) 19.34 {41.40) -4.23 (34.29) 58 -4.60 (41.60) 32 0.37 
Market Share 
Assets 3.61 (2.74) 0.54iO.57) 3.07*** 
ｄｾｯｳｩｴｳ＠ 3.62 (2.75) 0.54 (0.58) 3.08*** 
Loans 3.29 (2.471 0.64 (0.67) 2.64*** 
Assets ($ million) 1,211.877 188.394 1,020.290*** (1,159.096) (225.448) 
Notes: 
For a sample of 25 bank mergers occurred between 1994 and 2002 we estimate the differences of pre-merger average performance measures of acquiring and acquired 
banks. To test the significance of the differences we compare the test-statistic z = (Xl - Xz )/ ｾ＠ s; / nl + si / nz ' to the critical z* of the three standard levels of 
significance (1 %, 5% and 10%). X is the average performance measure of all acquiring/acquired banks, S z is the variance of performance measure of all 
acquiring/acquired banks and n is the number of observations. 
ROE is the after tax net income-to-average equity ratio; ROA is the after tax net income-to-average asset ratio; NPM is the after tax net income-to-total revenue ratio; 
Asset Utilisation is the total revenue-to-average asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; Overhead Ratio is the non-interest income-to-general 
operating expenses ratio; AssetiEquity/DepositILoan growth is the year-to-year (percentage) growth; Asset/DepositiLoan market share is the average of all 
acquiring/acquired banks assets/deposits/loans divided by total sector banking assets/deposits/loans; the other ratios are exactly as written. 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
% positive is the proportion of banks in the sample that have performance measures above the sector mean. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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Regarding the credit risk, it is obvious that acquiring banks are much better in 
controlling their portfolio quality than acquired banks. The second ratio shows a difference of 
113.36% and significant at the 5% level. The liquidity risk measures employed show a strong 
capability of classifying bidders and targets. Bidders have significantly higher liquidity than 
targets. The liquid assets-to-total asset ratio is higher for bidders by 14.59% and significant at 
the 1 % level, and the loan-to-deposit ratio is less for bidder by 19.54% and also significant at 
the 1 % level. Additionally, we notice that even compared to other banks, acquirers have 
higher liquidity shown by the positive difference between acquires mean and the sector mean 
(3.72%). These findings may give support to the cash-rich bidder theory, which suggests that 
bidder use their free cash to acquire other firms. 
For growth, we find that acquiring banks' equity grow more than acquired banks. The 
difference is 112.18% and significant and the 5% level. The other three indicators do not show 
significant differences. 
Finally, regarding the size of the acqUlrers and the targets, there is a significant 
difference between the two categories. The size of the acquiring banks and their market share 
is much larger than those of acquired banks. Therefore, it seems that (in general) larger banks 
target smaller banks and do not target banks from similar size. The difference in assets market 
share, deposits market share and loans market share are 3.07%, 3.08% and 2.64% and all are 
significant at the 1 % level. Additionally, the difference in size is significant at the 1 % level. 
The above analysis shows us the characteristics of acquiring and acquired banks. The 
general conclusion is that acquiring banks are more profitable and more efficient than their 
target. Moreover, the riskiness of the bidders is significantly less than acquired banks. Thus, 
banks with good performance target poorly performing banks because they see an opportunity 
of benefiting from the target by restructuring it and improving its perfonnance. All the above 
findings give support to H 1. 
188 
4.7.1.2 The Logit Model Results 
In the prevIOUS section, we have analysed the differences between acquiring and 
acquired banks during the last three years pre-merger using the sector-adjusted mean-
difference between the two categories. In this section will use another technique to detect the 
difference between the two groups of banks one year pre-merger. This additional analysis will 
clarify more the different characteristics of acquiring and acquired banks with focus on 
acquired banks and their perfonnance and efficiency. 
We present several different models to avoid any multicoliniearity among the 
regressors. Besides, we include in each model the minimum possible number of variables to 
minimise the loss of degrees of freedom, due to the small size of the data set. The empirical 
findings are presented in Table 4.6. In general, the results reported in Table 4.6 are consistent 
with those in Table 4.5, with few differences. Firstly, the difference in profitability between 
the two groups of banks is obvious and ROE and NPM show a significant superiority for 
acquiring banks one year pre-merger at the 5% and 1 % level successively. Note that NPM did 
not capture a significant effect for the three year-average in Table 4.5, which may suggests 
that the profitability of acquired banks deteriorates significantly before the acquisitions, which 
may represent a motive for the target shareholders to accept an acquisition offer. Another 
remark is that acquired banks have higher non-interest income relative to total revenue than 
acquiring banks, which is significant at the 5% level. This may represent a motive for 
acquiring banks to target banks with diversified income. 
All the efficiency indicators show that one year prior to merger, acquired banks have 
(on average) poor perfonnance. Cost-to-income ratio and cost-to-average asset ratio are 
significantly higher for acquired banks, at the 10% and 5% level successively. MorcO\er, the 
interest paid-to-interest received ratio shows that acquiring banks have better ability in 
controlling their spreads than target banks. 
Regarding the adequacy of merged banks, acquiring banks report significantly highcr 
equity-to-asset ratio significant at the 5% level and higher equity-to-risky assct ratio 
189 
significant at the 1 % level. Additionally, the loan to equity ratio shows a significant difference 
at the 1 % level. Thus, the three indicators implemented confirm that acquired banks ha\'e poor 
capital adequacy compared to acquiring banks one year prior to the merger. 
Table 4.6: Regression Estimates for the Characteristic Differences between Acquiring 
dA . dB nk an cc Ulre a s 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 
-0.50 (-0.51) 1.99*** (2.79) 2.44*** (3.43) 
-1.16(-1.50) ROE 0.04** (2.14) 0.01 (1.50) ROA 0.17 (0.47) 
NPM 0.07*** (3.16) 
AU 
-1.01 (-1.35) 
IRS 0.37 (0.37) 
-1.12 (-1.45) 
NNI-to-total revenue 
-0.03** (-2.07) 
CI 
-0.03* (-1.67) 
CA 
-0.75*** (-2.72) 
Interest paid-to-interest 
-0.22 * * (-2. 1 5) 
received 
Equity-to-asset ratio 0.04** (2.07) 
Eguity-to-risky asset ratio 0.10*** (2.86) 
Loan-to-equity ratio 
-0.58*** (-2.82) 0.43*** (-2.79) 
Bad debts-to-gross loan ratio 
-0.51 *** (-2. 72) 0.18 (0.81) 
Provisions-to-gross loan ratio 
-0.01 (-0.33) 
-0.03*** (-3.04) 
Liquid asset-to-total asset ratio 0.28*** (2.98) 
Asset growth 0.04 (1.07) 
Equity growth 0.02** (2.54) 
ｄｾｯｳｩｴ＠ growth 
-0.004 (-1.20) 
Loan growth 
-0.001 (-0.03) 0.002 (0.18) 
Size 0.003*** (3.19) 0.003*** (3.61) 
McFaddenR-squared 0.6537 0.5469 0.5307 0.4525 
Likelihood ratio 40.4166 33.8186 31.9411 27.2350 
Prob(LR stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations with Dep = 0 23 23 23 23 
Observations with Dep = 1 25 25 25 25 
Total observations 48 48 48 48 
Notes: 
All regressions are estimated with the Logit model. For a sample of 25 bank mergers occurred between 1994 and 
2002 we estimate the differences of pre-merger characteristics of acquiring and acquired banks. 
ROE is the after tax net income-to-average equity ratio; ROA is the after tax net income-to-average asset ratio; 
NPM is the after tax net income-to-total revenue ratio; AU is the total revenue-to-average asset ratio; IRS is the net 
interest margin-to-average asset ratio; CI is the cost-to-income ratio; CA is the cost-to-average asset ratio; 
Asset/Equity/DepositiLoan growth is the year-to-year (percentage) growth; Size is the total assets; the other ratios 
are exactly as written. 
I-statistics in parentheses, are reported based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error. 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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Credit risk indicators show ability to classify merged banks and the differences are 
significant at the 1 % level. Acquired banks report poor loan quality before the acquisition, 
which deteriorates their profitability and capital adequacy consequently as reported above. 
Again, the difference in liquidity between the two groups of banks, which is significant at 1 %, 
may give support to the theory of cash-rich acquirers. 
Regarding the growth indicators, the difference is only clear in equity growth. Finally, 
the difference in size is very obvious. Acquiring banks are significantly larger (at the 1 % 
level) than their targets, maybe because it is easier to absorb and integrate smaller entities. 
Again, these findings overall give additional support to HI. 
4.7.2 The Changes in Corporate Performance Associated With Mergers 
In this section we analyse the effect of the merger on the banks' performance. The 
acquisition could affect the profitability, the efficiency, the riskiness or the growth of banks. 
We have cited in the review of the literature that the objectives of mergers are to achieve any 
of these targets. In the following, we will detect the changes in the performance measures of 
banks post-mergers. The empirical results are reported in Table 4.7. 
In the first two columns we report the averages of all banks during the last three years 
before the merger and the three years after. We notice that there are differences between the 
reported figures. However, these differences could be again affected by firm-specific 
influences and/or industry-wide trends. To avoid this matter, we compare the pre-merger 
sector-adjusted measures and the post-merger sector-adjusted measures. The results are 
reported in the last five columns of Table 4.7. The fourth and the sixth columns show the 
proportion of banks that have higher measures than the sector mean. The differences (and their 
significance) are reported in the last column. 
Firstly, regarding the effect of mergers on the profitability of the involved banks, we 
notice that - indeed - it has improved post-merger. The sector-adjusted ROE has improved by 
11.89% and is significant at the 5% level. Additionally, the sector-adjusted ROA and net profit 
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margin have improved by 0.35% and 13.46% respectively, and both are significant at the 10% 
level. The other three measures do not show a significant change. Thus, we can claim that the 
merger has enhanced banks' profitability and this gives support to H3. A remark emerges is 
that the non-interest income of merged banks has increased post-merger. We notice that pre-
merger, the consolidated entity had higher ratio than the sector mean by 3.03%, and the ratio 
of the acquiring banks post-merger became 6.96%. Which means that acquiring banks benefit 
from their targets to diversify their income towards non-traditional banking activities. 
Second, regarding the effect of mergers on the efficiency of merged banks, it is 
obvious that they have a significant constructive effect. We see a significant reduction in the 
first three ratios. The cost-to-income ratio decreased by 22.62% and the cost-to-average assets 
ratio decreased by 0.39% and both are significant at the 10% level. The staff expenses-to-
average assets ratio decreased by 0.30% and is significant at the 5% level. The main source of 
cost reduction maybe the redundancies following the mergers. This gives additional support to 
H3. 
For capital adequacy, the enhancements are not significant. There is a (weak) positive 
improvement in the capitalisation of merged banks. Note that compared to the sector, the 
consolidated entity had lower equity-to-asset ratio by 1 % and lower equity-to- risky asset ratio 
by 0.42%. These two ratios had improved post-merger where the first ratio had became only 
0.12% less than the sector mean and the second ratio became higher the sector mean by 
0.04%. 
On the other hand, we notice that the credit risk has increased and the quality of the 
new entity's loan portfolio has deteriorated post-merger. The bad debts and provisions-to-
gross loans ratio has increase by 0.90% and is significant at the 10% level. This may be due to 
the fact that acquiring banks had targeted banks with higher credit risk and consequently they 
had to increase provisions for the target's (stressed) borrowers. Thus, absorbing the loan 
portfolios has forced acquiring banks to increase their provisions for bad debts. Besides, we 
notice that only 43% of the consolidated entities had provisions for doubtful loans-to-gross 
loans ratio higher than the sector average, whereas 65% of the merged banks have higher ratio 
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post-merger. Regarding the liquidity risk, we see an improvement. The loan-to-deposit ratio 
has decreased by 3.14% and is significant at the 10% level. Additionally, compared to the 
entire banking sector, there is also an improvement in merging banks liquidity. Overall, there 
is an improvement in the riskiness of the merged firms and this gives support to H3. 
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Table 4.7: Ch i] fPeru - M -- - P - i] 
Bank means Sector-adjusted means 
Performance measures % % Difference Pre-merger Post-merger Pre-merger positive Post-merger positive 
Profitability 
ROE 10.25 (30.06) 10.73 (27.06) -8.99 (29.51) 53 2.90 (17.92) 62 11.89** 
I ROA 0.76 (1.66) 0.16 (2.33) -0.36 (1.63) 35 -0.01 (0.48) 45 0.35* 
Net profit margin 27.66 (93.45) 11.22 (75.71) -14.67 (36.80) 40 -1.21 (12.91) 50 13.46* 
Asset utilisation 4.09 (1.59) 3.08 (1.10) 0.28 (1.52) 65 0.13 (0.64) 65 -0.15 
IRS 2.92 (0.76) 2.34 (1.02) 0.03 (0.68) 45 0.13 (0.64) 50 0.10 
Non-interest income-to-total 23.89 (27.60) 30.56 (42.01) 3.03 (17.39) 40 6.96 (44.11) 50 3.93 
revenue 
Efficiency 
Cost-to-income ratio 83.52 (88.25) 73.91 (36.65) 25.24 (86.34) 55 2.62 (15.80) 57 -22.62* 
Cost-to-average assets ratio 2.80 (1.52) 2.32 (1.30) 0.64 (1.49) 55 0.26 (0.65) 55 -0.39* 
Staff expenses-to-average 1.61 (1.04) 1.11 (0.44) 0.43 (1.01) 55 0.13 (0.36) 52 -0.30** 
assets ratio 
Overhead efficiency 43.44 (16.56) 41.30 (14.63) -1.90 (16.54) 30 -3.84 (13.09) 30 -1.94 
Interest paid to interest 73.10 (5.54) 73.68 (9.09) 0.98 (5.30) 56 0.77 (7.55) 29 -0.21 
received 
Capital adequacy I 
Equity-to-asset ratio 5.26 (8.96) 6.23 (3.51) -1.00 (8.96) 57 -0.12 (3.38) 45 0.88 I 
Equity-to-risky asset ratio 11.60 (18.68) 13.23 J7.121 -0.42 (18.57) 57 0.04 (6.92) 55 0.46 
Loan-to-equity ratio 6.03 (3.38) 4.54 (2.28) 0.85 (2.37) 52 0.44 (2.41) 48 -0.41 
Deposit-to-equity ratio 15.13 (7.63) 14.63 (7.85) 1.05 (5.94) 48 2.34 (8.19) 45 1.30 
Credit risk 
Bad debts & provisions-to- 1.15 (1.26) 1.92 (3.41) 0.10 (1.13) 48 0.99 (3.42) 50 0.90* 
. gross loans ratio 
Provisions for doubtful 10ans- 19.43 (26.01) 31.71 (12.28) 6.75 (25.10) 
to gross loans 
43 14.37 (40.04) 65 7.62 
Liquidity risk 
Liquid assets-to-total assets 63.57 (6.47) 67.84 (8.00) -0.67 (5.72) 62 0.12 (6.96) 70 0.79 
ratio 
Loan-to-deposit ratio 38.58 (11.01) 31.30 (8.40) 0.94 (0.95) 43 -2.20 (7.73) 25 -3.14* 
Growth 
Assets 29.40 (22.80) 19.82 (19.32) 7.39 (19.91) 85 6.61118.93) 71 -o.n 
Equity 52.19 (74.42) 9.09 J59.60) 14.99 (70.98) 70 -5.13 (62.44) 4X -20.12* 
Deoosits 27.31 (17.74) 20.10 (20}9J L. 5.96 (15.44) 80 7.13 (20.58) 57 1.1 X 
------
194 
Loans 28.48 (22.76) 12.15 (19.59) 5.16 (17.88) 75 5.56 (16.19) 57 0.40 
Market Share 
Assets 3.76 (2.55) 4.35 (2.72) 0.59 
Deposits 3.77 (2.561 4.28 (2.68) 0.50 
Loans 3.44 (2.281 3.96 (2.52) 052 
Notes: 
For a sample of25 bank mergers occurred between 1994 and 2002 we estimate the differences of pre-merger and post-merger average performance measures of 
the consolidated entities. To test the significance of the differences we compare the test-statistic z = (Xl - X2 )/ ｾ＠ ｳｾ＠ / n1 + S; / n2 ' to the critical z* of the 
three standard levels of significance (1 %, 5% and 10%). X is the average pre-merger/post-merger performance measure, S 2 is the variance of pre-merger/post-
merger performance measure and n is the number of observations. 
ROE is the after tax net income-to-average equity ratio; ROA is the after tax net income-to-average asset ratio; NPM is the after tax net income-to-total revenue 
ratio; Asset Utilisation is the total revenue-to-average asset ratio; IRS is the net interest margin-to-average asset ratio; Overhead Ratio is the non-interest income-
to-general operating expenses ratio; AssetiEquity/DepositiLoan growth is the year-to-year (percentage) growth; Asset/DepositILoan market share is the average 
of pre-merger/ post-merger consolidated entities' assets/deposits/loans divided by total sector banking assets/deposits/loans; the other ratios are exactly as written. 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
% positive is the proportion of banks in the sample that have performance measures above the sector mean. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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An interesting remark is that banks do not achieve growth after the merger. Regarding 
assets, deposits and loans, there is no significant difference between the pre- and the post-
merger growth. Whereas for equity, the difference is negative and significant at the 10% level, 
showing that merger affects negatively the equity growth. Therefore, it could be argued that 
the merger does not generate a growth, and may in fact decelerate it. This gives opposite 
evidence against H2, which suggested that banks achieve growth through mergers. 
Consistently, we notice that the changes in merging banks market shares are not significant. 
This may suggests that the expansion in acquiring banks' market share is only the additional 
share of the target, and post-merger there is no significant expansion in the market share. 
4.8 Conclusion 
We have analysed the bank mergers experience in Lebanon in this chapter. Between 
1994 and 2002, 25 bank merger operations occurred. Firstly, we have compared the 
characteristics of acquiring and acquired using two techniques. The first technique was 
comparing the average performance of the two groups of banks, and the second technique 
based on implementing a Logit Model. Both techniques show a significant differences 
between the two categories, where acquiring banks have been larger, more profitable and more 
efficient, and have better capability in risk management. This suggests that large and efficient 
banks target small and inefficient banks because they represent potential cases for 
performance improvement and cost cut on one hand and because they are easy to be 
"absorbed" and integrated on the other. 
Secondly, we have compared the performance measures of merged banks pre- and 
post-merger in order to detect the benefit of merger. We have found that - on average - the 
merger operations under study show a significant enhancement in profitability, efficient and 
liquidity risk. Conversely, the credit risk deteriorates and growth decelerates post-merger. 
Finally, we have an interesting remark regarding the effect of banks mergers on 
concentration. The literature has linked theoretically bank M&As and concentration, howcvcr. 
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there is no empirical evidence for this. In our case study (Lebanon) we have noticed that the 
wave of consolidations that have eliminated about 35% of the banks has increased the 
concentration (top 5 banks assets) from 36.35% at the end of 1994 to 43.87% at the end of 
2003. Besides the top 10 banks assets has increased from 60.87% to 66.83% during the same 
period. In fact, this increase in concentration was not considerable and the effect of the merger 
wave was limited by the openness of the Lebanese banking system to the entry of foreign 
banks. 
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Appendix 4.A: Summary of the Cited Empirical Studies 
-
Study Market Period ｓ｡ｭｾｬ･＠ Findings 
Allen and U.S. 1980-1987 
- The most entrenched managers pursue the most active acquisition policy, while 
Cebenoyan (1991) the least entrenched managers undertake the fewest acquisitions 
- Bidders stock returns depend upon whether on the insider stake and/or 
shareholder concentration. 
- The most entrenched managers are more likely to use cash to finance 
acquisitions, whilst the least entrenched managers are most like!y to use stocks 
Avkiran (1999) Australia 1986-1995 23 banks - Relative efficiency can be an indicator of likelihood of bank failure or becoming 
a target 
Baradwaj et al. u.S. 1980-1987 24 targets and 23 acquiring - Target banks of hostile bids reported positive and significant CARs 
(1990) banks - Bidders reported negative CARs 
- Hostile bidders reported more negative CARs than non-hostile bidders 
Cakici et al. U.S. 1983-1992 112 bank acquisitions - Positive and significant CARs for foreign acquiring firms 
11996) - Bidder CARs are inversely related to relative size 
Chamberlain U.S 1981-1987 50 acquiring and 180 - An improvement in net interest margin, and reduce in premises and salaries 
( 1998) acquired banks expenses. 
- An increase in non-interest expenses 
- Large acquisitions are associated with improved operating performance, whereas 
small acquisitions are not 
Cornett and u.S. 1982-1987 15 large interstate and 15 - Insignificant increase in ROA and significant increase in ROE 
Tahranian (1992) large intrastate bank - Insignificant increase in capital adequacy 
mergers - Insignificant improvement in credit risk, liquidity risk and interest-rate risk 
- Insignificant improvement in efficiency 
- A significant positive correlation between stock returns and performance 
improvement 
Corvoisier and OECD 1991-1999 246 Herfindahl - For loans, a higher margin of 100-200 basis points 
Gropp (2002) index/interest margins pairs - For deposits, a lower margin of 100-200 basis points 
Cybo-Ottone and 14 European 1988-1997 72 bank acquisitions - A positive and significant positive abnormal returns at the time of deal's 
Murgia (2000) markets announcement. 
- Positive abnormal returns for the following transactions: commercial banks, 
focused transactions, combinations with Insurance compames, domestic 
transactions, small deals. 
I [art and Apilado U.S. 1994-1997 158 bank mergers - Acquirers reported negative insignificant CARs 
(2002) - Targets reported positive CARs 
- A positive (insignificant) correlation between profitability improvements and 
stock returns 
- Significant improvement in ROA after the merger 
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Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994) 
Ely and Song 
(2000) 
Eun et al. (1996) 
Focarelli and 
Pozzolo (2001) 
Focarelli et al. 
(2002) 
Gelos and Roldos 
(2004) 
Gilligan and 
Smirlock ( 1984) 
(jrullon et al 
( 1997) 
U.S. I 1985-1991 
US I 1989-1995 
U.S. I 1979-1990 
Italy I 1985-1996 
8 emerging I 1994-1999 
markets 
U.S. I 1973-178 
US I 1981-1990 
153 bank mergers 
60 banks with assets more 
than $5 billion 
225 foreign bank 
｡ｾｵｩｳｩｴｩｯｮｳ＠
253 banks 
636 banks 
146 bank mergers 
- Bidders tend to be more profitable than other banks 
- Bidders reported negative CARS 
- Targets reported positive CARS 
- In-market mergers report higher CARs 
- Stock payments results negative CARS 
- Bidders target underperforming firms 
- Corporate control resolves agency problem because current managers would be 
ｲｾｬ｡｣･､＠
- Negative CARs for acquirers but different across countries of acquirers 
- Positive CARs for U.S. taI"gets 
Cross-border acquisitions is positively correlated to: 
- Degree of trade openness 
- The size of the banking sector 
- The average national ROA 
Cross-border acquisitions is negatively correlated to: 
- The size of the stock market 
- The average rate of inflation 
Mergers 
- Drop in ROA and ROE 
- Drop in equity 
- Decrease in asset growth rate 
- Rise in labour and operating costs 
- Increase in the share of fee income 
- Drop of loans to small business 
Acquisitions 
- Decrease ROA for acquirers, increase for acquired 
- Improvement of credit risk for acquired bank 
- Drop in loans to small business 
- M&As did not increase the concentration 
- Banks with less than $25 million in deposits are characterised by increasing 
returns to scale. 
- Large banks are characterised by diseconomies of scale 
- The method of payment is determined by the relative size of merging banks and 
the capital adequacy of acquirer 
- The target's stock price reacts more favourably when (1) its capital ratio is low, 
(2) its size is smaller, (3) the bidder's profitability is higher, and (4) the bidder and 
the target are in the same state. 
- The bidder's stock price reacts more favourably when ( I) the method of payment 
l _______________ ｾ＠ ________ __ __ 1 I is cash rather than stock, (2) the premium paid to the target's shareholders is low, 
199 
and (3) the target is in the same state 
Hadlock et al. U.S. 1982-1992 84 bank acquisitions and - Banks with high level of management ownership are less likely to be acquired 
( 1999) matched sample of banks - A high rate of management turnover following a merger 
Kwan (2003) Hong Kong, 1992-1999 164 publicly held financial - Liquidity rises banks operating costs 
Indonesia, institutions 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore, 
South Korea 
and Thailand 
Madura and Wiant U.S. 1983-1987 152 bank acquisitions - Acquirers reported negative abnonnal returns following the merger 
119941 - Multiple acquirers rej)orted less negative abnonnal returns than single acquirers 
Peristiani (1997) US 1980-1990 4,900 bank mergers - In market mergers do not yield a significant perfonnance improvements 
- Banks that incur an increase in non-accrual loans suffer a substantial 
deterioration in post merger profitability 
- Acquiring banks realise higher gains in profitability, scale economies, and 
operating costs when they absorb under-perfonning targets. 
Pill off (1996) U.S. 1982-1991 48 bank mergers - Insignificant positive correlation between stock returns and perfonnance 
improvement 
Rhoades (1993) U.S. 1981-1986 898 bank mergers - Horizontal mergers do not result in efficiency gains 
- Rapidly growing finns tend to experience an increase in their total expense ratio 
after the merger 
- ａ｣ｾｵｩｲｩｮｋ＠ banks are more efficient than target banks 
Rose (1987) U.S. 1970-1980 138 acquired banks and 138 - Acquired banks have lower ROE and ROA than non-acquired banks. 
non-acquired banks - Acquired banks are more conservatively managed, they have higher government 
securities-to-total asset ratios and lower loan-to-asset ratios investments 
- Acquired banks ｲｾｯｲｴ･､＠ lower equity ratios 
Saunders et al. U.S. 1979-1985 38 bank holding companies - Stockholder controlled banks are more risky than managerially controlled banks 
( 1990) - Risk taking differences between stockholder and managerially controlled banks 
increase during periods of relative deregtllation 
Shaffer (1993) US 9 Qair banks -megamergers do not reduce costs 
Shawky et al. US 1982-1990 320 bank acquisitions - Merger premiums are higher for: (I) smaller size targets, (2) targets with higher 
( 1996) ROE, (3) targets with higher leverage, (4) targets in different state than the bidder, 
and (5) transactions carried out through exchange of stock as opposed to a cash 
purchase. 
Vennet (1996) EC 1988-1993 492 bank M&As Domestic acquisitions 
- Drop in ROA and ROE 
- Significant decrease in credit quality 
I Domestic mergers 
! 
- Insignificant increase in ROA and ROE i 
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Cross border acquisitions 
- Significant efficiency improvement for acquired banks 
Zhang (1997) U.S. 1980-1990 128 assisted acquisitions - Assisted acquirers reported higher CARs than non-assisted ones. 
and 387 unassisted - Repeated acquirers reported significant positive CARs, first time acquirers 
acquisitions reported insignificant CARs 
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Appendix 4.B: Calculation of Control Variables 
Ratio Description 
Profitability indicators 
ROE After tax net income divided by average equity 
ROA After tax net income divided by average assets 
Net profit margin After tax net income divided total revenue 
Asset utilisation Total revenue divided by average assets 
IRS Net interest margin divided by average assets 
Non-interest income-to-total revenue 
Efficiency indicators 
Cost-to-income ratio 
Cost-to-average asset ratio 
Staff expenses-to-average asset ratio 
Overhead efficiency Non-interest income divided by general operating expenses 
Interest paid-to-interest received 
Capital adequacy indicators 
Equity-to-asset ratio 
Equity-to-risky asset ratio 
Loan-to-equity ratio 
Deposit-to-equity ratio 
Credit risk indicators 
Bad debts and provisions-to-gross loan ratio 
Provisions for doubtful loan-to-gross loan ratio 
Liquidity risk indicators 
Liquid assets-to-total asset Cash and central bank + T -bills + marketable securities + deposits 
ratio with head office and branches and with the other banks divided by 
total assets 
Loan-to-deposit ratio 
Growth indicators 
Asset growth Year-to-year percentage growth 
Equity growth 
ｾ＠ -
Year-to-year percentage growth 
Deposit growth Year-to-year percentage growth 
Loan growth Year-to-year percentage growth 
Market share indicators 
Asset market share Bank assets divided by sector total assets 
Deposit market share Bank deposits divided by sector total assets 
Loan market share Bank loans divided by sector total assets 
SIZE Natural log of assets 
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5 Conclusion 
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This study has tackled three different aspects of banking in Lebanon. These three 
aspects were bank performance, bank capital and bank mergers. There is an extensive body of 
literature both theoretical and empirical on these issues, however, we found that some points 
had not been explored and we could add to the literature, or in fact fill some gaps in it, by 
finding answers to some questions we have proposed. We believe that our findings are useful 
for banks and for regulators. We employed the Lebanese banking system as a case study for 
our empirical analysis because we believe that its features and characteristics that have been 
explained and analysed in details previously, allow us to extract many lessons about banking 
in emerging markets. 
Our first subject/chapter was Bank Performance. We were interested in analysing the 
performance of domestic and foreign banks operating in an emerging market, their similarities 
and differences. As mentioned before, the literature showed that foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic banks, without explaining "what are" those domestic banks. We, based 
on some theories and some previous evidence, proposed several hypotheses that were subject 
to empirical investigation. In this chapter we used a panel data containing almost the entire 
population of banks operating in the Lebanese market between 1993 and 2003. Regarding the 
issue of bank performance, our results have extended the literature in many ways. Firstly, we 
showed that although they operate in the same market, domestic banks' and foreign banks' 
profitability is determined differently and factors that are important in shaping their 
profitability are different. We have focused here on the effect of macroeconomic factors and 
found that foreign banks are less affected by these factors than domestic banks. Second, we 
found that the efficiency superiority of foreign banks over domestic ones could be translated 
into better profitability - at least in an emerging market. Finally, we found that the subsidiaries 
of foreign banks were more profitable than domestic banks acquired by foreign 
205 
banks/investors, which may suggest that it is better for a foreign bank willing to enter a new 
market to establish a new subsidiarylbranch from scratch rather than acquiring an "existing 
player". This could be due to the fact that foreign banks/investors usually target 
underperforming banks hoping that they will turn it around for better; however, it seems that 
the acquired banks continue to perform poorly even in the long run. Finally, another new 
finding was the effect of institutional ownership on bank performance. Our empirical results 
show that the institutional ownership in banks has a constructive effect on their profitability 
and banks that have institutional investors enjoy higher profitability than other banks. 
In the second chapter (Bank Capital) we were interested in assessing the validity of 
some theories on bank capital that the literature has proposed. The aim was to test if regulators 
and banks can rely on these theories when analysing bank capital and its determinants. The 
literature argues that - among other issues - bank capital is determined by market forces more 
than regulation, that banks may use their capital to signal confidence, that banks adjust their 
capital according to the economic cycle etc. We studied a panel data set of almost all the 
Lebanese commercial banks between 1993 and 2003. Firstly, we found that these theories do 
hold and our results are similar (when the data set is taken entirely) to other studies. We 
assumed that some/all of these theories may not hold if we split the data set in different ways. 
We split the panel in two ways: (1) the cross sections according to ownership (domestic vs. 
foreign), and the time series, the period, according to the change in capital requirements. By 
doing this, we were able to obtain several empirical results that could extend the literature in 
many ways. Firstly, we found that the determinants of domestic bank capital are different from 
those of a foreign bank. Secondly, we found that the cyclicality theory does not hold in two 
cases: (a) foreign banks do not adjust their capital according to the economic cycle of the host 
country, and (b) when capital requirements become tighter, domestic bank capital loses its 
cyclicality. 75 Thirdly, regarding the theory of signalling, we found that it does not apply for 
foreign banks at all - at least in an emerging market - and these banks do not use their 
capitalisation level as a signal for confidence. 
75 In fact we found that it became counter-cycle. , 
206 
Another interesting finding in this chapter was the effect of institutional ownership in 
domestic banks on their capitalisation. We found that domestic banks that have institutional 
ownership were able to meet the new capital requirements implemented by the central bank 
more than other banks. This shows the importance of institutional ownership in the domestic 
banks of emerging markets and should represent a motive for banks to expand their 
shareholders base and allow/encourage institutional investors to invest in them. 
In the third chapter (Bank Mergers), we were motivated by assessing the experience of 
bank mergers in an emerging market. There is a large body of literature on bank merger in 
developed market that explains the motives of bank mergers and their outcome. By reviewing 
the literature on developed markets, we were able to understand why banks consolidate and 
the important role market forces play in this phenomenon. The market under study has 
witnessed the highest number of bank mergers among all the other emerging markets and thus, 
represented a good case study for bank mergers in emerging markets. We found that bank 
consolidations in this market were motivated (at least) by three objectives: (1) the 
encouragement of the bank supervisors (regulators) who believe that creating larger and 
healthier entities is more beneficial for the banking system and the national economy. (2) 
Larger and good performing banks target smaller and underperforming ones, assuming that 
they will be better run under their management. And (3) acquiring banks target banks that 
have higher non-interest income and non-traditional banking activities in order to benefit from 
them to diversify their income. The regulator played an important role in our case study by 
providing merging banks with incentives on one hand and by "pushing" banks to consolidate 
through several regulations, e.g. capital requirements, branch opening restrictions etc, on the 
other. The effect of regulatory assistance for merged banks may have a constructive effect, 
where the overall results of our case study show a significant improvement in the performance 
of merged banks. Finally, the literature has argued - theoretically - that increasing growth 
could be one motive behind mergers. However, there was no empirical support for it. We have 
investigated this issue empirically and tried to find a support for it. Our results contradict this 
theory and show that mergers do not necessary trigger growth and all that acquiring banks 
gain is the market share of the target bank. 
207 
Finally, it is important to mention that we have dropped the effect of acquisitions on 
domestic banks' performance from our analysis due to the limited number of these 
acquisitions, which implies a difficulty in testing the significance of the differences between 
the pre- and the post-acquisitions performance measures. However, we have covered this issue 
partially in the first and the second empirical chapters, where we have tested the profitability 
and the capitalisation of these banks. As mentioned in the above two sections we see that 
acquired banks do not realise higher ROE or ROA post-acquisition. Moreover, we have seen 
that they have lower equity-to-asset ratio than the other domestic banks. This difference, 
however, diminishes with tighter capital requirements. 
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